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INTRODUCTION 
The writings of Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) – American economist, teaching fellow 
at the University of Chicago, Stanford, Missouri, and at the New York School of 
Social Research and editor of the Journal of Political Economy – have recently 
enjoyed a renewed interest. It will be sufficient to recall that in 1998 the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics devoted a special issue to Veblen’s economics and that in 2003 
– thanks to Rick Tilman – about ninety essays on Veblen’s whole thought were 
collected. As regards his contribution to economics, scholars have mainly focused 
their attention on his methodology and on his theory of institutional changes. Less 
emphasis has been placed on his analysis of the determinants of unemployment and 
income distribution. 
The aim of this work it to provide a re-reading of Veblen’s economics with 
particular regard to these latter issues. In particular, the following main questions are 
in order: a) What are the main causes of unemployment according to Veblen’s works? 
b) How can the dynamics of income distribution affect economic growth and 
institutional changes?  
On the methodological plane this is a work of history of economic analysis, in 
accordance to the method suggested, amongst others, by Takashi Negishi who writes 
in his History of Economic Theory: “we hope we can find in the works of past 
economists clues to questions of present interest or theories and techniques of analysis 
that might be applied to modem problems”, while also accepting the vision of a 
“competitive” development of economic ideas as pointed out by Alessandro Roncaglia 
in his La Ricchezza delle Idee (2001).  
This book explores the idea that Veblen’s theoretical framework is based on 
the assumption that contemporary economies are credit economies and conflictual 
economies. Credit – managed, as will be shown, by the leisure class – is conceived as 
a means of capitalization, thus of expansion of firms aimed at monopolistic control of 
markets. Conflict involves two dimensions: a) on the microeconomic plane, that is to 
say within the firm, where undertakers and technicians have contrasting targets for the 
level of production (‘internal conflict’); b) on the macroeconomic plane, that is to say, 
within the social-political arena, where the behaviour of members of the leisure class – 
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aimed at consuming for the purpose of ostentation and competition  – can produce 
waste to the detriment of the underlying population (‘external conflict’).    
It will be argued that unemployment ultimately depends on the existence both 
of internal and external conflicts, due to the following mechanisms. In a context of 
conflictual economy the firm becomes a locus of conflict between undertakers and 
technicians. undertakers want to reduce production in order to maintain high prices 
and obtain high monetary profits, while technicians want to maintain a high production 
since production is the concrete form in which they show their skill, efficiency and 
knowledge. The internal conflict therefore derives from the “clash” between two 
tendentially incompatible instincts: the workmanship of technicians and the predation 
of undertakers. When predation defeats workmanship, unemployment occurs. In fact 
employment is a function of the degree of utilization of capital, which is reduced if the 
undertakers’ profit aim overcomes the technicians’ production aim.  This kind of 
unemployment can be called unemployment from internal conflict or from under 
utilization of capital. When the degree of capital utilization falls, both prices and 
profits increase; the increase in prices determines a reduction of real wages. The 
consequence is that the increase in the profit/wages ratio determines unemployment. 
Moreover, given the context of credit economy managed by the leisure class, the 
financial rent represents the main form of income for the leisure class. In particular the 
financial rent is assured via banking loans of by the acquisition of stocks and bonds. 
leisure class is considered here to be the class able to control the banking system and 
the financial market. Consequently it controls the interest rate in the monetary market 
and the quantity of stocks and bonds in the financial market. When the leisure class 
increases the level of its consumption – waste – the financial rent increases via the 
increase in the interest rate and the volume of stocks and bonds bought. This can 
generate two effects: a) when the financial rent increases, the leisure class increases 
demand for goods; this in turns generates increased investments, production and 
employment (Malthusian element of Veblen); b) at the same time financial rent is a 
financing cost for firms and when full employment is reached, there is an additional 
increase of rent, reduced profits, increased prices, reduced real wages. The reduction 
of profits combined with the reduction of the real wage determines a reduction in 
investment, production and employment; investments in fact are negatively affected by 
the high costs of financing and by the negative expectations on sales; expectations 
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decline since the reduction of real wages determines a reduction of demand. In both 
cases the increase of the rents/wages ratio has produced a reduction of investment and 
therefore a reduction of production and employment. This kind of unemployment can 
be called unemployment from external conflict, since it derives from the conflict in the 
distribution of income between social classes.   
The most important result is the following: the more unequal income 
distribution can be – both in terms of the profits/wages and the rents/wages ratio - the 
higher is the resulting unemployment level. Note also that, in Veblen’s view, income 
distribution does not reflect the marginal productivity of the inputs, but it originates in 
habits of thought.  
The rereading proposed here also suggests the idea that institutional change is 
mainly driven by the dynamics of income distribution. The key variable is assumed to 
be the limit of tolerance of workers and of the unemployed. The limit of tolerance for 
workers and unemployed is measurable as the maximum difference tolerated between 
the real wage received the maximum unemployment benefit received. Note that the 
limit of tolerance of workers and unemployed has the same origin. In fact the state of 
social discontent is a consequence of policies of reduction of production; the reduction 
of production not only determines an increase in unemployment but also in prices, 
which affects the workers’ real wage level. Both the workers and the unemployed can 
therefore feel the effects of the state of income distribution of the leisure class and 
when the limit is reached, social conflict occurs. When the “limit of tolerance” is 
reached a problem arises: How can the conflict have originated? There are two 
possibilities: a) the conflict  originated from economic motives, in other words on 
rational grounds, or b) the conflict originated from moral motives, in other words on 
irrational grounds. In Veblen the conflict does not have an economic basis but a moral 
one and this is due to one main consideration: the economic grounds of the conflict 
call for a rational calculus on the expected benefits and costs of conflict which the 
Veblenian agent in fact is not able to do since s/he has no information on benefits and 
s/he is not rational. Being non rational, Veblen looks at morality as the main basis on 
which workers and the unemployed enter into conflict. The violation of the limit of 
tolerance – as will be argued – is the basic determinant of social conflict  driven by 
morals. Social conflict, in turn, affects the habits of thought of the underlying 
population, in the sense that – via social conflict - they internalise critical attitudes 
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towards the existing social order and perceive waste as a non value (and, by contrast, 
efficiency as a value). Moreover, the social conflict determines institutional change but 
also economic growth. In fact social conflict pushes the system to distribute income 
more equally. In other words social conflict determines an increase of real wages; 
when real wages increase, total demand increases and undertakers are more inclined to 
increase the grade of utilization of capital by employing more workers.  
Furnishing a clear and precise interpretation of Veblen’s thought on the above 
topics is certainly not simple; the interpretative literature on the author knows this 
difficulty only too well. His peculiar writing style (ironic, satiric, literary) and his 
recurring polemical attitude make his writing interesting but often difficult to organize 
with the aim of furnishing a clear reconstruction of his thought and/or for the purpose 
of finding the internal consistency of his theories. As a consequence the topics 
presented in this work have been analysed through a preliminary study of Veblen’s 
thought in all its complexity, then in the attempt to order it following a logic that is 
functional to the rationalization of the topics of the present work. In particular the 
analysis of the Veblenian theory of unemployment requires a preliminary critical 
reconstruction of the features of social classes, their instincts and habits of thought, 
their order within a hypothetical Veblenian macroeconomic schema in which credit 
and social conflict structure the productive and distributive order. Moreover the 
analysis of the relation between income distribution and economic growth requires a 
preliminary critical reconstruction of economic categories of income, their features 
and their attribution to each social class. Finally the relationship between the 
distribution dynamic, institutional change and economic growth requires a preliminary 
reconstruction of Veblen’s theory of institutional change.  
 
Outline of the thesis 
 
The present work is organized as follows. Chapter one opens with the presentation of 
Veblen’s methodology and continues with the construction of the Veblenian 
macroeconomic system via description of the social order - formed by the leisure 
class, undertakers, technicians and the underlying population – of the theory of 
instincts and institutions and their attribution to social classes. These are the steps 
needed to get to the presentation of the Veblenian theory of unemployment from 
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internal conflict. Chapter two firstly presents a description of the circuit of income 
production within a credit economy and then a critical description of the economic 
categories of income (rents, profits and wages), their features and attribution to social 
classes. Particular emphasis will be given to the consumption of the leisure class, to 
the capital of undertakers and to the institutional base of the subsistence wage since 
social classes in fact make reference to these objects for quantifying their income and 
also for structuring their actions in order to maintain effective income in line with 
desired income. The description of economic categories of income and their 
distribution between social classes is followed by the description of the second topic of 
the present work: that is to say economic growth and the relationship between income 
distribution, economic growth and employment/unemployment from external conflict. 
Finally, Chapter Three firstly presents a reconstruction of the Veblenian theory of 
institutional change emphasising his historical description of the evolution of 
institutions and his ideas of the role of technicians and workers as regards the process 
of institutional changes. After the necessary presentation of the Veblenian theory of 
institutional change, an expansion of his ideas is presented and the relationship 
between the distribution dynamic and institutional dynamic will be shown.     
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C h a p t e r  I   
 
THE ECONOMICS OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN: INSTINCTS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS AND SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 
1.1 The economics of Thorstein Veblen: some methodological issues 
 
Thorstein Veblen’s contributions to economics are different and affect different 
planes. In fact he was interested in numerous economic phenomena: the motivations of 
economic behaviour, consumption, production, distribution, growth, development and 
the cycle, and his way of looking at such topics was unique, not only in the original 
theories he put forward but also in the starting point from which he tried to explain 
economic matters1. Veblen was an innovative economist first of all in his 
methodological approach to economics and then in his theories2 and as Sweezy (1957, 
p.112) writes: “[scholars of modern capitalism] will find more inspiration and 
guidance in [Veblen’s studies] than in all the rest of American social science put 
together”. The aim of this section is therefore to describe his contribution to economics 
from the methodological side before investigating the peculiarities of his theories3. For 
                                                   
1 Thorstein Veblen was born on 30 July 1857 on the family farm in Wisconsin from a family of 
Norwegian immigrants. Veblen attended the Carleton College Academy in Minnesota from 1874 to 
1877 where he studied under the economist John Bates Clark; there in 1877 he obtained his B.A. and 
then moved to Johns Hopkins University and  Yale where he obtained his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1884. 
Veblen went through a long period of unemployment from 1884 to 1891. It was not until 1892 that he 
found a job as teaching fellow at the University of Chicago, where he worked until 1904. From 1896 he 
was also managing editor of the Journal of Political Economy; however a scandal of marital infidelity 
made him resign from the University of Chicago and it was only in 1906 that he obtained a new job at 
the University of Stanford, living at Palo Alto in California. He remained there until 1909 when a new 
scandal forced him into a new resignation from the University of Stanford. He moved again in 1911 to 
the University of Missouri for a new job, then to Washington in 1917 and then in 1919 to New York 
where he taught at the New School for Social Research. In 1926 he came back to Palo Alto where he 
died on 3 August 1929 from heart disease. For additional biographic information see, amongst others, 
Bates (1934); Dorfman (1932a; 1934); Lerner (1948); White (1952); Dobriansky (1957); Fredrickson 
(1959); Vianello (1961); Del Grosso Destriei (1970); Edgell (2001).  
2 Gruchy (1958, pp.11-12) for example stresses that Veblen contributed to the development of economic 
theory in different respects: a) on the microeconomic plane “he was one of the first to make what we 
now call the administered price [and] he had enough of the essentials of economics of oligopoly”, b) on 
the macroeconomic plane “Veblen develops a rudimentary form of the nation’s economic accounts in 
which he offsets actual total national output or total supply with various consumption and investment 
items or components”.   
3 For a reconstruction of the style of writing see Dorfman (1932b), Conroy (1968); Horowitz (1980). On 
the Veblen’s theoretical and historical background see Dorfman (1958), Riesman (1953). For a 
reconstruction of Veblen’s ideology see Metzger (1949), Fusfeld (1973); Cassano (2005).  
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this purpose, two main methodological issues will be discussed in what follows, i.e. 
the Veblenian conception of economics as an evolutionary science and his view of 
economic phenomena as cumulative and indefinable causation phenomena.  
a) Economics as an evolutionary science. Veblen considers economics an 
evolutionary science. As the author himself remarks (Veblen, 1961 [1898c], p.77) 
“[economics] is a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in 
terms of the process itself”. So he sees economics as a theory on the nature, 
motivations, working and effects of intertemporal sequences of economic institutions, 
in brief, as a theory of “cultural sequence” on economic matters  (Veblen, 1961 
[1898c], p.77). In particular he defines economic institutions as:  
 
“Habitual methods of carrying on the life process of the community in contact with the material 
environment in which it lives” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.193).   
 
Two points can be made here. According to Veblen a) economic matters deal with the 
“material means of life” (Hobson, 1937, p.140), b) the meaning of economic matters 
changes with the changing of habits4. So if economics is seen as a science of economic 
institutions then the economic phenomenon is social. As Edgell (1975, p.267) 
convincingly remarks, Veblen “considers economic phenomena as a social phenomena 
and consequently [he recognizes] that each type of economic system presupposes a 
specific form of society”. In these terms, the economic phenomenon becomes a matter 
of social order, in other words of the peculiar structure and distribution of classes in 
the society. In addition, when he studies the economic phenomenon he uses a 
particular methodology known as cumulative causation approach (see, among others, 
Ginger, 1952; Argyrous and Sethi, 1996; Cutrona, 2003). Following this approach 
Veblen considers each economic phenomenon as a phenomenon whose current 
features are outcomes of the chain of institutions which move by a continuous shifting 
of past and current actions and opposing actions. In these terms the investigation of the 
direction of a given economic phenomenon and of its origin become the main aspects 
on which Veblen concentrates. Moreover he builds his economic theory on the basis of 
                                                   
4  However it is important to notice - although the intention of the present work is to investigate Veblen’s 
study of economic behaviour and others’ commentary on it  - that  “[Veblen] always  treated behaviour 
as a whole, not caring to mark off a narrow segment as strictly economic” (Mitchell, 1973 [1929], 
p.605).  
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two particular critiques of the neoclassical approach: a) the critique of its ‘taxonomic’ 
function and b) the critique of its philosophical source: “natural law”.    
a1) The taxonomic issue. Veblen criticises the neoclassical approach defining it 
as a “taxonomic science” (Veblen 1961 [1899c], p.82; see also Veblen, 1961 [1899d], 
1961 [1900]) that is to say as “essentially classificatory” theory (Edgell and Tilman, 
1989, p.1005; see also Tilman, 2003, p.xix). Veblen therefore opposes the traditional 
cataloguing of socio-economic variables – rents, interest, profits and wages – in terms 
of “fixed logical relations” (Davis, 1945, p.138) since - as clarified by Davis (1945, 
p.138; italics added) - “ [when he] defined social reality as a process continually 
changing [..] he implicitly reasoned that no genuine science could be founded on an 
assumption of fixed logical relations. No facts can legitimately be classified in 
permanent abstract categories because the facts are changing all the time”. When 
Davis stresses that “no facts can [..] be classified in permanent abstract categories” he 
is discussing another important aspect of Veblenian criticisms of neoclassical 
economics: The invalidity of natural law.  
a2) The rejection of the natural law view. A taxonomic science needs 
“immutable premises” on which it defines its features (Veblen, 1961 [1909a], p.236). 
Veblen argues that neoclassical economics makes reference to two particular 
“immutable conditions”: a) ownership and b) free contract which are assumed as given 
in the logic of natural rights. On this point Veblen remarks:   
 
“The order of nature [- natural rights-] is an order of things in which men [are] conceived to be 
effectually equal in all those respects that are of any decided consequence - in intelligence, working 
capacity, initiative, opportunity, and personal worth” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.36). 
 
Being natural rights “they are part of nature of things” and consequently “there is no 
need of accounting for them or inquiring into them” (Veblen, 1961 [1909a], p.236).  
So neoclassical economics – in Veblen’s vision – seems to attribute a sort of 
spirituality to nature (“animism”) whose ‘behaviour’ is not casual but has a design. 
Natural variables are taken as exogenous that is to say they are assumed as typical, 
normal and definitive for each individual (see Veblen, 1961 [1909a], p.236). An 
economics working on this line of thought is seen by Veblen as a “pre-Darwinian 
economics” (see Edgell, 2001, p.68) based on – according to Coats (1954, p.529) 
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“outmoded preconceptions” (Coats, 1954, p.531) – which must be rejected since it is a 
non-evolutionary science. As Veblen remarks: 
 
“To the pre-Darwinian [scientists] the centre of interest and attention [..] was the body of natural 
laws governing phenomena under the rule of causation. These natural laws were of the nature of 
rules of the game of causation. They formulated the immutable relations in which things ‘naturally’ 
stood to one another before causal disturbance took place between them, in orderly unfolding of the 
complement of causes involved in the transition of the interval of transient activity, and the settled 
relations that would supervene when the disturbance had passed and the transition from cause to 
effect had been consumed, - the emphasis falling on the consummation” (Veblen, 1961, [1909], 
p.37). 
 
On the other hand Veblen views economics in evolutionary terms, or rather as “post-
Darwinian economics” (see Edgell, 2001, p.68).  As he remarks: 
 
“The characteristic feature by which post-Darwinian science is contrasted with what went before is a 
new distribution of emphasis, whereby the process of causation, the interval of instability and 
transition between initial cause and definitive effect, has come to take the first place in the inquiry; 
instead of that consummation in which causal effect was one presumed to come to rest” (Veblen, 
1961 [1909a], p.37). 
 
In other words it could be argued that in Veblenian thought pre-Darwinian science is 
characterized by the process of description of effects while post-Darwinian science by 
the process of causation of effects. In these terms the role of economics changes, from 
the analysis of economic behaviours and their effects within a natural order of natural 
law to an analysis of causation and continuous changes – “self propagating and self 
continuing” changes (Veblen, 1964 [1919b], pp.36-37) – of social habitat and their 
impact on individual economic behaviours (see Edgell, 2001, p.68)5. On this point 
Hodgson (1998, p.419) remarks that Veblen rejects neoclassical economics since it 
does not “contain an evolutionary explanation of the origin of the assumed behavioural 
characteristics”; for example - Hodgson (1998, p.419) adds – in the neoclassical theory 
of consumption the explanation “on the origin and initial acquisition of [..] 
preferences” is completely absent [and] the assumption that individuals are selfish 
requires an explanation of the evolution of selfishness” (Hodgson, 1998, p.419; see 
                                                   
5 On Veblenian Darwinism see also Harris (1934), Hofstadter (1945), Murphree (1959), Dewey (1967), 
Sowell (1967), Russett (1976), Mayhew (1987), Edgell and Tilman (1991), Hodgson (1994).   
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also Tilman, 1999). Edgell (2001) tries to identify the conditions for which Veblen is 
certainly identifiable as a post-Darwinian. As he agues - Veblen’s economic theory 
incorporates some “key Darwinian elements [that is to say:] variability, struggle for 
existence and natural selection” (Edgell, 2001, p.69; italics added). More specifically, 
as remarked by Edgell and Tilman (1989), there are three key principles of Darwinian 
theory that affect Veblen’s theory: a) “species vary enormously”, b) “species tend to 
reproduce on a scale that precludes the survival of all but the fittest”, and c) “in the 
ensuing struggle for existence, the variations that are best adapted will survive” 
(Edgell and Tilman, 1989, p.1005; italics added). Such inspiring principles allow 
Veblen – as Tilman (2003, p.xviii) remarks – to build an economic theory as the 
“science of collective welfare” in other words as “a [science] of advancing the 
instrumental adaptive powers of the entire community to ceaseless change”. In 
addition Dugger (1979, p.426) remarks that the idea of “post-Darwinian economics” in 
Veblen’s thought can be seen as a Darwinian combination of the main schools of 
evolutive processes: a) “progressionism” and b) “uniformitarianism”. Let us look 
more closely at this point: as Eiseley (1958, p.353) argues, by progressionism “life has 
risen from simple to more complex forms throughout the successive eras of the 
geological past [while uniformitarianism states] that geological phenomena were the 
product of natural forces operating over enormous periods of time and with 
considerable [..] uniformity”. Following these concepts, Dugger (1979, p.426) remarks 
that just as Darwin supplied progressionism with the principle of natural selection – 
demanded by uniformitarianism – so Veblen supplies social progressionism with the 
principle of institutional change via social uniformitarianism. In fact inspired by 
Darwinian principles, Veblen would build his theory of institutional change (see ch. 3) 
in terms of cause and effect of the succession of great cultural eras substituting  – as 
remarked by Edgell and Tilman (1989, p.1005) – “the concept institution for Darwin’s 
reference to species”. In this sense Anderson writes: “the several [social eras described 
by Veblen] are admitted to be not sharply separated; they are supposed to be marked 
off only roughly according to certain characteristic features” (Anderson 1933, p.605; 
italics added).  
b) The indefinable causation approach. His studies of the origin of economic 
phenomena are based on a strong interdependence between micro and macro matters. 
With particular reference to his studies on human nature and behaviour Veblen writes: 
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“The individual is a creature of heredity and circumstances” (1922 [1914], p.139; 
italics added). In these terms Veblen sees human beings and their current behaviour as 
the outcome of traits and behaviours inherited from the past and of traits and current 
behaviours. Consequently current micro traits and behaviours are outcomes of current 
and past social traits and behaviours, just as current social traits and behaviours are 
outcomes of the past and current micro ones. As Hodgson (1998, p. 419) remarks, at 
the same time Veblen rejects “the proposition that the individual is exclusively a social 
[outcome]” or that s/he is completely exempt from social influences. So in Veblen a 
static and ‘natural’ vision on human nature does not exist and – it could be added – it 
is not necessary for it to exist insofar as economic behaviour is an institutional 
product, no ‘natural’ law being admitted. As Hodgson adds: “there is both upward and 
downward causation; individuals create and change institutions, just as institutions 
mould and constrain individuals” (in Davis et al., 2004, p.87)6. In opposition to 
Hodgson’s interpretation others point to the holistic nature of Veblen’s methodology 
as his distinctive trait as regards the methodological individualism of neoclassic 
economics. Bush (1999, p.134) maintains that Veblen’s methodology can be regarded 
as holistic, where holism is defined in the following terms: “A holistic methodology 
[..] rests upon the view that [..] facts can be derived from an analysis of socially 
prescribed patterns of correlated behaviour (i.e. institutions), which are both the 
determinants and consequences of individual behaviour in a complex, evolving 
relationship”7. Coats (1954, p.532) also looks at Veblen’s methodology in holistic 
terms since “Veblen’s [society] is a type of [society] in which the forces of heredity 
and environment are given primacy over human rationality”.  
b1) The critique of neoclassical hedonism. It is well known that neoclassical 
economics structures its theory assuming that after having collected information and 
elaborated it, all individuals rationally structure their own actions so as to have 
maximum pleasure (gains) or minimum pain (costs) – the ‘hedonistic’ aim – in a given 
                                                   
6 Veblenian human nature is in fact a mix of social and individualistic aspects where the predominance of 
one aspect rather than another one can be ‘obscure’ in its origin but not in its effects. For example – as 
will be shown more clearly below – while the origin of an instinctual is not particularly clear in Veblen, 
its effect instead is clear and significant, in particular on topics like institutional changes, economic 
growth and income distribution.  
7 On the other hand, the same author describes methodological individualism in the following terms: 
“Methodological individualism prescribes an atomistic view of society based on the premise that any 
meaningful proposition about social phenomena must be reducible to the logic of individual choice-
making” (Bush, 1999, p.133). 
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context which it is not necessary to investigate8. Contrary to such a vision, Veblen 
identifies two particular problems of sustainability of neoclassical ‘hedonism’: a) the 
oversimplification of the causes of action, b) the oversimplification of the 
environmental context. In fact Veblen is not mainly interested to making a critique of 
hedonism itself. Hedonism conceals an element on which he is in agreement since he 
too views human action in terms of action with a design. The matter on which Veblen 
focuses critically is the construction of human conduct by which human beings reach 
their aim. In other words the critical point of differentiation between the neoclassical 
school of that period and Veblen concerns the sense of intelligent conduct, in other 
words the sense and meaning of rationality. For neoclassical economics an intelligent 
choice coincides with a rational action. In particular a rational action must lead the 
individual to reach her/his ‘hedonistic’ aim by an objective, deliberate and exhaustive 
procedure which – starting from a perfect knowledge of the cause of an action, that is 
to say the sensations of pleasure and pain – involves an optimum certain or foreseeable 
effect. His studies on human behaviour instead raise two main questions: one 
connected to the cause of an action and the other to its effects. In other words  the 
sensation of pleasure and pain can be a cause of action but it is not the only one. Often 
instinctual behaviours find their foundations in causes that are different from pleasure 
or pain. Obviously if the cause is not simply identifiable as pleasure and pain then the 
effect of action cannot be simply the reduction of pain or the increase of pleasure. On 
the other hand the matter of environmental influence is expressly investigated by 
Veblen (1961 [1909a], pp.234-236). As Hobson (1937, p.140) remarks: “To present 
economic man as a rational being, calculating and regulating all his activities in terms 
of conscious costs and satisfactions, falsifies the actual situation, for it requires the 
suppression of facts and activities which intimately interfere with the hedonist 
calculus”. Tilman (2003, p.xiv) has recently argued that: “Veblen criticized the 
hedonistic [..] theory for portraying humans as passive agents reacting to external 
forces only when impinged upon”. So he is in agreement with the interpretation of 
Anderson (1933, p.601; see also Hobson, 1937, p.141) who identifies the neoclassical 
agent in Veblen as “a passive creature who reacts only to external stimuli in a 
mechanical sort of way”. Actually Veblen sees such an individual not as an agent. He 
                                                   
8 As known, Bentham (1969 [1780], p.86) identifies hedonism as “that property in any object, whereby it 
tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, happiness”. For a reconstruction of the literature on 
rationality in economics see amongst others Sacco and Zamagni (2002) and Davis, et al. (2004).   
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often calls her/him “absorbent” or “defective subject” (Veblen, 1898a, p.189). The 
idea of the neoclassical agent as a passive agent requires an explanation of the 
significance of external conditions for such an approach and a comparison with 
Veblen’s vision. In a hedonistic logic the external context is not an integral part of life 
for each individual and therefore of her/his choices. In other words, the external 
context is just a constraining context against which the individual reacts. It is not like 
the context in which the individual moves and acts for Veblen; in other words while 
hedonism is based on a logic of ‘reaction to’, where incentives/disincentives (in terms 
of the opportunity-cost of the action) are the sole forces which prompt reactions, 
Veblen stresses that economic behaviour rests on the ‘active propensities’, i.e. actions 
not (necessarily) driven by external stimulus. Moreover Veblen shows his own sense 
of rationality in a different manner. As Bush (1999, p.138) writes: “human beings are 
rational [for Veblen] in the degree to which they can evaluate their behaviour 
according to whether it enhances the life process taken impersonally”. In other words 
Veblen sees rationality in terms of critical evaluation of current institutions. Obviously 
such a sense of rationality is completely different from the neoclassical meaning and it 
is instrumental to institutional change (see ch.3). So according to Bush (1999, p.139) 
the Veblenian concept of rationality is prevalently dynamic, not static. In other words 
it evolves with the changing of the “specific content of the [..] concept of what 
enhances the [human life]” whose changing is a matter of “changes in the 
environment, [..] growth of knowledge, [..] technological innovations, and [..] contact 
with other cultures”. Bush (1999, p.138) also adds that the Veblenian rationality is not 
the “precondition for the exercise of [self-interest] in the fulfilment of one’s desires but 
for its “self-restraint”. Two points Bush raises are: a) the individual prevalently acts on 
the basis of experience since “self-restraint” is objectively possible if the individual 
has “learned [her/his] behaviour” (Bush, 1999, p.139), b) rationality has a cultural 
dimension (see also Waller, 1988, p.118; Hodgson, 1998, p. 419)9. Looking more 
                                                   
9 The modern institutional literature emphasises the realism of hypotheses rather than their axiomization 
(see Vanberg, 1993). So as Forges Davanzati remarks (2006a, p.81) the neoclassical model of 
rationality should be revised on the bases of the following main variables that affect the decision-
making process, namely: culture, experience and uncertainty. However apart from the range of social 
and psychological variables that could be taken into consideration, the main point on which 
institutionalists agree is that – as Forges Davanzati (2006, p.83) writes – “no unique motivation of 
human behaviour is assumed” and “the economic problem is not [necessarily] a problem of allocation 
of scarce resources among different exogenous uses” and external contexts are not simple constraints 
since they represent “relevant or irrelevant situations” (Forges Davanzati, 2006, p.84). It is important to 
notice that unlike the neoclassical model, institutionalism is still lacking in the definition of an organic 
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closely, Veblen defines culture thus: “[culture] is a complex of habits of life and 
thought prevalent among the members of the community (Veblen, 1961 [1908c], 
p.39)10.  As Bush (1999, p.139) writes: “All cultures begin inculcating their young at 
the earliest possible age with a sense of the individual’s obligation to the well-being of 
the group. It is through this learning process [..] that such rationality becomes 
habitual”. The main matter connected to the cultural dimension of rationality is the 
quantity and quality of information that each individual needs for structuring her/his 
decision-making process. In fact the question of the cultural dimension of rationality is 
a matter of knowledge. More specifically, Veblen assumes that “human logic” 
(Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.7) and the conduct of individuals is structured on the basis of 
knowledge and belief. Knowledge and belief are institutional matters since they 
include “convention[s], inference[s] and authentic opinion[s]” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], 
p.39) which represent those circumstances in which culture is formulated (see Coats, 
1954, p. 534). Knowledge is the complex “of principles governing what is fact” while 
belief is the complex “[of principles governing] what is credible” (Veblen, 1964 
[1919a], p.6). Knowledge and belief necessarily affect behaviours since these 
principles supply suggestions about “what is to be done" and “how it is to be done”. 
So knowledge and belief become matters of experience and theory. Moreover no 
human action is completely based only on knowledge or belief. In fact action is often a 
mixture between the two components but the prevalence of one component over the 
other is instinctual and a matter of habits (cf. Weed 1972). Moreover if the cultural 
dimension affects rationality then rationality changes over time. Let us explain why: 
Knowledge and belief are social outcomes11; they are outcomes of institutions and 
consequently they are institutions themselves and like other institutions, knowledge 
and belief are subject to “revision and correction by experience” when conditions of 
                                                                                                                                   
and coherent alternative model of behaviour (see Costabile, 1998 for a general picture on contemporary 
institutional theories). Many authors in fact limit their analysis to the demonstration of the critical points 
of the neoclassical model often by empirical or psychological simulations (see for example Marglin, 
1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Camerer, 1997; Van Staveren, 2001; Reisman, 2002; Schmid, 
2004). 
10 Unlike Mitchell (1973 [1929], p.610) who remarks that culture is in fact the consequence of the 
modality of consumption of time. Investigating the habits of thought – and therefore culture – is equal 
to investigating the modality in which individuals spend their time. 
11 In fact when Veblen writes that “blind persons do not build colour schemes” he wants to point out that 
they cannot have knowledge or belief about colour schemes precisely because colour schemes are 
outcomes of a social convention to which these persons unfortunately cannot conform.  In the same way 
he adds “nor will a man without an ear for music become a master of music composition (Veblen, 1964 
[1919a], p.6). Music is conventionally accepted as being catchy and only a musician who is able to 
conform to such a convention becomes a master.  
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life change (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.7) and consequently also rationality changes. 
Ries (1964) instead sees Veblen’s meaning of rationality in a more pragmatic sense. 
As he writes “rationality for Veblen meant the adaptation of technical means for the 
most efficient achievement of the ends of production”12. 
 
 
                                                   
12 In the above sections the Veblenian idea of economics and its differentiation from neoclassic economics 
has been described. However it is important to notice that when he makes critiques of current 
economics (first of all as regards John Bates Clark) he looks at both classical and neoclassical 
economics without a precise differentiation between the two schools. It is interesting to understand in 
what terms Veblen refers to the classical and the neoclassical approach. On this topic Aspromourgos 
(1986) and Fayazmanesh (1998) agree that concepts of classical and neoclassical economics are not 
very clear in Veblen. They also agree that Veblen uses hedonism as a merging criterion between the 
two approaches. What they disagree on is the sense and correctness of the term ‘neoclassical’ in Veblen. 
In particular Aspromourgos argues that – by the term neoclassical economics  - Veblen’s intent was to 
attribute a theoretical continuity between classical economists and marginalists, who may differ on the 
methodological plane but not in the underlying principles. Aspromourgos therefore takes up the case 
put forward by Anderson (1933, p.600) who writes: “According to Veblen’s analysis of the 
development of economic thought, the theory of today is substantially an elaboration of the English 
classical doctrine. [..]”. So neoclassical economics becomes the natural and cumulative development of 
classical economics. However, Fayazmanesh stresses that even if Veblen’s intent is to convey a 
continuity between classical economists and marginalists with the term ‘neoclassical economics’ he in 
fact fails to do so; Fayazmanesh argues that Veblen in fact confines himself to showing a certain 
similarity rather than a continuity between the two approaches. The consequence is that – he writes 
(1998, p.75)  - “this makes the term neo-classic [in fact] unnecessary and as result Veblen himself 
abandons the use of the term” substituting the term neoclassical with the term “post-Bentham 
economics” (see Veblen 1961 [1899d], p.132). Fayazmanesh (1998, p.75 and ff.) then adds that the aim 
of common identification of the two approaches is built by Veblen on the wrong premises since: a) he 
interprets classical and marginalist thought in a superficial manner, b) in fact he coins a term 
(neoclassical) with the purpose of clarifying the description of the evolution of economic thought but 
concretely just produces confusion originating from the aim of classifying classical and marginalist 
theories merely by the hedonistic criterion (see also Cornehls, 1969) which, in addition, was not clearly 
identified by the same author. Veblen - Fayazmanesh (1998, p.79) argues – limits himself to adapting 
the hedonistic criterion to each author rather than verifying the objective congruity of each theory to his 
criterion. For example with reference to Adam Smith, Fayazmanesh (1998, p.75) argues that Veblen 
makes reference to the sense of Smithian utility or “value in use” in terms of usefulness and therefore in 
terms of “serviceability”. Bush (1996, p.3, in Fayazmanesh, 1998, p.80) tries to explain why Veblen 
considers Smithian serviceability in hedonist terms, supplying the following answer: since Smithian 
serviceability can be seen both in an objective and subjective way, then it is perfectly within the 
hedonistic logic. In contrast, Fayazmanesh (1998, pp.80-85) gives a different answer: Veblen does not 
principally look at the nature of utility in Smith but mainly at his theory on the goals of human action. 
So the Smithian logic of self-interest is the criterion by which Veblen assigns Smith the label of 
‘hedonistic economist’, actually confusing self-interest and hedonism. In fact on this point Veblen 
writes: “In hedonistic theory the substantial end of economic life is individual gain” (Veblen 1961 
[1899d], p.139). At the same times Veblen tries to adapt hedonism to other classical authors such as 
Marx, assuming that the author looks at the nature of class struggle in terms of self-interest (see 
Fayazmanesh, 1998, pp.85-88) and in Ricardo for his “uncritical[..] acceptance of the metaphysics 
comprised in the common sense of his time” (Veblen, 1961 [1899d], p.131 footnote 23).  
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1.2 The theory of instincts and institutions   
1.2.1 Instincts   
 
According to Veblen, all individuals are affected by two kinds of aptitudes: a) the 
“instinctive proclivities” – instincts, b) the “tropismatic aptitudes” – institutions 
(Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.1)13. The difference between these two aptitudes can be 
interpreted in the following terms: a) instincts are directional aptitudes, that is to say 
aptitudes towards the definition of contexts while b) institutions are response 
aptitudes, that it to say aptitudes towards re-actions, in other words they are aptitudes 
of response to contexts. So while instinct becomes a directional aptitude from the 
individual towards a context, the institution becomes a directional aptitude from a 
context towards the individual. The predominance of a particular institution is the 
effect of the prevalence of a particular instinct. On this point Veblen writes:  
 
“A genetic inquiry into institutions will address itself to the growth of habits and conventions, as 
conditioned [..] by the innate and persistent propensities of human nature; and for these propensities 
[..] no better designation than the time-worn “instinct” is available” (Veblen, 1914, pp.2-3). 
 
Even if all individuals structure their conduct on the basis of instincts and institutions 
this does not mean that instinct and institutions are simply individualistic matters. 
These variables of conduct can be also variables of social conduct and in particular 
variables of conduct of particular social classes in which the individual is allocated. In 
Veblen’s vision different social classes are formed by individuals with the same 
instincts and institutions, and the peculiarity of such instincts and institutions 
structures the features and behaviour of the social class itself. In view of this it could 
be argued that individuals – on the whole – are involved with different instincts for 
three main reasons: a) each instinct manifests itself with distinctive aims to be attained 
and considered as “the ends of life” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.5), b) different 
individuals are involved with a shared instinct, finally c) each individual is involved 
with different instincts. Given the above premises let us see two particular aspects of 
Veblenian instincts:  
                                                   
13 It is important to notice that unlike the common vision Veblen speaks about institution in terms of habits 
of thought and not directly in terms of rules, organizations and customs. In the present work the term 
institution and habit of thought will be used as synonymous, in line with Veblen’s original definition.   
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a) The origin of instincts. A problem not explained by Veblen is the origin and 
predominance of a given instinct. Two possibilities can be taken into account: a) 
instinct has a biological origin, b) instinct has an institutional origin itself. Veblen 
defines instincts as teleological native proclivities that is to say “native proclivities [or 
stimulus which] set up a characteristic purpose, aim or object to be attained” (Veblen, 
1922 [1914], p.3; see also Veblen, 1961 [1898c], p.75). The ‘teleological’ character of 
instinct allows Veblen to view the same instinct as a conscious and adaptive 
propensity – “activity” – towards “an end aimed at”. One could argue that Veblen 
rejects the idea that instinct always expresses itself in mechanical and biological terms 
as “movements of orientations” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.4) since the instinctual 
activity is not independent of will, reasoning and emotion. However Edgell (2001, 
p.79) maintains that the individual will, reasoning and emotion is not incompatible 
with the biological nature of instinct. As Edgell (2001, p.79) writes “instincts for 
Veblen [are] biological” and differ from animal instincts for the high degree of 
intelligence with which the human species manage and control them. On the other 
hand O’Hara (1999, p.162) states that “instincts, for Veblen, are not purely 
physiological, biological, and psychological, but are heavily conditioned by 
institutions”. In the same way Asso and Fiorito (2003, 2004, p.448) remark that 
“[...]instincts [were seen as] propensities inborn in the human agent and transmitted as 
hereditary traits”, but that the sense of the “hereditary trait” is not biological. 
Interpreting Veblen the authors adds that instincts were not actually seen as direct and 
simple reactions to impulses but mainly as “intelligent adaptations towards selected 
ends”. Hence instincts required natural and spontaneous observation, analysis, calculus 
and decision about the goal to be reached. According to O’Hara the interpretation on 
the biological nature of instincts can be interpreted correctly if Veblen’s theory of 
instincts is combined with his theory of institutions. In other words the origin of 
instinct must necessarily be biological but – in an evolutive process – it necessarily 
combines with the pressure of institutions; as a result, habits of life – affecting habits 
of thought – also affect human intelligence which then affects the instinctual traits of 
the human species. In these terms Veblen in fact considers institutions as outcomes of 
instincts, probably at the outset of the evolutionary process, but then the causal 
relationship changes from instincts-institutions to institutions-instincts.  
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The interpretation presented by O’Hara allows us to understand better the 
interpretative mistakes of Frank Knight who made a critique of theory of instincts in 
the 1920s. As remarked by Asso and Fiorito (2003, 2004) Knight argued that the 
theory of instinct would be useful for economics if instincts as a whole were 
enumerable and describable. It is important to notice that Knight interpreted the origin 
of instincts only in biological terms so his critique seems to be affected by a 
misunderstanding of the Veblenian theory of instincts. In fact he stressed that since 
instinct has a biological nature and is in constant evolution nobody is capable of 
defining a closed set of instincts which in turns appears to be a necessary condition for 
describing the logic of a behaviour in the sense that a closed set of instincts can 
correctly represent a set of hypotheses from which economists can elaborate a 
universal law about behaviour (see Knight, 1922, p. 467). In addition to this 
methodological criticism of the instinct theory, Knight adds that economic behaviours 
are not biological since they are often led by mystical expectations and by “cultural 
canons”. On this point Knight writes: “Wants are culture products, to be judged by 
culture canons and understood and controlled through culture categories. Even our 
food and clothing, in all their concrete content, and by far the larger part of their 
money cost, represent social and aesthetic and not biological value” (Knight, 1935, p. 
95; italics added; see also Knight 1924, 1935, 1956 [1951], 1960). The above 
quotation seems to have more elements in common with Veblen than elements of 
opposition. In fact if instincts are seen as the outcome of institutions then the 
Knightian idea of behaviours as outcomes of culture is perfectly consistent with the 
Veblenian idea of behaviours as the outcome of habits of thought.  
On the interpretation of the origin of instinct Rutherford (1984, p.332) remarks 
“it must be understood that in Veblen’s system the instincts, except in the earliest 
phases of cultural evolution, do not have a major role in determining or shaping the 
institutional structure. For him, human behaviour is [..] a matter of institutions [..] 
which are not the direct [..] products of the innate propensities of human nature”. So 
Rutherford does not see the origin of institution in terms of instincts. Referring to The 
Instinct of Workmanship (1898) and The Engineers and the Price System (1921) 
Rutherford stresses that institutions originate in the “methods of livelihood that 
prevail[..] at [a given] time” (Rutherford, 1984, p.333) rather than in instincts. In other 
words, following Rutherford (1984) it is possible to say that in the Veblenian view an 
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institutional system is the outcome of a material system, that is to say it is a system of 
habits of action and thought that develop within a system formed by “material, 
technological and economic means” (Rutherford, 1984, p.333). One could argue that 
such an observation does not concretely explain the origin of institutions since the 
material system in Veblen’s vision is a human outcome not a natural one; in other 
words the material system is an instinctual and institutional outcome itself. Dugger 
(1979, p.430; italics added) for example writes that in Veblen’s thought “people, not 
divine forces, shaped institutions but institutions also shaped people”. In conclusion, in 
view of the above it can be said that a clear explanation of the origin of instincts and 
consequently also of institutions is not clear in Veblen and different interpretations 
have been presented by the literature without completely clarifying the question.  
b) The rationality of instincts. Though, as has been said above, instinct is 
therefore a conscious propensity. Instinct is a conscious propensity because individuals 
know their own traits and act within them. In other words instinct is a complex 
proclivity and the impulsivity of action is not its main feature. On the contrary Veblen 
attributes the feature of activity to instinct and an activity cannot be impulsive since it 
calls for reasoning, thought and feelings. As Veblen writes:    
 
“[Man] acts, so  he [always] thinks and feels. This is necessarily so, since it is the agent man that 
does the thinking and feeling” (Veblen, 1898a, pp.192-193).  
 
The above consideration appears clearer in the following passage: 
 
“The agent moved by its impulse not only runs through a sequence of actions suitable to the 
instinctive end, but he is also given to dwelling, more or less sentimentally, on the objects and 
activities about which his attention is engaged by the promptings of this instinctive propensity” 
(Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.53).  
 
It is interesting to notice that Veblen builds his theory of instincts in line with the state 
of the cognitive sciences at his time. As Cordes (2005, p.7) writes: “In contrast to the 
modern ethological understanding of ‘instincts’, Veblen’s notion of them does not 
involve more or less fixed behaviours but a bundle of flexible dispositions or 
propensities that can be suppressed or diverted” (see also Wolozin, 2005).  
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So according to Veblen, instinct is ‘rational’ since it is conscious and has a design but 
its goal is different from the neoclassical goal. In fact the neoclassical goal is simply 
represented by the ‘hedonistic’ aim. In the first case the aim of actions is freely 
determined a priori by the agent while in the second case instinct shows itself as a 
stimulus determined a priori by itself. So the ‘rationality’ of instinct is principally a 
matter of intelligent management of the same in a non-impulsive way. In fact while 
“the purposes to be achieved are assigned by man’s instinctive proclivities [..] “the 
ways and means of accomplishing those things [… are a] matter of intelligence” 
(Veblen, 1922 [1914], pp.5-6) where intelligence is not a biological matter but an 
institutional one. As Veblen remarks:   
 
“In an eminent sense [the individual] is an intelligent agent [in other words] man is an agent, not an 
absorbent; he is an agent seeking in every act the accomplishment of some concrete, objective, 
impersonal end” (Veblen, 1898a, p.188-189). 
 
In particular Veblen defines the agent in the following terms: “[s/he] is a coherent 
structure of propensities and habits which seeks realisation and expression in an 
unfolding activity” (1961 [1898c], p.74). The ends of life – to which instincts direct 
actions - are different for a given group of individuals. Even if the ends of life depend 
on instincts their actual achievement realistically depends on external conditions. 
External conditions in fact represent a kind of constraint on the free manifestation of 
the instincts themselves and therefore on the full realization of the end of life. The 
external conditions to which Veblen makes reference are prevalently social 
constraints; in other words, external conditions are imposed by the presence of other 
social groups, so they are imposed by the incompatible presence of each instinct with 
others, as well as of each institution with others.  
As Veblen remarks, individuals live in an unfriendly habitat mainly due to the 
presence of limited resources14. Living in an unfriendly habitat requires intelligent 
actions, in other words “intelligent” uses of instincts (Veblen, 1898a, p.188). The 
                                                   
14 Veblen does not make reference to the scarcity of resources in natural terms. In his idea resources are 
kept scarce. The behaviour of undertakers on the under utilization of capital (see below) is a clear 
example. However the idea of natural scarcity of resources is not completely excluded by the author. 
When he tries to explain the evolution of instincts and institutions (see below and ch.3) in fact he seems 
to make reference to the natural scarcity of resources. In particular the instinct for efficiency – 
workmanship (see below) – is explained by Veblen as the first instinct of the human species since it was 
the “intelligent” answer to the adversities of the natural environment surrounding the individual.  
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individual is an intelligent agent if s/he gives concrete form to the instinctual action by 
a “concrete, objective [and] impersonal” tool: the institution. The intelligent use of 
instinct – therefore the adaptation to the corresponding institution – is therefore able to 
bring the outcomes which are recognized as ends of life: survival, excellence, and 
creation.  
  
1.2.2 The institutional dimension of individual action 
 
Mayberry (1969, p.316) stresses that Veblen identifies institutions from two points of 
view: a) “from a psychological perspective they are habits of thought and life”; b) 
“from a social point they are [habitual processes of management of social life]”. In fact 
the two points are interdependent in Veblenian thought and as for each other aspect of 
his theory it is not clear which aspect prevails over the other. With reference to the 
previous section, a fundamental consideration must be made: while the ends of life are 
imposed by the social evolution of classes – constituting an instinctual matter – “the 
logic of ways and means” for replying to the stimulus is an institutional matter (see 
Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.6). The intelligent use of instincts in fact depends on “the 
available body of knowledge”; since knowledge is a matter of thinking and experience, 
then intelligence is “a matter [..] of habits of thought accumulated through the 
experience” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], pp.6-7; italics added). Consequently, institutions at 
the same time furnish: a) information and b) a mental methodology of choice based on 
the use of common attitudes and on ‘natural’ predispositions in acting and thinking in 
a well-defined and regular way. An attitude of thought and action becomes an 
institution when an individual as well as a group gives the role of spiritual or practical 
guide to it by a process of use, repetition and/or imitation – normalization - and this 
happens when individuals attribute an authoritative character to it – Veblen’s 
legitimation (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.212).  
It is possible to look at institutions in terms of normalized and legitimated 
habits of thought (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.190) and habits of life (see Veblen, 1967 
[1923], p.101); in other words they are styles of behaviour and reasoning. It is 
important to point out that Veblen sometimes sees habits of thought and habits of life 
in a parallel sense, sometimes in an interdependent sense and sometimes in a 
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dependent sense. In fact in the Theory of the leisure class Veblen defines institutions 
precisely in terms of habits of thought. As he writes:  
 
“The institutions are [..] prevalent habits of thought with respect to particular relations and particular 
functions of the individual and the community” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.190).  
 
He also sees institutions alternatively as habits of thought produced by habits of life 
and vice versa. However, Veblen often considers institutions only as outcomes of 
routine habits of life and sometimes as outcomes of routine habits of thought. He 
writes:  
 
“An institution is of the nature of a usage which has become axiomatic and indispensable by 
habituation and general acceptance” (Veblen, 1967 [1923] p.101, footnote 1). 
 
But he also remarks:  
 
“The habits of thought which are [..] formed under the guidance of teachers and scholastic traditions 
have an economic value – a value as affecting the serviceability of the individual – no less real than 
the similar economic value of the habits of thought formed without such guidance under the 
discipline of everyday life” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.363).  
 
However it is important to notice that habits of thought and habits of life do not 
automatically constitute an institution. As Edgell (1975, p.272) comments, only “when 
habitual thoughts and actions become established and patterned over time” do they 
become institutions. As a result, it is not sufficient to have a habit to have an 
institution; it is also necessary for it to be normalized and legitimated. By what 
mechanism does a habit become normalized? According to Veblen normalization of 
conduct and thought can be considered an instinctual and/or educative and/or coercive 
process (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.212). Moreover, the normalized habit needs 
legitimation. Interpreting Veblen one could argue that in fact the mere use of an 
institution is the cause-effect of its legitimation. Using an institution means conferring 
legitimation upon it but an institution is used because it has been legitimated. So an 
institution can exist only if it is used and the use of an institution automatically credits 
it as a right and good norm. The legitimation of an institution is not necessarily natural 
since it may be imposed; it might therefore suffer from elements of immorality but the 
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continuous utilization of the same institution in fact eliminates such elements, 
conferring complete morality upon it. In addition, Veblen comments: 
 
“What men can do easily is what they do habitually, and this decides what they can think and know 
easily” (Veblen, 1898a, p.195).  
 
It could be argued that Veblenian institutions have the nature of particular methods of 
simplification of cognitive/decisional processes. In fact institutions simplify this 
process in a double and interdependent way: a) predisposing individual decisions and 
b) predisposing individual actions. The predisposition of a cognitive/decisional 
process is simply a matter of use of the institution. Such a process is not necessarily 
based on a methodology of reasoning and calculus. In particular Veblen points out that 
reasoning and individual calculus count for little as regards the weight of habits. It 
could be argued that this relative weight is also due to the fact that reasoning and 
individual calculus is in fact an institutional outcome. However it could be added that 
institutions play the part of a mental trainer in the sense that they lighten the mental 
effort – needed for taking a decision and then acting – training human cognition 
towards the regular use of thoughts and actions. Allowing a saving in mental effort 
allows the individual to save effort in collecting information, assessing it and 
elaborating it since “[men] feel at home in the range of ideas which is familiar through 
their everyday line of action” (Veblen, 1898a, p.195).  
Scholars have been particularly interested in investigating the dynamic or static 
trait of Veblenian theory of institutions. On this topic, two contrasting interpretations 
can be traced: the evolutionist interpretation and the social order stability view. This 
distinction pertains to those who prevalently sustain the Veblenian theory of 
institutional change – focusing on the dynamic aspect of social order – and those who 
oppose it, supporting the Veblenian theory of social inertia, and therefore mainly 
focusing on the static analysis of social order.  
A curiosity concerning the original title of his main work seems to show a 
‘strange change’ in Veblen, who seems to move from one direction towards another, 
even though this oddity has not been clearly explained by the literature. As Edgell 
(2001, p.77) – referring to Dorfman (1934, p.232) – remarks – The theory of the 
leisure class: An Economic Study of Institutions (1899) – was originally subtitled An 
Economic Study of the Evolution of Institutions and the subtitle was changed only in 
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1912. Why this happened is not clear. It may simply have been a stylistic change but 
the elimination of the term ‘evolution’ may conceal Veblen’s’ explicit intent to 
formulate a static theory of institutions. On this point Edgell - referring to Dorfman – 
simply argues that the subtitle changed “on the occasion of the [new] publication” 
(Edgell, 2001, p.77) which was “a special cheaper edition” (Dorfman, 1934, p.323).  
In the absence of adequate sources no particular or original interpretations can be put 
forward. 
As remarked by Rutherford (1984, p.331): “a number of commentators on 
Veblen’s work on the processes of institutional change have concurred that for Veblen 
institutions are static, backward looking, and resistant to change, alterations in the 
institutional structure occurring only under pressure from the dynamic of technological 
process” (see for example Teggart, 1932; Riesman, 1960; Hamilton, 1970; Walker, 
1977; Viano, 2003). At the same time Rutherford (1984, p.334; italics added) himself 
sustains the evolutionary aspects of Veblenian theory stressing that: “Veblen, [..] did 
not present his evolutionary schema in a general or abstract fashion, but the same 
sequence of processes is repeated throughout his treatment of institutional history”. In 
this second case, a rationale for the possible institutional stability is needed. Eby 
(1998, p.691), interpreting Veblen, tries to reply in the following terms: each 
institution always enjoys a “relative stability” in the sense that “institutions cause 
established behaviours and social structures to seem natural and therefore correct”. In 
other words “the relative stability” manifests itself first in an self-sustaining sense; in 
Veblen’s thought in fact institutional change cannot be immediate since it is an 
outcome of habits and as we have said a habit becomes an institution when it is 
normalized; normalization in turn requires time because the same action and thought 
must be continually repeated and when it is normalized it becomes “natural” and 
“correct”. Next, this self-sustaining process Eby (1998, p.691) also adds an external 
factor which she describes thus: “institutions also confer power on groups of people 
whom Veblen refers to as ‘vested interests’, allowing them to exploit the generic 
public or ‘common man’”.  As Forges Davanzati (2006a, p.54) points out, “inertia is 
seen [by Veblen] both as psychological – as “instinctive resistance” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.203) and as a social phenomenon”. With reference to the psychological 
aspect of inertia, Veblen writes: “The aversion to change is in large part an aversion to 
the bother of making the readjustment which any given change will necessitate” 
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(Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.203; italics added). On the other hand, on the social plane 
inertia has an economic foundation: the distribution of income in favour of the leisure 
class.   
It is interesting to notice that the static analysis of institutions is particularly 
evident in those points in which Veblen describes the current situation, that is to say 
the nature and effects of pecuniary culture. Inertia therefore becomes instrumental to 
his critique of the current state of things. Thus Veblen uses the concept of social inertia 
as an expression of his pragmatic attitude to the critical description of his current 
situation. As Mayberry (1969, p.316) remarks – on institutional inertia – that “habits of 
thought would persist indefinitely if circumstances did not force a reappraisal of the 
facts”. The current facts described by Veblen show such a situation. For this reason as 
Eby (1998, p.689) points out, inertia is a Veblenian form of speculation on “the causes 
of social stagnation”. In brief in Veblen’s thought, institutional development is the rule 
and it could be argued that social inertia represents the exception to the rule: “the 
question [Veblen writes] is not how things stabilize themselves in a static state, but 
how they endlessly grow and change” (Veblen, 1925, p.51).  
 
1.3 The social order  
 
Veblen’s picture of the macroeconomic process as well as of class distinctions and the 
relative function is to be mainly traced in The theory of the leisure class. Two peculiar 
features characterize the Veblenian macroeconomic system: a) it is a credit economy 
(see § 2.1), and b) it is a conflictual economy (see § 1.4). Moreover Veblen structures 
an economy in which different social classes (or groups) are involved: a) the leisure 
class, b) the undertakers, c) the technicians, and d) workers. These classes work within 
a system ruled by a State – “that is to say the government” (Veblen, 1904, p.284) – 
which is identified by Veblen as an institution representative of the prevalent habits of 
thought in the society. More specifically analysing the current traits of the State 
Veblen remarks as:  
 
“The ring of business interests which secures the broadest approval from popular sentiment is, under 
constitutional methods, put in charge of the government establishment [..]. But the only secure basis 
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of an enduring party tenure of the government machinery is a business policy which falls in with the 
interests [..] of the effective majority” (Veblen, 1904, p.294; italics added). 
 
Veblen studies the traits of the State in the specific form of “constitutional government 
and parliamentary representation” (Veblen, 1904, p.284). Since the State has the form 
of a representative Parliament, different social classes can manage it, but the logic of 
its management is always the same: “the business policy” to sustain the social class 
that is mainly represented.  More specifically the social class mainly represented in the 
current organization of the State, according to Veblen is that of business men, 
therefore both the members of the leisure class and undertakers (see below). As he 
writes:        
 
“Representative government means, chiefly, representation of business interests. The government 
commonly works in the interest of the business men [..]. Government has, in the main, become a 
department of the business organization and is guided by the advice of the business men” 
(Veblen, 1904, pp.286-287; italics added). 
 
It will be argued in section 3.3c that the State plays an important role in whether or not 
the existing social order is maintained. On the role of the State in Veblen’s thought see 
Mouhammed (2003) who emphasises that the State is involving in preserving the 
interests of the kept classes. Moreover O’Hara (2004, p.979) has recently argued that 
“Veblen recognized that politics and economics were two aspects of a unified social 
whole to be understood together. The State is the guarantor of the existing social order 
and protects existing property rights and the interest of the leisure class […] Veblen 
made it very clear that the interests of the capitalist absentee owners are the primary 
concern of the government”. In the prosecution of the discussion about social order the 
analysis of the State will not be taken into consideration since in fact Veblen does not 
see the State as a different organization independent from the existing social classes 
but as  the “department” of some class. So it is sufficient to investigate the traits of the 
social classes to also automatically have the traits of the State, since it is representative 
of the interests of the main representative class.   
The originality of Veblen’s social order is not the description of features and 
functions of social classes but mainly his attempt to attribute instincts to them rather 
than to single individuals. In his writings Veblen identifies the following main groups 
of instincts: a) the predatory instinct, the salesmanship and the pugnacity that present 
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similar features and are attributed both to the leisure class and undertakers, b) the 
instinct of workmanship and idle curiosity that are attributed to technicians, c) the 
instinct of survival of the lower classes and finally d) the parental bent and the instinct 
of solidarity and sympathy which are attributed to all classes.  It is possible then to add 
that the ends of life of the social classes are: a) survival for low classes, b) creation for 
technicians, finally c) excellence for kept classes: the leisure class and undertakers 
(Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.162; see also Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.229). Commentators 
have tried to identify some of the criteria followed by Veblen in cataloguing instincts. 
Edgell (2001, p.82) for example uses the parameter of benefit as a criterion of the 
distribution of instincts. Given such a principle the author places Veblenian instincts 
within two groups: a) one group represented by those instincts that benefit the group – 
“group-regarding” instincts – and b) another one represented by those instincts that 
benefit the individual –“self-regarding instincts”. So according to the author, Veblen is 
interested in the meticulous study and characterization of the instinct of workmanship 
and the predatory instinct as the fundamental watershed between “group-regarding 
[instincts] and [..] self-regarding [instincts]” (Edgell, 2001, p.80; see also Ayres, 1958; 
Dugger, 1984; Edgell, 1975; Hunt, 1979; Tilman, 1996; Watkins, 1958). The 
classification presented by Edgell requires a clarification. He convincingly makes 
reference to group or individual in terms of benefit not necessarily in terms of aim. In 
other words the group-regarding instincts are compatible with self-interest but unlike 
self-regarding instincts they produce positive externalities for the collectivity.     
On the other hand, O’Hara (1993, pp.111-112) makes reference to the parameter 
of reproduction. Given such a principle the author places instincts within two groups: 
a) one group represented by the instincts that intensify the reproduction of wealth of a 
community – “good” instincts and b) the instincts that control it – “bad” instincts.  
More in particular, the instinct of workmanship, the parental bent and idle curiosity are 
examples of good or group-regarding [instincts], while the predatory instinct, 
pecuniary instinct, salesmanship and pugnacity are examples of bad or self-regarding 
[instincts].  
Seen in detail, the criteria used by Edgell and O’Hara can be conceived as 
homogeneous since the instincts that allow reproduction in fact are those that benefit 
the group and vice versa while the instincts that do not allow reproduction just benefit 
the single individual but not the society and vice versa. A further discriminating factor 
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can be traced in the element of time, by classifying instincts between farsighted and 
speculative, in other words between those which capitalize the present – like 
workmanship - and those that discount the future – like the predatory instinct. Let us 
see the Veblenian social classes and their instinct and institutions in more detail.  
 
1.3.1 The leisure class   
 
Veblen identifies the leisure class as the class whose components are excluded from 
industrial occupations since they have the right to  “industrial exemption” (Veblen, 
1975 [1899a], p.212). The right to industrial exemption is a consequence of their 
employment in other activities, mainly in those that are recognized as honorific and 
called “worthy employments” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.1, p.8). It is important to point 
out that Veblen analyses the features of the leisure class – as well as of all social 
classes – starting from a clear distinction of labour into economic and non-economic 
employment. Economic employment is composed of “pecuniary employment” and 
“industrial employment” (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.229); these two kinds of 
employment are economic since they are activities aimed at production of monetary or 
real income  - even if “the aptitudes and habits of thought fostered by the one and the 
other class of employment [have] different economic value” (Veblen, 1899b, p.113)  - 
while the non-economic employments include activities which are aimed neither at the 
production of income nor monetary or real income (see Veblen, 1961 [1901], pp.287-
289). Industrial employment entails the material production of goods so it is 
considered productive labour, while pecuniary employment entails working activities 
whose aim is “make money, not to produce goods” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.92) and 
for this reason it is considered – along with the non economic employments – as 
unproductive labour15. Veblen is particularly critical of non-productive occupations 
                                                   
15 The distinction between productive and unproductive labour is not new in literature. Classical 
economists agree on the distinction between the two kinds of labour. Adam Smith in chapter three of 
the second book of his “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (1776) makes 
a distinction between productive and unproductive labour in terms of value and outcome. In the first 
case the labour of individual X is productive if it generates value in other words if individual Y is willing 
to transfer part of h/his own value-labour to X to obtain the value-labour of X. In the second case  labour 
is productive when it is ‘storable’ in some material form. On the other hand labour is unproductive 
when it refers to those labours not ‘storable’ in material goods, that is to say those activities (services) 
that lose their serviceability as soon as they are supplied. John Stuart Mill in chapters two and three of 
the first book of his “Principles of Political Economy” (1848) also sustains Smith in his conception of 
productive labour intending it as labour able to produce real goods including – unlike Smith – the skills 
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since they are not essential for the society because they do not furnish material 
outcomes (see Veblen, 1899b, p.114). However even if they are not indispensable to 
the community they are “integral features of modern economic life” and consequently 
they must “be classed as normal [even if only] for the existing situation” (Veblen, 
1961 [1901], p.287; italics added). In other words they are conventional activities – 
one could say institutional activities – even if non-productive in a strict sense, and for 
this reason non-indispensable16. As Veblen writes:  
 
“There are activities and classes of persons which are unavoidably present in modern life and which 
draw some income from the aggregate product, at the same time that these activities are non patently 
productive of goods and can not well be classed as industrial”  (Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.287). 
 
Given the above considerations on productive/non productive labour, the leisure class 
can be said to be engaged in non productive labour. In addition the main feature of all 
activities of the leisure class is the exploitation which consists of “[..] the conversion to 
[the ends of an agent] of energies previously directed to some other end by another 
agent” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.12)17,18, or as he adds “it is [by] the exercise of 
                                                                                                                                   
of workers and those services designed to increase skills. Moreover, Mill adds that the activities aimed 
at the protection of ownership must be considered productive activities. Marx instead in the first book 
of “Capital” (1867) considers productive labour simply the labor that produces surplus value. Instead 
Veblen seems to have a vision of productive labour in line with Smith and Mill in the sense that in his 
vision productive labour is the labour used to obtain real goods. In addition he considers labour 
employed in the pursuit of knowledge to be productive labour (see ch.2) but unlike Mill he does not 
regard services aimed at the support of ownership as productive labour (see ch.2). O’Hara (2000, p.73) 
– interpreting and expanding the Veblenian view – has identified a group of unproductive activities 
even if he does not assign such activities to a particular social class. He speaks about unproductive 
workers as “accountants, advertisers, public servants, members of parliament, owners of land and 
capital, banks and sales workers”.    
16 Notice that several economists were interested to the study of the “social value” of the upper classes. 
Dugger (1998) has compared Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter and Thorstein Veblen on the issue 
pointing out that – unlike the others – Veblen appears to be extremely critical on the possibility that the 
behaviour of upper class can have positive effects on society. Differently from Veblen – Dugger 
stresses - the others recognize that the behaviour of the upper classes is functional for the society, even 
if “this is not to say that [Marx and Schumpeter agree that] the members of the upper classes intend to 
benefit society. They are not altruist. But that is to say they intend to benefit themselves and by doing so 
they also end up benefiting their society” (Dugger, 1998, p.74). So the aim of the construction of 
personal dynasties of entrepreneurs in Schumpeter and the aim of profits accumulation of capitalists in 
Marx can have a positive effect on society since they push the increase of innovation (Schumpeter) and 
improve several aspects of social and economic life (Marx) even if  the Marxian functionality of the 
upper class has mainly a dialectic sense. In fact as Dugger (1998, p.75) adds – “the selfish pursuit of 
profits by the capitalists [in Marx] is leading, dialectically, to a destruction of capitalism itself”.  
17 Historically he attributes the institution of the leisure class to the feudal period in which “the higher 
stages of the barbarian culture” predominated and in which the two main “honourable employments” 
were “warfare” and “priestly service” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.1). Examples of members of the leisure 
class in Veblen are “[those that] may be roughly comprised under government, warfare, religious 
observances, and sports” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.2) 
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control and coercion over the population [that the leisure class] draws its sustenance” 
(Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.383). Members of the leisure class can refrain from 
productive labour thanks to some economic conditions and because of some 
institutional reasons. In the first case: a) members of the leisure class obtain sufficient 
income – mainly in the form of rent, b) their accumulation of wealth allows a 
subsequent or prior (to point a) above) abstention from productive labour. Instead, 
from the institutional point of view: a) “application to productive labour is a mark of 
poverty and subjection” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.38), b) productive labour removes 
time from ostentation of “honorific waste” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.116), that is to 
say, from the “method of demonstrat[ing] the possession of wealth” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.85), in terms of time and possessions whose “expenditure does not serve 
human life or human well-being on the whole” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.97). Not only 
does the leisure class own a great deal, but it also consumes a great deal. In fact it 
absorbs a large part of  “[..] the net product of the country’s industry over cost” 
(Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.163) just for ostentatious motives, which Veblen sees as 
futile, attributing “socially wasteful roles” (Tilman, 2003, p.xvi) to the leisure class. 
It is important to notice that the recognition of worthy, unworthy, noble and 
ignoble is based on invidious judgement (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.92). In these 
terms honourableness is a relative concept and is not innate to the nature of an act but 
rather to the social convention that gives this description of “a conventional basis of 
esteem” (Veblen 1975 [1899a], p.29). The conferring of honourableness can be seen 
therefore as an outcome of the mind. In this way a human act is honourable if it is 
actually or ideally emulated independently from any concrete evaluation on its utility, 
morality and modality of acquisition (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], pp.15-21). Veblen 
sees envy, in particular, as a common motive for conferring honourableness to an act, 
thus leading people to emulate it (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.26). On the 
honourableness of abstention from labour Veblen writes: 
 
“Abstention from labour is not only a honorific or meritorious act [since members of the leisure class 
are engaged in other activities with higher value] but it presently comes to be a requisite of decency. 
[In addition] abstention from labour is the conventional evidence of wealth and is therefore the 
conventional mark of social standing” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.41).   
                                                                                                                                   
18 Since Veblen does not have a theory of value the term exploitation is not intended in Marxian terms. 
Exploitation – a term Veblen explicitly uses - means here the existence of “free income”, i.e. income 
which does not derive from productive activities, i.e. “unearned” (see Veblen, 1964 [1919a]). 
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Consequently highly honorific activities are the domain of the leisure class and such 
activities are different from working activities. In particular members of the leisure 
class can only perform “honorific”, “meritorious” and “decent” activities. Generally 
speaking the leisure class spends its time in “decorous employments” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.115) that are not addressed to making a material product. Members of the 
leisure class direct their effort “on objects which are of no intrinsic use” which, in turn, 
take the form of “immaterial goods” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.45). The improvement 
of these accomplishments is not functional to the production of real goods; instead it is 
instrumental for ostentatiously displaying the non-productive use of time. It is 
important to remark that “non productive use of time” is not equal to non-occupation; 
that is to say the leisure class is however a class that employs its time in some activity 
even if such activities are unproductive activities; in other words members of the 
leisure class are not employed in the direct production of real goods. So the leisure 
class is engaged in activities that correspond to three main requisites: a) they are 
immaterial and b) they do not have “intrinsic use”, c) they supply evidence of the 
leisure class’s ability to attach a different value and goal to effort compared to 
workers, i.e. they allow members of the leisure class to provide effort for higher 
finalities rather than for simply obtaining sustenance. The description of the 
“honourableness” of work given above enables us to look at the retributive gaps 
between social classes in different terms from the parameter of productivity or 
serviceability of work. It appears that the retributive system follows the logic of social 
recognition of the status of classes which are hierarchically ordered within the 
macroeconomic system (see ch.2).     
There are several types of non productive consumption of time by the leisure 
class: a) the first kind is represented by pecuniary activities, b) the second one is 
represented by those activities aimed at the improvement and ostentation of 
honourable knowledge, in particular in “quasi-scholarly” or “quasi-artistic” knowledge 
(Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.45)19, c) the third kind of non-productive consumption of 
time is represented by those activities of improvement and ostentation of honourable 
gestural communication – think for instance of the acquisition and ostentation of 
“manners and breeding, polite usage, decorum, and formal and ceremonial 
                                                   
19 On this point Veblen writes “for instance in our time there is the knowledge of the dead languages and 
the occult sciences; of correct spelling, of syntax and prosody; of the various forms of domestic music 
and other household arts; of the latest proprieties of dress, furniture, and equipage; of games, sports, and 
fancy-bred animals; such as dogs and race-horses” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.45).   
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observances” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], pp. 45-46); c) finally the third kind of non-
productive consumption of time is engaged in the training of tastes20. By the 
ostentation of ‘honourable knowledge’ the leisure class also has a significant role as 
controller of the education system. Veblen looks at the “educational system” as a 
system of discipline and control of individuals under the guidance of the leisure class. 
For Veblen education supplies a particular “economic value” for the upper classes: the 
“serviceability of the individual” (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.363). The control of 
education expressed by the leisure class finds its origin in the “devotional function” of 
the earliest forms of education. As Veblen writes:  
 
“In point of derivation and early development, learning is somewhat closely related to the devotional 
function of the community, particularly to the body of observances in which the service rendered the 
supernatural leisure class expresses itself. [It was] ”knowledge of ritual and ceremonial [and] what 
was learned was how to make oneself indispensable to [the supernatural leisure class]” (Veblen, 
1975 [1899a], pp.364-365).   
 
The leisure class’s capacity for controlling the education system is not absolute for 
Veblen since the leisure class can only control one kind of knowledge, namely what he 
calls “esoteric knowledge” or erudite knowledge – represented by “scholasticism and 
classicism” that is to say, knowledge with “no economic or industrial effect” and 
according to the author knowledge has an “economic or industrial effect” when it 
shows itself in “an articulate recognition of causal sequence in phenomena” (Veblen, 
1975 [1899a], p.386). If knowledge is not scientific – that is to say when it is not based 
on “causal sequences” of phenomena – then the state of things is taken for granted by 
individuals. A spread of erudite knowledge serves the leisure class for the maintenance 
of the state of things since it does not form habits of thought addressed to a critical 
vision of reality. On the other hand, technological development has contributed to the 
spread of a different kind of knowledge, namely what he calls “exoteric knowledge”, 
that is to say “knowledge of industrial processes and of natural phenomena which were 
habitually turned to account for the material purposes of life” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], 
pp.366-367). Such knowledge allows individual to know how a phenomena has been 
                                                   
20 On this point Veblen remarks “in order to avoid stultification he must also cultivate his tastes, for it now 
becomes incumbent on him to discriminate with some nicety between the noble and the ignoble in 
consumable goods. He becomes a connoisseur in creditable viands of various degrees of merit, in manly 
beverages and trinkets, in seemly apparel and architecture, in weapons, games, dancers, and the 
narcotics” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.74).   
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generated and how it can evolve, therefore providing tools of judgement on it and on 
its serviceability for the “material purposes of life”. In addition since Veblen stresses 
that the leisure class looks at the productive activity as a “mark of poverty and 
subjection” and therefore of social inferiority (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.38) then also 
each kind of “exoteric knowledge” becomes mark of inferiority. That is the reason 
why in the eyes of the leisure class “esoteric knowledge” is “higher learning” and 
“exoteric knowledge” is lower learning (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.367). The 
interest of the leisure class in “esoteric knowledge” is in line with its proclivity to look 
at reality in terms of “belief” (cf. the instinct of workmanship) Members of the leisure 
class conform to an institution by psychological processes of adaptation rather than by 
forms of adaptation founded on facts. Consequently the psychological adaptation to 
the institution is for the leisure class the “belief in luck” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.276) 
which represents “a sense of fortuitous necessity in the sequence of phenomena” 
(Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.278; italics added). So members of the leisure class seem to 
believe in causality of progression of facts by two main forms: a) attributing the 
evolution of the fact to concrete and animated identities and objects – “quasi-personal 
character of facts” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.279); b) attributing the evolution of the 
fact to abstract and no-animated identities – “preternatural agency” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.280). The necessity of the above forms of belief is an institutional necessity, 
that is to say for acting as a predator the individual continually needs approval, 
recognition and support from high and authoritative real or abstract identities. So “the 
belief in luck” works as a precondition to predatory action; in other words if a 
predatory agent had not an optimistic expectation of the result of his/her action then 
s/he would not give concretisation to his/her predatory action.    
The leisure class suffers institutional changes since these could threaten its 
privileged state. As Veblen writes:  
 
“It is commonly the invidious one that the wealthy class opposes innovation because it has a vested 
interest, of an unworthy sort, in maintaining the present condition” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.199).   
 
On this point Cummings (1899, p.438) remarks that Veblen makes a mistake since he 
considers the leisure class contrary to all institutional changes. Contrary to Veblen, 
Cummings (1899, p.437) believes: “institutional inertia is not [..] inhibition of social 
progress and evolution but on the contrary is the very condition and sine qua non of 
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such progress”.  More specifically, Cummings’s vision of social progress is equal to 
improvement of the present state of things so he stresses that social progress 
necessarily requires adjustment of institutions developed in the past and conserved in 
the present for the “accomplishment of human purposes” (Cummings, 1899, p.437).  
In opinion of Cummings (1899, p.437), Veblen regards institutional inertia as a form 
of inhibition of “all change, including progress itself”. Actually – Cummings stresses – 
institutional inertia is against destruction of the present not against its improvement. In 
addition, in the view of Cummings (1899, p.437), the present institutions are the 
“evolutionary product of man’s reaction upon his environment throughout those ages 
which have step by step developed man out of the ape [..] They are therefore worthy of 
conservation against innovation”. Institutional inertia appears to be for Cummings a 
defensive tool of the cumulative state of development from past to present against the 
destructive perturbations of the quiet state that innovation could generate. Cummings 
remarks that it is obvious that the leisure class does not want to lose what it has. But at 
the same time it is also plausible to think that it wants to increase and improve what it 
has. On this point Cummings (1899, p.438) writes “the inertia of the leisure class is 
inertia against multifarious means of wealth dissipation”. In addition he adds: “A 
railroad corporation has a material interest in preserving its railroad from destruction, 
in leaving it as it is, but the corporation has a greater material interest in making the 
railroad more efficient in service, and economical in management that it is. [So] it is 
conservative against destruction, not against progress” (Cummings, 1899, p.438; 
italics added). Cummings’s interpretation can be configured – according to Forges 
Davanzati (2006a, p.65) – as “institutional change without economic growth”. In other 
words it is reasonable to think that the leisure class is not opposed to progress and 
consequently also to all institutional changes, but in Veblen institutional changes are 
those that assure social well-being – “institutional change with economic growth” – 
not those that improve the living conditions of the leisure class: that is the sense of 
“innovation” in Veblen; the conservative action of the leisure class is therefore 
addressed to preserving things from “innovations” so its action is addressed to 
maintaining institutional inertia and therefore social inertia (see also Edgell, 2001, 
p.13). 
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1.3.1.1 Instincts and habits of thought of the leisure class  
 
The emergence of a leisure class calls for a particular kind of activity:  exploitation. So 
the emergence of the leisure class requires the identification of the socio-economic 
conditions for the origin of exploitation, as well as for the origin of the class which has 
the right to enjoy the exploitation itself. In the first case Veblen thinks about the 
following two main conditions: a) a predatory habit of life, that is to say the  
“infliction of injury by force and stratagem” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.8) and b) the 
social production of surplus21. With particular reference to the surplus it is important to 
notice that Veblen defines surplus – or net production or profit – as “the amount by 
which the actual production exceeds it own cost, as counted in terms of subsistence, 
and including the cost of necessary mechanical equipment” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], 
p.55)22. In addition he writes:  
 
“The conditions [..] necessary to [the emergence of exploitation] are: (1) the community must be of a 
predatory habit of life. [..] That is to say, the men, who constitute the inchoate leisure class [..] must 
be habituated to the infliction of injury by force and stratagem; (2) subsistence must be obtainable on 
sufficiently easy terms to admit of the exemption of a considerable portion of the community from 
steady application to a routine of labour” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.8; italics added).    
 
In the second case instead “the emergence of the leisure class coincides with the 
beginning of ownership [..] as a conventional right or equitable claim [..] to extraneous 
things” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.22-23; italics added; see also Veblen, 1898b), 
including not only material things but also “personal services” directly supplied by 
others –think for instance of the role of “servants”, women, etc. (see Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], pp. 53 and ff.). As a result, the “habitual appropriation” of things generates 
ownership of the same when: a) things are produced by individuals who are different 
from the holders and b) the right to the possession is conventional, not natural.  
More specifically, the concept of natural ownership is expressed by Veblen thus 
“[..] the person who has produced an article or [..] by a constructively equivalent 
                                                   
21 As Veblen remarks “a predatory life is possible only after the use of tools has developed so far as to 
leave a large surplus of product over what is required for the sustenance of the producers” (Veblen, 
1898a, p.194). 
22 Gruchy (1958, p.12) remarks that – with the exploitation/surplus relationship - “Veblen’s object is to 
show that some of the consumption component of total output constitutes a surplus or net product, 
which goes to [the leisure class rather] than to the working population”.  
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expenditure of productive force has found and appropriated an object [has the natural 
right to posses it]” (Veblen, 1898b, p.353; italics added). Natural ownership therefore 
has a strict economic relevance. Its naturalness is inborn in the origin of this kind of 
property. Natural ownership is always linked to the outcome of a productive activity. 
So the productive effort supplied is the reason for its existence. It could be argued that 
natural ownership is the natural legitimation of material possession aimed at the 
absolute private pleasure proportionate to the grievousness of the productive effort 
supplied. Consequently, in a system characterized by natural ownership the exchange 
of ownership is natural since it refers to real goods and it is fair since nobody has more 
goods than what s/he has helped to produce.  
In contrast, there is nothing natural in the current sense of ownership. It is simply 
a conventional attribution of the right to other things. This right was born as a 
prerogative of the leisure class since possession of things allows a concrete exhibition 
of “some durable result of [..] exploits” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.24). As Diggins 
(1977, p. 119) remarks “Veblen perceived the [..] institution [of ownership as] the act 
of conquest [and seizure]”; so it could be agued that the higher the “force and 
stratagem”  used for the appropriation of things, the higher the image of its “prowess”. 
More specifically, the logic of the existence of ownership can be found in three 
particular elements:  
 
 “(1) A propensity for dominance and coercion; (2) the utility of [owned things] as evidence of the 
prowess of [the] owner; (3) the utility of their services” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.53).   
 
So ownership represents a conventional tangible indicator of social “prowess” 
recognized as honorific “prowess”, where the dignity of the leisure class is assured by 
a widespread proclivity to emulation (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], pp.15-21). It is 
interesting to notice that the right to own does not entail a duty to supply. In other 
words the right to have does not have a ‘meritocratic’ nature, in fact “force and 
stratagem” requires proclivities such as astuteness rather than proclivities to efficient 
effort. On this point Veblen remarks “the possession of wealth which was at the outset 
valued simply as an evidence of efficiency, becomes, in popular apprehension, itself a 
meritorious act” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.29). 
In view of the above, the leisure class can exist and act if society produces 
surplus and if this surplus is mainly distributed in favour of the same class. So the 
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production of surplus is the condition for the existence of the predatory instinct just as 
the predatory instinct is the condition for the existence of an unfair system of income 
distribution23. In addition, as we shall show more clearly below, the production of 
surplus requires the existence of a particular instinct: the instinct of workmanship. 
Even though Veblen is not clear on this point, one could argue that the first instinct 
characterizing the evolution of the human species must have been the instinct of 
workmanship, and this also means that the instinct of workmanship was the instinct 
from which the others were generated. What is more, if the institution linked to the 
predatory instinct is ownership while the institution linked to the instinct of 
workmanship is industry - “the effort that goes to create a new thing” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.12) - then it was industry that gave rise to ownership. So while the 
production of a surplus is strictly linked to the instinct of workmanship and the 
institution of industry, the distribution of income is strictly linked to the predatory 
instinct and the institution of ownership.   
Hence, amongst the other features of the leisure class there are three particular 
characteristics to consider: the leisure class owns a great deal, consumes a great deal 
and does not produce real goods. Its wealth consists of different kinds of goods: land, 
money, real estate, stocks, bonds, precious metals, etc. Veblen does not see such goods 
in terms of savings; in fact the traits of leisure class consumption leave no space for 
savings; its income is therefore prevalently used for consumption. However at the 
same time the leisure class holds wealth, but what does such wealth depend on? The 
traits of the leisure class provide the answer to this question; in other words the wealth 
owned by the leisure class is historically acquired by activities of predation and the 
exploitation of the right of ownership. Amongst the kinds of goods owned in the form 
of wealth, a particular role is played by money, stocks and bonds. In fact – and this 
will be shown better below – Veblen looks at money in terms of the initial and final 
goods on which the production circuit depends, and anticipating the description of this 
circuit money (see ch.2) – with which the system starts production – is therefore 
mainly in the hands of the leisure class, which in fact has the right to the production of 
money, a right – it could be argued – historically obtained. The leisure class supplies 
money to the system for production since production serves for its consumption. 
Money is supplied to the production system in two forms: a) by loans to undertakers, 
                                                   
23 The meaning of a perception of an unfair income distribution in a Veblenian perspective will be better 
investigated in the chapter 3.  
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b) by acquisition of stocks; in the first case the leisure class is the financer of firms, in 
the second case it is financer-capitalist of firms 24.            
   
1.3.2 Undertakers  
 
undertakers are the capitalists and/or the managers of firms. The trait of the undertaker 
as capitalist and/or manager depends on the role of the leisure class in the production 
system. In particular when members of the leisure class buy stocks then undertakers 
become mere managers while the role of capitalists is attributed to the leisure class. On 
the other hand, when the leisure class supplies money as loans to undertakers then the 
leisure class is merely the financer of firms and the undertakers become capitalists and 
managers. In this last case Veblen assumes that undertakers – like the leisure class – 
can hold money, and such money is the outcome of the accumulation of past profits. 
Apart from the formal figure of capitalists or managers, undertakers are materially 
involved in the conduct of firms for business purposes, in other words to make 
monetary profits. Veblen generally recognizes profit as “the amount by which the 
actual production exceeds it own cost, as counted in terms of subsistence, and 
including the cost of necessary mechanical equipment” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.55). 
The undertakers’ aim is to obtain monetary profits since they have an aptitude for the 
business side of management of firms (see Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.91); an interesting 
issue is to understand if firms are interested in a maximum level of profit or in a 
normal one. In his works Veblen changes his view on this point originally stressing the 
aim of normal profits, then moving onto the maximization of profits and competitive 
advantages. The idea of profit maximization is clear in the following quotations which 
will be considered again for other purposes:  
 
“Profitable sales can be made only if prices are maintained at a profitable level, and prices can be 
maintained only if the volume of marketable output is kept within reasonable limits [where] 
reasonable means what the traffic will bear, that is to say what will yield the largest net return” 
                                                   
24 It is important to notice that in Veblen there is also an idea of production of money by the banking 
system alongside the holding of money by the leisure class. As the author writes “broadly speaking” [..] 
“banking is profitable chiefly because the banker lends more than that he has or borrows”, and “the 
banker [can] create a new volume of credit” (Veblen, 1905, p.470).  
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(Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.91 italics added; see also Veblen, 1904, ch. 3 and ch. 5; Veblen, 2001 
[1921], p.66).  
He also writes:  
 
“The earning-capacity [of capital] is determined by what the traffic will bear, that is to say by 
curtailing production to such an amount that the output multiplied by the price per unit will yield the 
largest net aggregate return” (Veblen, 1967 [1923], p.68). 
 
On the other hand, on normal profits Veblen remarks that this is assumed as the 
“natural thing” for undertakers; it is based on undertakers’ common sense in looking at 
business. Veblen does not spend much time explaining the meaning of normal profit; 
as he remarks normal profit can mean average net return or “something else”. In other 
words normal profit is just a matter of undertakers and profit is normal when 
undertakers are clear as to its sense, entity and stability so they spend their time 
thinking over “the businesses” (see Veblen, 1904, ch. 4). Veblen tries to clarify the 
question of normal profit by stating that it is concretely the profit on whose level 
undertakers are willing to employ their own capital in the firm’s activity (see Veblen, 
1904, ch. 4). In addition he stresses the uselessness of an exact definition of normal 
profit; in fact on this point he writes:   
 
“The precise meaning of "ordinary profits" need not detain the argument. It may mean net average 
profits, or it may mean something else. The phrase is sufficiently intelligible to the business 
community to permit the business men to use it without definition and to rest their reasoning about 
business affairs on it as a secure and stable concept; and it is this commonplace resort to the term 
that is the point of interest here” (Veblen, 1904, p.87). 
 
Since undertakers are only interested in business matters they remove themselves from 
industrial management and production of firms, delegating this activity to “practical 
[..] men [..] who are possessed of [..] workmanship ability” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], 
p.230). As he writes:  the undertakers is mainly an “economic manager” – not a 
technical manager – of industry (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.230), so undertakers are 
interested in production for making money and not for satisfying human needs and 
welfare (see Veblen, 1961 [1901], pp.303-304). In other words – see in detail chapter 
2 – undertakers are interested in monetary profits via the ‘monopolization’ of markets 
addressed to reducing quantities of production so as to increase prices. The undertaker 
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deals with commercial and financial transactions, with “distribution and circulation of 
goods” (Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.27) and with credit operations. So undertakers deal 
with “the phenomena of value”, with “exchange or market values”, with “purchase and 
sale”; so they “sell in order to buy cheaper [and] buy in order to sell dearer” (see 
Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.293; p.296-297). As Veblen stresses: 
 
“These activities begin and end within what may broadly be called the higgling of the market” 
(Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.294).      
 
Being interested in the “higgling of the market” the undertaker just acts by evaluating 
the results of her/his actions in terms of influencing and persuading in the phase of 
exchanges (see Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.294). An increase or decrease of exchange 
values can affect the aggregate production mainly in terms of “serviceability” of goods 
to produce, and indirectly its quantity and quality. In pecuniary terms a good is 
“serviceable” if it is vendible and all judgements on its utility in terms of “human 
welfare” are excluded (Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.304).  
In addition, the undertaker’s activity is competitive. Veblen sees 
competitiveness as a game based on improvement of methods of selling outcomes and 
on the introduction of new technology. In fact such competition is based on the 
pecuniary excellence which appears to be a struggle for simple ownership; someone 
obtains something if s/he wins the competition thus preventing the other from the 
possibility of reaching the same result. In other words the Veblenian competition is 
configurable as positional competition by which each firm acts on the market with the 
aim of obtaining competitive advantages over others. The removal of a competitor 
from the struggle is mainly based on the capacity to obtain higher monetary gains. So 
the possibility of having higher pecuniary gains depends on the ability to exchange, 
and ability to exchange requires the ability to increase the value of the things 
exchanged; it is not important to increase the real value of these things but their 
exchange value, acting, if needed, by fraudulent practices so as to create a large gap 
between the exchange value and the effective value. So - even though Veblen does not 
directly highlight this point – undertakers act following proclivities that are recognized 
as honorific if they provide “success and superior force” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], 
p.181). undertakers therefore act through the institution of ownership and attitudes of 
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“salesmanship”, “bargaining”, “effrontery” and “make-believe” which are all similar 
aspects to the predatory instinct (see Veblen, 1967 [1923], p.78, p.108). 
 
 
1.3.3 The instinct of workmanship 
 
Unlike the leisure class and undertakers, technicians are engaged in industrial 
occupations. As Veblen remarks “[these activities] begin and end outside the higgling 
of the market” (Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.294; italics added), in other words they are 
employed in the industrial sector and they must deal with mechanical processes. 
Technicians are interested in continually improving the industrial process and in 
increasing production. They act and evaluate the efficiency of their own activity in 
terms of “mechanical effects” on the production process (see Veblen, 1961 [1901], 
p.294). So they aim to continually innovate and supply useful effort, i.e. effort that 
serves to create new things (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.12). Let us see their instincts 
and institution in greater detail.   
A) The instinct of workmanship and the institution of industry. Veblen’s instinct of 
workmanship can be interpreted in a double manner: a) as a  primary instinct, and b) 
as a ‘current’ trait of technicians.   
a) Workmanship as primary instinct. Veblen builds his theory of the 
workmanship instinct with the purpose of making a critique of the neoclassical theory 
of labour supply. In particular he wants to critically reply to the neoclassical axiom of 
labour disutility which is summarised by the same author in the following terms:   
 
“It is one of the commonplaces of the received economic theory that work is irksome. Many a 
discussion proceeds on this axiom that [..] men desire above all things to get the goods produced by 
labor and to avoid the labor by which the goods are produced” (Veblen, 1898a, p.187). 
 
Veblen summarizes the above axiom stressing that neoclassical economics agrees on 
the idea that any form of working effort is useless in the sense that working activity 
only supplies disutility and painfulness, leading individuals to prefer different 
activities. Veblen opposes this generalization since in his vision the human being can 
be characterized by natural traits that positively direct the individual toward her/his 
labour activity. So for Veblen disutility is an irrelevant concept for a theory of labour 
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supply. However apart from this critique Veblen in fact does not present an alternative 
theory of labour supply. Interpreting the sense of workmanship John Maurice Clark 
(1960 [1948], pp.56-57) critically replies to Veblen arguing that efficiency can only be 
attributed to “work” not to the worker. In other words, the author points out that the 
instinct of workmanship cannot be a human trait, it is a consequence of the 
characteristics of work. More specifically, the attitude to efficient work is connected to 
the nature of the work itself and not to the nature of workers. Consequently it is simply 
a matter of technical efficiency. So only technology can positively direct workers 
towards labour activity and not vice versa. The axiom of disutility therefore has its 
validity and it is only technological development that can mitigate the disutility. 
According to Veblen (1899a; 1922 [1914]) in the primitive phase of human evolution 
individuals did not try to avoid work since this was not possible in the sense that it was 
in the nature of things; individuals were naturally called to continually supply “useful 
effort” that is to say any form of material contribution to the production of everything  
-“the material means of life” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.39) - that was strictly needed and 
vital for survival and development (see Veblen, 1898a, p.187). As a result, individuals 
had a natural predisposition to work that is to say an instinctual “proclivity for taking 
pains” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.33). This natural and instinctual proclivity supplied 
utility to the individual in the sense that it assured the material production of those 
tools that were needed to overcome the adversities imposed by the process of natural 
selection. Veblen calls this natural, and therefore, instinctive human proclivity the 
instinct of workmanship (Veblen, 1898a, p.189). Workmanship is the instinct to be 
efficient and to supply “industrial effort” where “any effort is to be accounted 
industrial only in so far as its ultimate purpose is the utilisation of non-human things” 
(Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.10)25. Due to a natural constraint, therefore the natural 
instinct to ensure survival, individuals supplied their own services in industrious 
activities (see Veblen, 1922 [1014], pp. 31-32). Without an inborn attitude to the 
allocation of working services in this particular kind of activity, the individual would 
not have had those tools needed for her/his survival and evolution in a generally 
adverse environment. In addition, the absence of the instinct of workmanship would 
have required the presence of a friendly environment where natural selection would 
                                                   
25 As has been said above, Veblen sees industry as “effort that goes to create a new thing, with a new 
purpose given it by the fashioning hand of its maker out of passive (“brute”) material” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.12). 
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not have had no influence on human development. But since, as the same author 
remarks, the world is not an Eden - because “the trial of the Edenic serpent [does not] 
plain to all men” (Veblen, 1898a, p.187) - individuals realistically do not have 
freedom to choose whether to work or not and their own preferences cannot play a 
major role in individual decisions. The selection process requires an active and 
continued – therefore industrious – effort which is addressed to the maintenance and 
evolution of the human species (see Veblen, 1898a, p.187). The above description 
allows us to interpret Veblen in the following terms: the instinct of workmanship is the 
primary instinct since the human species started its evolution thanks to a common 
instinct, i.e. the instinct of workmanship. Since the instinct of workmanship was a 
common feature of all individuals and since they habitually acted in order to produce 
material goods, they acquired a particular kind of institution: the institution of 
industry. However thanks to the progress of knowledge and skills the community 
started to produce more than was strictly necessary to its survival. So the production of 
a surplus due to technological progress allowed some to remove themselves from the 
productive process since their presence was no longer necessary. Obviously their non-
productive utility had to be provided by other kinds of ‘utilities’ for the community 
and this research was necessary to avoid social exclusion. So the community found 
additional kinds of not strictly productive activities – war for example – which were 
however instrumental in increasing the social surplus and consequently instrumental 
for the development of the community itself. At the same time, the community found 
additional utility in the cure of children and the research of knowledge. In view of 
what has been said, workmanship appears to be the source of the other instincts, so the 
source of the related institutions and so of social differentiation. However, apart from 
the primary process of evolution, social development continues thanks to the co-
presence of industrial activity and non-industrial activity, in other words allowing the 
co-presence of the instinct of workmanship and other instincts, i.e. the co-presence of 
the institution of industry with other institutions. On this point Shannon (1996, p.5) 
remarks “Veblen offers not so much a history of the instinct of workmanship but 
rather history as the instinct of workmanship”.  
b) Workmanship as ‘current’ trait of technicians. The Veblenian study of the 
instinct of workmanship as the current trait of technicians is strongly influenced by the 
historical circumstances of his times. As remarked by Edgell (2001, p.4) Veblen lived 
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in a time of great change in the United States; in fact, the author writes “at the 
beginning of Veblen’s life, America was a predominantly agricultural society. [..] By 
the end of his life an expanded and politically unified America had displaced Britain as 
the world’s leading industrial nation, and had inaugurated the era of mass production 
and consumption”. Historians – see for example Cameron (1993, ch.9-12) – in fact 
recognize the United States as an extraordinary example of the rapid economic growth 
of the 1800s. According to the author the population was about forty million in 1870 
and about a hundred million in 1915; such an increase was both the result of European 
immigration and also of internal development; one element that helped the population 
increase was the increase in wages due to the scarcity of the labour force compared to 
the availability of land and to other resources. Cameron argues that there are two main 
reasons for the rapid growth of the United States: a) technological development, b) 
regional specialization where the use of industrial equipment was strongly stimulated 
by the high cost of labour. Moreover, the expanse of the United States – combined 
with the differentiation of climate and of resources – led the Nation to a strong 
regional differentiation of production. These combined aspects allowed both industry 
and agriculture to be constantly involved in technological innovations, along with the 
fact that they were always oriented to the market. As a result, the nation saw the 
development and spread of industrial activities and of industrial employment on the 
one hand and the spread and development of business activities and of business 
employment on the other. The consequence of the parallel development of industrial 
and business employment was the development of two parallel classes: the class of 
technicians and the class of businessmen, where only the first class is assumed 
indispensable for the collectivity. As Veblen states: 
 
“The technicians are indispensable to productive industry of this mechanical sort; [..] it follows that 
the material welfare of all the advanced industrial peoples rests in the hands of these technicians” 
(Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.84). 
 
Differently from point a), here Veblen intends to investigate the instinct of 
workmanship as the trait of the new emerging social class: technicians (see also 
Edgell, 2001, ch.7). Following this line Veblen identifies three interdependent aspects 
of workmanship: a) creativity, b) proficiency and c) “[the] technological mastery of 
facts” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.33). Creativity and proficiency are variables of 
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workmanship on which Veblen places little emphasis and they are not generally 
examined by the literature, while “the technological mastery of facts” is the main 
matter of investigation. With particular reference to this point it is possible to say that 
in Veblen’s view, facts prevail on the technological plane because they govern both 
culture and technique. So to Veblen’s mind, technology is a broad concept. In fact he 
does not limit technology to the mere mechanical and technical plane: it is first of all a 
matter of mental disposition to reasoning on evidence and facts. The central point on 
which technology depends is the current state of  matter of fact logic rather than the 
materialistic state of things. So technology is first of all a mental matter and then a 
material matter. But if technology is a variable of workmanship and technology is a 
mental matter, then workmanship is a mental and therefore a human trait (cf. John 
Maurice Clark (1960 [1948], pp.56-57). In these terms “the logic of workmanship” is 
mainly a “matter of fact[s]” and “matter of imputation” by which each event is 
observed in terms of evidence and “objective knowledge” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.55-
56). Such logic allows people to explain facts in terms of cause and effect. A logic 
working on this plane is able to structure the cultural patrimony and the general life of 
a collectivity in terms of realism, scepticism and materialism (see Veblen, 1904, ch. 9). 
Consequently, individuals are pushed to apprehend facts for what they objectively are 
(imputation) or for what they will objectively become (derivation). Veblen comments 
thus: 
 
“In the workmanlike apprehension [..] the nature of things is twofold: a) what can be done with them 
as raw material for use under the creative hand of the workman who makes things, and b) what they 
will do as entities acting in their own right and working out their own ends” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], 
p.54). 
 
If facts are interpreted by the above method then the instinct of workmanship forms an 
aptitude for change, for the evolution of thought and knowledge; consequently, this 
method of interpretation of facts can be considered to be at the basis of reformist 
attitudes (see ch. 3; see also Veblen, 1904, ch.9). 
B) Idle curiosity. Veblen looks at “idle curiosity” as “desire for knowledge” 
(Anderson, 1933, p.603). Veblen writes:  
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“Idle curiosity formulates its response to stimulus, not in terms of an expedient line of conduct, nor 
even necessarily in a chain of motor activity, but in terms of the sequence of activities going on in 
the observed phenomena” (Veblen, 1961 [1906a], p.7).  
 
In the presence of idle curiosity the observed phenomenon becomes the centre on 
which the individual focuses his/her attention. In particular the observed phenomena 
are not studied for a particular purpose; in other words they do not serve either 
individualistic or altruistic aims. The expedient line of conduct recalls the idea of 
action driven by the predatory instinct, the main self-interest instinct, while the chain 
of motor activity recalls the idea of matter-of-fact so of the instinct of workmanship, 
which is in fact an altruistic instinct at least in its effects and not in its purposes. On the 
other hand, in idle curiosity the cause of action is the knowledge of the observed 
phenomena and the effect of the same action continues to be the knowledge of the 
same observed phenomena. In this way the desire for knowledge becomes desire to 
provide answers to the phenomena as if the questions were raised by the phenomena 
themselves and not by the individual. Walker (1977, p.220) writes: “[Veblen] did not 
mean that the curiosity is idle or aimless, but that it operates only if there is surplus 
energy after the satisfaction of essential needs; and meant that humanity is motivated 
by a desire to discover knowledge independently of the desire for material gain and of 
any utilitarian aim”. It might be wrongly thought that Veblen looks at idle curiosity in 
terms of knowledge that is non-serviceable for the well-being of the collectivity. In 
view of the above, Veblen seems to emphasize the role of workmanship rather than 
idle curiosity for the well-being of society, but this does not mean idle curiosity does 
not positively affect social well-being since workmanship can be seen as an outcome 
of idle curiosity. In other words instincts are also overlapping (see Asso and Fiorito, 
2004). This is the particular interpretative line of the institutionalist economist 
Lawrence Kelso Frank (in Asso and Fiorito, 2004, p. 564) who in the 1920s wrote: 
“scientific and technological effort [..] has to wait for the emancipation of human 
intelligence from animistic belief and practices”. In fact in the long run idle curiosity 
entails a practical serviceability for society since a feature of gaining knowledge for 
the sake of knowledge is its systematisation. In other words vague answers in a quest 
for knowledge become certainties, and these same certainties will be selected for 
application to the needs of the human species (see Veblen 1922 [1914], p.87).        
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1.3.4 Workers   
 
Workers are the component of society engaged in industrial activity but unlike 
technicians “they supplement the machine process rather than make use of it” (Veblen, 
1922 [1914], p.307). Workers are economically dependent on undertakers and 
technically dependent on technicians so they mainly present a servile instinct that is 
functional to survival. As Walker (1977, p.230) writes, workers are the “amorphous, 
passive, and anonymous mass”. Workers represent the “people” (Veblen, 1899, 
p.187), the “inferior class” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.8), “common men” (Veblen, 
1975 [1899a], p.8), the “underlying population” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.72).  Veblen 
identifies workers as “common men” for two main reasons: a) they work to earn a 
livelihood rather than acting to “get something for nothing” – like the upper classes, b) 
they are numerous in the community (see Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.162).    
The inferior class takes a negative view of its own working activity, considering 
it irksome. Members of this class are inclined to consider their working activity as a 
source of useless effort. Unlike other classes, for the inferior class working activity is 
just a necessity and source of disutility. So workers highlight “[a] conventional 
antipathy to work” (Veblen, 1898a, p.190) unlike technicians who see their own work 
as a tool for the improvement of knowledge and skills, and unlike the leisure class that 
is in fact engaged not in working activities, but mainly in other more honorific 
activities - that is to say highly profitable activities which do not call for a particular 
physical or mental effort. As Veblen remarks:  
 
“With more or less sincerity, people currently avow an aversion to useful effort. The avowal does 
not cover all effort, but only such as is of some use; it is, more particularly, such effort as is vulgarly 
recognized to be useful labor” (Veblen, 1899, p.187).  
 
So it falls to workers to carry out those exhausting, modest, “unworthy” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.8) even if indispensable activities for the collectivity; workers’ activity has 
to do “directly with the everyday work of getting a livelihood” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], 
p.2). Moreover the allocation of workers to the productive sectors depends directly on 
the choices and behaviour of the upper classes about what must be produced and in 
what quantity. Workers are the identifiable “impecunious class” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.26) since they consume the whole of the income received for their activity. 
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Veblen does not spend much time on the analysis of the instincts and habits of thought 
of workers. He in fact attributes the instinct to the struggle for subsistence to them as 
well as a conservative – passive and docile – habit of thought. On this point in fact 
Veblen remarks:     
 
“The objectively poor and all those persons whose energies are entirely absorbed by the struggle for 
daily sustenance are conservative because they cannot afford the effort of taking thought for the day 
after to-morrow” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], pp.203-204; italics added).  
 
Note that the conservative habit of thought of workers is a consequence of low levels 
of subsistence. The lower the subsistence the lower the workers’ critical attitude of 
thought since if the subsistence is low workers only have energies for surviving. In 
fact even if the consequence of the passivity of the underlying population is low-level 
subsistence Veblen does not attribute an economic nature to this passivity, in the sense 
that the underlying population are not passive because there is some hypothetical 
benefit greater than the hypothetical cost of passivity. He instead attributes a 
metaphysical motive to the underlying population’s passivity. As he writes:    
 
“There is a naive, unquestioning persuasion abroad among the body of the people to the effect that, 
in some occult way, the material interests of the populace coincide with the pecuniary interests of 
those business men [..]. This persuasion is an article of popular metaphysics, in that it rests on an 
uncritically assumed solidarity of interests, rather than on an insight into the relation of business 
enterprise to the material welfare of those classes who are not primarily business men” (Veblen, 
1904, pp.286-287; italics added). 
 
Veblen adds that the primary principles of the metaphysical nature of the passivity of 
the underlying population are “patriotism and property” (Veblen, 1904, p.288) that are 
ruled by irrational motives: the “unreasoning sentiments”. As he remarks: 
 
“The substance of both is of the nature of unreasoning sentiment, in the sense that both are insisted 
on as a matter of course, as self-legitimating grounds of action which, it is felt, not only give 
expedient rules of conduct, but admit of no question as to their ulterior consequences or their value 
for the life-purposes of the community” (Veblen, 1904, p.288; italics added)26. 
                                                   
26 On this point Tsuru (1993)  has written: “Veblen […] differs from Marx and Engels in thinking that the 
state does not exclude the underlying population from the governing process for the reason that the 
business leadership would not be able to govern without ‘the advice and consent of the common run’ 
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Even if the passivity of the underlying population is a fact for Veblen based on 
irrational motives, in chapter 3 it will be argued how and under what circumstances the 
underlying population stops being passive. More specifically it will be argued how 
“unreasoning sentiments” push the underlying population into conflict with the upper 
classes when the real income is not in line with the subsistence wage.    
 
 
1.3.5 Instincts common to the social classes  
 
In view of what has been said, the institutional foundation of predatory instinct is 
ownership. According to Diggins (1977, p.123) this can give rise to an interesting 
question: “if property is founded upon conquest and seizure, must we conclude that 
man is aggressive and acquisitive?” As the same author remarks, some Veblenian 
instincts contain “the potential for contributing to the material welfare of the 
community” (Diggins, 1977, p.123; italics added) even though Veblen is not able to 
furnish an exhaustive explanation on their origins; Veblen in fact considers these 
altruistic attitudes as “unfolding impulsive activit[ies]” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.15) 
and more specifically he identifies three kinds of non-predatory instincts: a) the 
instinct of workmanship, b) the parental bent, and c) the instinct of solidarity and 
sympathy. The term potential is not used lightly by Diggins. In particular the author – 
interpreting Veblen – assumes such instincts as potential since their concrete form is 
mitigated by their propensity to corruptibility. As he writes “the instinct of 
workmanship can combine with a concern for beauty to produce goods which are both 
useful and aesthetic [..]. The parental bent is no less corruptible. It may have its origins 
in altruistic impulses, but it gives way to the ‘self-regarding sentiment’ of a 
‘gerontrocacy’ as subservience to able-bodied elders gains the upper hand in the 
increasingly predatory [..] culture” (Diggins, 1977, p.125; italics added). So Diggins 
seems to attribute an explicit intention – in Veblen - to describe the institutional 
development in regressive terms since such development is identified as cause of the 
process of corruption of the above and named as “innocent institutions” by him. In 
                                                                                                                                   
[…] Veblen was aware of a possible crisis [and] he developed a theory regarding the counter 
instruments to which the business leadership was expected to resort. Thus came his theory of ‘national 
integrity’ (or plain nationalism) into the picture. It had two aspects, namely: (1) equating the interests of 
business leadership with those of the nation as a whole; and (2) adopting aggressive policies towards the 
outside world, accompanied by the militarization of society”. 
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describing an evolutive process in regressive terms Diggins indirectly sees Veblen 
moving away from the strong, ‘positivistic’ Darwinian vision of selection. As Diggins 
writes with reference to Veblen “he could not accept the position of [..] Social 
Darwinists, who looked to the principle of natural selection as evidence that man is 
naturally combative and socially competitive”. In fact, in that “could not accept” 
Diggins shrewdly looks at the origin of Veblen’s normative position.     
Parental bent and the instinct of solidarity and sympathy denote an altruistic 
proclivity in the individual. They reveal aptitude for the well-being of other 
individuals on the part of the agent. The formal difference is that while the parental 
bent is the specific attitude to the well-being of family and descendants (see Veblen, 
1922 [1914], p.48) the instinct of solidarity and sympathy is the specific attitude to 
“charity, [to] social good-fellowship, or conviviality” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.333) 
that is, to the welfare of non-parental individuals or groups. So both the instincts are 
attitudes to the well-being of others and it is possible to increase others’ well-being if 
there is also an increase in efficiency. This is why Walker (1977, p.220) argues 
“[parental bent] reinforces the instinct of workmanship in the pursuit of efficiency”.  
 
 
1.4 Structural conflicts and unemployment 
 
In Veblen the life of social classes is characterised by a continuous conflict, conflict 
that finds its origin in institutional motives. More specifically, Veblen stresses that 
while the working class fights for subsistence, undertakers fight for wealth and the 
leisure class for excellence. So Veblen identifies three possible causes of conflict: a) 
the “struggle for subsistence”, b) the “struggle for wealth” and c) the “struggle to 
excel” (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.24). In fact subsistence, wealth and excellence are 
institutional causes of action – causes driven by habits of thought – of the social 
classes aiming at the possession of goods, but since the effects of these actions may 
diverge from the goals then the social classes may come into conflict with others that 
have hampered – or are thought to have hampered – the reaching of the goal. The 
above causes of actions and conflict are therefore all pooled into one goal: the 
possession of goods, i.e. the institution of ownership. As Veblen writes: 
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“Wherever the institution of private property is found, even in a slightly developed form, the 
economic process bears the character of a struggle between men for the possession of goods” 
(Veblen 1975 [1899a], p.24). 
 
On the whole the literature agrees on the interpretation of conflict in Veblen even if it 
limits its analysis to the macro plane. In other words it is generally recognized that the 
Veblenian conflict is a conflict of institutions for itself or a conflict of institutions in 
the distribution of wealth. More specifically the conflict of institutions derives from 
the “division of interest[s] between the business community, who do business for the 
[business purposes], and the underlying population, who work for a living” (Veblen 
2001 [1921], p.67) and who in fact “suffer the inconvenience of it all” (Veblen, 2001 
[1921], p.72). Anderson (1933, pp.620-621; see also Harris, 1951; 1953) for example 
remarks: “Veblen [fundamentally] conceives the  [major economic] problem to be that 
of constructing that set of institutions most effective in overcoming scarcity27. Harris 
(1951, p.68) adds that “in the struggle for existence [..] instincts [..] become organized 
into social habits, but the extent to which any one of them enters into the composition 
of habits is a matter of selective adaptation induced by changes in the material 
conditions of life”. The conflictualistic nature of Veblen’s vision is also emphasised by 
Edgell (1975, p.276) who in describing Veblen’s machine era (see ch.3) writes: “The 
climax of Veblen’s contribution was a concern to understand the social, economic and 
political ramifications of the negation of workmanship during the machine era that he 
attributed to the conflict between habits and institutions of business and industry”. In 
addition Edgell adds (2001 pp.5-6) that Veblen’s contraposition of industry and 
business probably finds its inspiration in the radical-populist movement of the 1890s 
which was engaged in a political conflict for the defence of farmers and “small-scale 
capitalism” against the increase of “monopolistic industrial capitalism”28. Moreover as 
Walker (1977, p.235) writes: “[Veblen] applied his theory to the special case of 
change under capitalism, portraying a conflict between the institutions of the system of 
natural rights and the institutions that result from the impact of the modern machine 
                                                   
27 “While [neoclassical economists] conceive[..] the economic problem to be one of making the best use of 
the resources already at hand within the existing framework of institutions” (Anderson, 1933, pp.620-
621). 
28 Veblen did not only make critiques on the spread of business culture in strictly productive sectors. Also 
relevant is his critique of the spread of business culture into the education sector. As Edgell (2001, p.21; 
italics added) stresses “the thrust of Veblen’s critical study was that businessmen, their priorities and 
their culture were increasingly dominating and contaminating American institutions of higher learning, 
to the detriment of the disinterested growth of knowledge”.   
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process”. Tilman (2003, pp.xv-xvi) has recently argued that “Veblen’s theory is 
powerfully dualistic” and that this dualism is evident in all such occasions in which 
Veblen argues his case in a conflictual manner, using expressions such as “struggle 
between animistic and the matter-of fact”, [..] “between business and industry”, 
“between pecuniary and industrial employment”, “between those who make money 
and those who produce socially useful goods and services, etc”29. Finally Viano (2005, 
p.241) recently wrote “[Veblen] believed that struggle is a constant trait of modern 
societies and shapes all aspects of their institutions”.  
Next to the idea of  conflict over the distribution of resources – which will be 
reconsidered in chapter 3 –the literature has given less emphasis to micro conflict, that 
is to say to conflict within firms between undertakers and technicians, which can be 
recognized as the main cause of unemployment in Veblen. So unemployment appears 
to be determined by the outcome of the conflict within the firm, involving contrasting 
aims and contrasting instincts, and in particular its level depends on the result of 
conflict between undertakers and technicians. Let us see why: the conflict between 
undertakers and technicians is not a conflict over the necessities of life. It is a conflict 
between tendentially incompatible instincts. undertakers in fact pursue the aim of 
monetary profits via predatory instincts while technicians are interested in expanding 
production via the use of new scientific knowledge being driven by the instinct of 
workmanship. So conflict between undertakers and technicians derives from the 
‘clash’ between tendentially incompatible instincts: workmanship against predation. 
                                                   
29 So unlike neoclassic economics Veblen looks at the economy in non-cooperative terms. As remarked by 
Realfonzo (1995, p.18) the market economy is assumed to be cooperative for two main reasons: a) 
“absence of powers and class struggle”, b) working of “a principle of distributive equity” (see Clark, 
1965 [1889]). In particular the two points are closely connected since each agent is assumed to be 
completely free to take her/his decision on how, where and what to produce. In addition if each agent is 
free to choose how to participate in production s/he will obtain remuneration that will be exactly 
proportional to her/his contribution. In addition, if the remuneration is proportionate to the contribution 
to production, then remuneration is in fact considered fair. Consequently, conflict does not occur since 
each agent knows perfectly what contribution to the production has been given and what remuneration 
is due. However conflict is not completely excluded and it is connected to market rigidity. In fact when 
the market economy works correctly, all markets are in equilibrium since flexibility of prices allows the 
equality between demand and supply. As a result, conflict does not occur if flexibility of prices is 
guaranteed since in this case each agent is able to reach an equilibrium between what s/he asks for and 
what s/he supplies. If conflict exists markets are not actually in equilibrium and in fact this is possible if 
an external rigidity does not allow the equality between demand and supply (cf. Forges Davanzati, 
1999, p.11). In addition in a market economy the equilibrium of the markets ensures that the conflict is 
in fact removed ex ante since each agent has collected all the information that is needed to obtain an 
effective result equal to the expected one. This point is well expressed by Basile and Casavola (1992, 
p.10) who remark: “[..] in the Walrasian word agents must agree ex ante on all the relevant variables [..] 
As the information structure is complete, time is irrelevant and terms of trade are always known to the 
agents ex ante. Conflicts of interest and related problems of enforcing terms of transactions do not come 
to the surface as they can be solved by a costless long-term contract”.  
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The result of this conflict is the definition of a level of production in line with the 
decisions of the ‘winners’ of the conflict, and the effects of these decisions have a 
positive or negative effect on the level of employment. If predation defeats 
workmanship then production and employment decrease; on the other hand, if 
workmanship defeats predation then production and employment increase. More 
specifically, both undertakers and technicians mainly define their own production 
target according to the intensity of their own instinct. The predation of undertakers is 
shown in the desire to obtain the maximum competitive advantage in terms of profit 
while the workmanship of technicians is shown in the desire to obtain the maximum 
production for giving concrete form to their efficiency, knowledge and skills. It is 
possible that the production function of the firm – that could be called workmanship 
function – is composed of the following variables – (see O’Hara 2000, p.72) – a) 
technology, b) workers’ skills and knowledge and c) the “stock and rate of utilization 
of the available capital stock”. Given this representation of Veblen’s hypothetical 
production function, it is possible to assume that the technological state, the state of 
knowledge and skills and the stock of capital are given in the short run; as a 
consequence, the effective production depends only on the degree of utilization of 
capital. The number of workers employed in the firm becomes a function of the capital 
stock and rate of utilization, and since the capital stock is given, the number of 
workers becomes a function of the rate of capital utilization30. Given the technology, 
knowledge, skills and stock of capital, the production can be definable as a function of 
the demand for labour which in turn becomes a function of the rate of utilization of 
capital. If the rate of capital utilization increases then employment increases too and 
vice versa. If employment is a function of the rate of utilization of capital then we need 
to investigate this rate. We can consider the degree of capital utilization to be equal to 
the effective output/potential output ratio. Potential output is an increasing function of 
the technicians’ production aim given information on the non-bankruptcy condition. 
Effective output is instead the result of the conflict between undertakers and 
                                                   
30 Implicitly here the production function is assumed at constant return in line with a non marginalist 
construction of models and in absence of alternative and clear positions by Veblen. Mouhammed (2003) 
argues that – with the theory of economic growth (see § 2.3)  - Veblen removes validity from the law of 
decreasing return of inputs. On this point Mouhammed (2003, p.151) writes: "Technology (the industrial 
arts or the joint stock of knowledge) is a social ownership of the community and is accumulated over time. 
However, by private ownership of the means of production capitalists invariably manage to appropriate 
the benefits of the technological advantages, which should have been imputed to the community. Thus, for 
Veblen, the neoclassical marginal productivity theory cannot be applied either to the tangible (or the 
durable part of the capital) or to the intangible part". 
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technicians given the expectations on demand on the part of undertakers. So it is 
possible to define k* as the undertakers’ goal of capital utilization and k0 the 
technicians’ goal of capital utilization. The effective rate of utilization of capital is the 
result of conflict between undertakers and technicians. In fact conflict occurs when k* 
is different from k0 and the intensity of conflict depends on the bargaining power of 
undertakers and technicians, which depends on: a) the technicians’ degree of docility, 
which in turns depends on the wage they are paid; it is reasonable to think that the 
higher the wage, the higher the docility of technicians in the conflict against 
undertakers, b) the extent to which the firm is capital intensive since it can reasonably 
be argued that the higher the capital/labour ratio, the more necessary technicians are in 
implementing the production process and c) the number of technicians. Points b and c 
are strictly connected since in both cases the bargaining power of technicians is high; 
in fact when the capital/labour rate is in favour of capital, technicians are more 
necessary for undertakers. Consequently while the number of workers is reduced the 
number of technicians is increased, and as a result technicians acquire a higher 
bargaining power than undertakers31. 
                                                   
31 Note that considering the position played within the firm it is reasonable to think that technicians have 
more bargaining power than workers so they have higher wages. The wage differential existing between 
technicians and workers is not simply the result of the differential of skills and efficiency between them 
but it is probably the result of the conflict that naturally exists within the firm between undertakers and 
technicians. In other words the wage differential can be seen as a “discipline device” for technicians or 
rather as a tool for assuring their docility and avoiding conflict. As Veblen writes “by settled habit the 
technicians, the engineers and industrial experts, are a harmless and docile sort, well fed on the whole, 
and somewhat placidly content with the “full dinner-pail” which the lieutenants of the Vested Interests 
habitually allow them” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.83; italics added). Moreover, one could argue that the 
undertakers’ bargaining power increases if the  technicians’ unemployment rate increases since 
undertakers could obtain the docility of technicians with a strong threat of dismissal. Supposing there is 
high undertaker bargaining power, the docility of technicians increases; as a consequence the 
undertakers’ predatory instinct ‘swamps’ the technicians’ instinct of workmanship, and the more docile 
the technicians, the easier it is to control and under-use capital. This in turns determines a reduction of 
real production, a reduction of employment, an increase in prices and an increase in monetary profits. 
Expanding the Veblenian theory of under-utilization of capital it could be argued that the bargaining 
power of firms increases if policies of deregulation of labour market are in place. Deregulation of the 
labour market includes two kinds of arguments: a) deregulation of the labour market in the strict sense 
(sometimes simply called deregulation of the labour market) and b) deregulation of the labour contract. 
The first type of deregulation places limits on the presence of the State – and other institutional 
organizations (Trade Unions above all) – during the bargaining between firms and employees over 
wages and unemployment benefits. On the other hand, deregulation of the labour contract eliminates 
constraints on the influence of the State – and other institutional organizations – over working hours, 
firms’ freedom to hire and fire and workers’ mobility within firms. Here with the term ‘deregulation of 
the labour contract’ will entail considering both the deregulation of the labour market in a strict sense 
and the deregulation of the labour contract. So policies of labour market deregulation could have a  
negative effect on the level of production, and as a consequence, while the degree of capital utilization 
falls, unemployment, prices and profits rise. In brief, the Veblenian theory of under utilization of capital 
could also explain a probable process of stagflation. More specifically, if there is unemployment and 
policies of deregulation of the labour market, then the threat of dismissal of technicians becomes more 
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The rate of utilization of capital taken as the technicians’ goal is however subject to 
constraints and it is reasonable to think that k0 meets a constraint in the non-bankruptcy 
condition, i.e. the firm does not produce at a loss but at least at a nil profit. On the 
other hand k* is determined on the basis of market demand which has an upward or 
downward slope and is tendentially inelastic. Veblen implicitly assumes that all goods 
produced are goods with a low degree of replaceability and Sweezy (1957) and Arrow 
(1975) argues that the market structure is one of monopolistic competition. There is 
another important consideration to make: Veblen does not rule out an upward sloping 
demand curve, so that demand increases if the price of goods increases (particularly 
for luxury goods), an effect that in the literature has been called “the Veblen effect” 
(see Leibenstein 1950; see also ch.2). It is important to notice – although Veblen does 
not directly remark on this point – that his theory of under-utilization of capital can be 
built on the implicit assumption that this effect is not in operation; in fact if this effect 
were in operation the internal conflict would not occur since the aim of maximization 
of production for technicians would also be the aim of the undertakers. So the 
undertakers’ opposition to the maximization of production is connected to the nature 
of the goods produced or to the policies of differentiation put in place by undertakers 
via business activities when the Veblen effect is absent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
realistic, and their market wage can be reduced as well. The undertakers’ bargaining power increases 
and that of technicians declines; as a result, the conflict between undertakers and technicians is to the 
advantage of undertakers, who reduce production – determining a reduction of employment – while 
prices and monetary profits increase: Deregulation has therefore generated stagflation (see also Pacella, 
2005a, 2005b; 2006a). In addition if the threat of dismissal increases and if wages decrease (in the 
whole working class) the demand for wage goods diminishes. In this case the degree of capital 
utilization decreases again and its under-utilization is no longer profitable since demand is low. In this 
case, the system works by an additional reduction of the degree of capital utilization, which makes 
unemployment rise and prices and profits fall. In this case a vicious circle could be generated if policies 
of regulation are not introduced. In fact if profits decrease, undertakers could react with an additional 
wage cut, but this would push them to make an additional reduction of demand, which would a drop in 
production, employment, prices, and profits. Since an endogenous change appears to be unlikely due to 
the predatory nature of undertakers, then policies of labour market regulation become essential. These 
in fact bring about an increase in employment and production via the increase in wages and/or the 
reduction of threat of dismissal thanks to the increased bargaining power of technicians, who can now 
give concrete form to their instinct of workmanship through the increase in production, and thanks to 
the increased demand to which undertakers react by raising production at least up to a profitable level.    
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C h a p t e r  I I  
 
PRODUCTION, INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH  
 
 
2.1 Credit, prices and the circuit of income 
 
As anticipated in chapter 1, alongside the idea of conflictual economy, the Veblenian 
macroeconomic process is built with the additional hypothesis that the current 
economy is a credit economy. In the Theory of Business Enterprise (ch.6) Veblen 
makes a brief evolutionary analysis of the role of money in the economy. Here he 
stresses that the economy was primarily a “natural economy”, which then changed into 
a monetary economy and finally into a credit economy: the current economy. Veblen 
distinguishes the three economies on the basis of the goods exchanged and the aim of 
these exchanges. More specifically, Veblen remarks that in the “natural economy” the 
main market is the commodities market in which the goods exchanged are the outputs 
which are exchanged with the aim of having sources of material serviceability; in the 
monetary economy the main market continues to be the commodities market but 
outputs are not exchanged to obtain goods but to have just one good: money. However 
– Veblen  adds – the possibility of making money depends on the capacity to produce 
goods that provide a material serviceability. On the other hand the credit economy – 
Veblen stresses – is an economy in which the institution of ownership and the 
“pecuniary principles” are the “spiritual fonts” of firms (see Veblen, 1904, ch.4). In 
such an economy, credit has a fundamental role in production. More specifically in 
Veblen’s vision “credit is an expedient of business [and] business men resort to credit 
for the sake of gain being counted in money values” (Veblen, 1905, p.461). In 
particular Veblen gives credit two functions: a) the function of “loans or debts – notes, 
stock shares, interestbearing securities, deposits, call loans, etc”. (Veblen, 1904, p.92) 
and b) the function to postpone payments (see Veblen, 1904, ch.5)32. While the first 
                                                   
32 With reference to the second function of credit Veblen states that the industrial system is a complex 
structure based on a construction of interdependent relationships formalized by contracts of purchase 
and sale amongst firms. Such contracts define sales and purchases in terms of monetary values and are 
regularized by credit agreements under the specific form of postponement of payments (see Veblen, 
1904, ch.7).  
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kind of credit precedes production the second one follows it. Consequently it is 
reasonable to think that Veblen makes reference to “loans or debts” as tools for 
financing production33. The issue of credit as loans or debt is widely studied by 
Veblen, in particular under two main aspects: a) its relation with the formation of 
prices and b) its relation with the formation of profits. While the topic of credit-profits 
will be examined in section 2.2.2 here let us see the credit-prices relation. In particular 
according to the author, in a monetary economy the variation of prices depends:  a) on 
the variation of quantity of money demand of firms, that is to say the demand for 
credit; b) on the variation of interest rate. Let us see the first point. Veblen has a clear 
idea that an increased money demand by firms is a sufficient cause of the increase of 
prices. His work “Credit and Prices” (1905) is the main source with which it is 
possible to explain why a causal relation exists between money demand by firms and 
prices. As Veblen writes:  
 
“A pronounced advance in prices [that] results in an increase extension of credit seems plain from 
what happens during a [..] speculative advance (Veblen, 1905, p.461) [and] closely related to the 
expansion of credit [..] is a large volume of new capitalization” (Veblen, 1905, p.463).  
 
In Veblen money is demanded to obtain profits and – according to the author (see § 
2.2.2) – profits increase if the firm’s dimension increases. Why this happens will be 
explained in section 2.2.2. Here it is sufficient to say that Veblen always assumes that 
the firm’s size is the competitive factor, that is to say the factor that assures 
profitability to firm. More specifically Veblen stresses that firm size is functional to 
the realization of monopolist markets, in which undertakers can obtain high profits via 
the control of prices. The consequence is that the higher the money demand, the 
greater the firm’s size and the higher the prices.  
                                                   
33 Using money as a financing tool is different from its use as a payment tool. In the last case money 
serves to obtain the ownership of the use of given products and services. In other words the use of 
money as a tool of payment releases the purchaser from the obligation to pay as soon as the product or 
service is bought or used. This also means that the product or service has been produced, is being 
produced, or will be produced independently of the existence of money. In brief, money supplies 
serviceability just in the moment of exchange, and therefore in a subsequent phase of production. On 
the other hand if money is used as a financing tool then it supplies serviceability in the starting phase of 
production. In other words the existence of products and services presupposes the foregoing existence 
of money and not vice versa (see Graziani, 2003; Realfonzo, 2003). Following Graziani’s distinctions 
(2003) between pure monetary economy and pure credit economy, one can classify Veblen’s picture as 
a monetary-credit economy or simply – as Veblen sums it up  - as a credit economy since he often 
speaks at the same time about money as a financing tool and a tool of payment. Veblen’s theory of the 
monetary-financial market is also interesting because the author puts the financial market on the same 
level as the monetary market in the phase of financing production. 
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Veblen however remarks that the use of credit is not only motivated by monopolist 
aims. In fact competition itself is a cause of the increase of money demand and 
increase of prices. More specifically, due to competitive pressure the individual firm is 
forced to expand its capital via the use of credit, but “since the advantage to be derived 
from this expedient is a competitive advantage only, the universality of the practice 
results in but a slight, if any, increase of the aggregate earnings of the business 
community” (Veblen, 1904, p.98). Insofar as firms are not homogeneous, the credit 
system tends spontaneously to contribute to the increase in the size of the biggest 
firms: “since an advance of credit rests on the collateral as expressed in terms of 
value” (Veblen, 1904, p.105), firms with a higher amount of collateral obtain a higher 
amount of credit and, hence, can expand, thus gaining further advantages over their 
(smaller) competitors. As a result, an ‘imperfect’ credit market is likely to 
spontaneously generate a selection of firms on the basis of their collateral, thus 
allowing the expansion of the bigger firms and the possible bankruptcy of the smaller 
firms. Moreover, the bigger firms can increase their prices thanks to their additional 
enlargement but also because the increase of bankruptcies reduces the aggregate 
output.  Note that, in both cases, bank-firm relationships do not affect the volume of 
aggregate production, but simply redistribute aggregate profits among firms34. 
Let us see the second point. As we have seen above, Veblen structures a 
positive relation between quantity of money demand and profits (see § 2.2.2). On the 
quantity of money demanded firms have to pay interest. Interest is seen by Veblen as 
financial cost that can reduce profits. In other words Veblen himself defines an inverse 
relation between interest rate and profit rate since – given a firm’s size – the increase 
in interest reduces profits since financing costs increase and revenues are the same. As 
Veblen argues, a variation of the interest rate, in fact, “diminishes the aggregate net 
profits […] in that it requires them to pay interest” (Veblen, 1904, p.112; italics 
added).  
                                                   
34 On the interpretation of the determination of prices and possible inflationary consequences in Veblen’s 
thought, Mouhammed (2003, p.163) stresses that in Veblen’s thought: “i) prices [..] are created by large 
corporations through restricting the output of the machine industry in order to generate required rates of 
profits; ii) they can depend on the increased money supply; iii) they can be generated via social conflict 
within the firm, since “unionised workers can slow down productivity and thus increase the per unit 
costs of output, a condition that forces producers to raise relative prices in order to defend their rate of 
profits” (On the effect conflict-inflation see also § 3.3c).  
 
 61
The decrease of profits can push firms to disinvest and as a result, output decreases 
and prices increase. At the same time however the process of disinvestment does not 
appear so obvious; in fact if financing costs increase firms can reply by merging 
operations that lead to an increase in size and therefore in prices. In other words new 
capitalizations are not necessarily stopped if interest rates increase since “[the] large 
volume of new capitalization [can also have] the form of new incorporations or 
expansions and coalitions of corporations already in existence” (Veblen, 1905, p.463).  
Since: i) the functioning of the credit market contributes to expanding firm size 
and ii) a positive relation between firm’s capitalization and its profits is assumed, one 
can draw the following conclusion. In Veblen’s view, high profits derive from high 
prices (and low levels of production), and high profits derive from high volume of 
finance: as a result, the higher the amount of finance, the higher the price level. 
Moreover, since the increase in the interest rate reduces  aggregate money profits, one 
can argue that two possible reactions on the part of firms are in order: a) they increase 
prices, if demand is high enough (i.e. the argument of “what the traffic will bear”) and 
this strategy is likely to be effective in the event that the functioning of the credit 
market determines a lower intensity of competition in the market for goods; b) in the 
opposite case, the increase in the interest rate generates disinvestments (hence, a drop 
of output and the consequent price increases). In both cases a direct relationship 
between interest rate and the price level holds.  
Given the above premise on the Veblenian credit economy let us show a 
possible representation of the Veblenian circuit of income in the following figure: 
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Figure 1: The Veblenian circuit of income I 35 
 
The Veblenian circuit of income is formed by the working of two main markets: a) the 
monetary-financial market (generally understood as the credit system) and b) the 
commodities market with the first preceding the second. In addition in the Veblenian 
circuit of income three classes are involved: a) the leisure class, that is to say the 
financers’ class; b) the undertakers, that is to say the class of manager-owners of firms 
and c) the class of technicians and workers.  From the above schema it is can be said 
that the leisure class directly controls undertakers and indirectly technicians and 
workers36. On the other hand, undertakers directly control technicians and indirectly 
workers. Finally technicians directly control workers37. The leisure class is 
                                                   
35 C = consumption, R = reimbursement of loans. 
36 It is important to notice that Veblen is not steady in maintaining a clear opposition between the leisure 
class and undertakers. Consequently the possibility that undertakers are also members of leisure class is 
not completely excluded by Veblen in his writings even though for the purpose of the present work the 
hypothesis of the overlapping between leisure class and undertakers is not taken into consideration. 
37 Before showing Veblen’s circuit in detail it would seem useful to give a brief description of Marx’s 
money capital circuit (Capital Vol 2 part 1; see on this point the clear description presented by 
Bellofiore, Forges Davanzati and Realfonzo, 2000). This description is useful for a better understanding 
of Veblen’s circuit since Veblen seems to want to maintain the Marxian logic chain of money-goods-
money even if in describing the monetary economy Veblen does not explain the determinant of profits 
as in Marx; he in fact limits his hypothetical analysis of the circuit of income to the role of money in the 
sense that for Veblen the process starts from money and finishes in money via the commodities market 
without however tracing the origin of profits within the production process. In addition note that a 
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superordinate to the other social classes; its superordinacy is due to its capacity to 
control the monetary-financial market; the control can be direct when the leisure class 
manages the banking system or indirect when the volume of money is mainly 
concentrated in its hands. More specifically the leisure class controls the credit sector 
mainly on the side of quantity of financing supplied, since it owns the right to the 
production of money historically acquired; it also sets the interest rate at which they 
are interested to supply the financing. Moreover members of the leisure class can 
control firms also by means of the ownership of firm’s stocks (often called intangible 
assets):  
 
“The free income which is capitalized in the intangible assets of the vested interests goes to support 
the well-to-do investors, who are for this reason called the kept classes, and whose keep consists in 
an indefinitely extensible consumption of superfluities” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], ch.5). 
                                                                                                                                   
considerable part of the literature sees Veblen as proposing the Marxian vision of capitalism. On this 
point see for example Harris (1958), Knight (1969), Sowell (1987). Rutherford (1984, pp.121-122) for 
example argues that “there is [in Veblen] a dialectic reminiscent of Marx: the internal logic of a system 
giving rise to contradictions that create its own transformation”. In addition O’Hara (2000, pp.67 ff.) 
remarks that “strong associations between Marx and Veblen” exist; in particular the author remarks that 
both the authors in fact accept the idea of the materialistic conception of history and they both place 
importance on the “technological and social relationship” of capitalism even if the approach to the 
“directive motion” of capitalism is in fact absent in Veblen. Like Marx – O’Hara adds – Veblen finds 
positive aspects and negative aspects of capitalism; in Veblen for example the main positive aspect is 
the development of technology, while negative aspects are “long-term crises, the private expropriation 
of the economic surplus by the vested interest, the financial domination of industry, etc.”. On the other 
hand, Edgell and Townshend (1993, p.313) point out that Veblen’s thought appears to be different from 
Marx stressing that “Veblen’s theory of increasing status competition, expressed in terms of a ‘struggle 
to keep up appearances’ is alternative to Marx’s theory of increasing class conflict”. Now let us briefly 
describe the Marxian’s circuit. As we know, Marx’s circuit of money capital features three steps: a) the 
use of money for the purchase of inputs (raw materials and labour force); b) the process of production 
and valorisation – in quantitative terms - of outputs; c) the selling of outputs at a higher value than that 
of the inputs employed. The surplus obtained by the sale is ploughed back into the purchase of new 
inputs to start a new circuit: accumulation for accumulation. As also remarked by O’Hara (2000, ch.2), 
Marx considers the buying and selling phases as movements of “formal capital” which in fact is the 
expression of the separation between social classes: the capitalists that own the means of production and 
who need workers for the production of a surplus and workers that just own their own labour force and 
need capitalists so as to obtain wages. The commodities market and labour market are the main markets 
on which Marx bases his theory of circuit of capital where the labour market is superordinate to the 
commodity market (cf. Veblen’s credit economy). Capitalists meet workers at the labour market; here 
capitalists sell their own money capital in exchange for labour force, then they use the labour force to 
produce outputs with a higher value than what was advanced for them; such outputs are then sold into 
the commodities market and here capitalists obtain the money capital advanced to workers plus the 
surplus originating in the production phase. The process of valorisation of outcome is not identified by 
Marx in the lattermost phases (purchasing and sale) but in the movement of “real capital” in other 
words in the production process. Marx sees the labour force as source of surplus since the means of 
production cannot add more value to the outcome than what was absorbed by them. In Marx, value is 
the quantity of labour employed in the production, so if a mechanical tool has been produced by – for 
example – 40 hours of labour then its contribution to the valorisation of new products cannot go over 40 
hours. On the contrary this limit does not occur for workers and the size of the surplus is equal to the 
difference between the labour that is needed to produce outputs and the labour that is necessary for the 
production that assures the workers’ subsistence.  
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Note the kind of control of the monetary market is not equal to the kind of control of 
the financial market. In the monetary market the leisure class can control the price of 
financing – that is to say the interest rate – while the quantity of money depends on 
firms’ demand. At the same time in the financial market the leisure class can control 
the quantity of financing by the acquisition of stocks and bonds issued by undertakers 
but not their remuneration since while the remuneration of stocks depends on 
dividends produced by firms the remuneration of bonds depends on the interest rate 
fixed by undertakers, even if it is reasonable to think that undertakers fix the interest 
rate with reference to the interest rate of the monetary market.   
In view of what has been said, although Veblen includes a variety of subjects 
within the leisure class for the purpose of the interpretation proposed here the leisure 
class is assumed to be formed only by those who obtain money gains without directly 
contributing to the production of goods: namely, financiers, rentiers and bankers. 
Although Veblen does not stress this point it would be possible to attribute the role of 
“captain of finance” to the leisure class; the term is used here to indicate the pre-
eminent role at the top of the industrial system, serving to finance the production 
sector, and in opposition to the role of “captain of industry” given to undertakers38. 
                                                   
38 In fact Veblen is not clear in distinguishing captain of industry from captain of finance; he sometimes 
uses the terms synonymously; other times he seems to give the name captain of industry to financers 
and sometimes he gives the name captain of finance to undertakers; so the owners are sometimes 
financers and undertakers are simple business men, therefore mere managers (see Veblen 2001 [1921], 
ch. II and III). This lack of clarity is due to the fact that the idea of financer in Veblen is broader than 
may be imagined. In other words the distinction between captain of finance and captain of industry 
would be clear if the financer granted his/her financing only by forms of credit agreement; in this case 
the separation of the figure of creditor and owner of the firm is clear. On the other hand when a financer 
grants financing through operations of copartnership in the capital of firm than the figure of financer 
mingles with the figure of owner and in fact the captain of finance is also captain of industry. In the 
present work however greater emphasis will be placed on separating the roles of captain of finance from 
captain of industry for the purpose of investigate how the economic choices of the top class of the 
industrial system can affect the working of the economic system as a whole.  At the same time Veblen 
sometimes calls undertakers captains of industry or businessmen and on this pint Veblen writes “captain 
of industry [is] the absentee owner and controller of industrial equipment and resources” (Veblen, 1967 
[1923], p.70). According to Dixon (2002, p.202) Veblen’s theory of  “captain of industry [..] posed 
serious issues for economic analysis and political economy [such as]: What were the implications of the 
rise of this class of people [..] for theories of income distribution? What were the implications for likely 
future relations between labor and capital?”. In view of what has been said above, undertakers and 
financers can be a single unit or separate units. One could argue that Veblen separates undertakers from 
financers not on the level of their aim – both undertakers and financers act to obtain pecuniary gains – 
but in the sense of expertise. On this point Veblen for example remarks that “it is currently believed, 
probably on sufficient grounds, that the corporations can make more profitable use of the property than 
the buyers of the securities, particularly a more profitable use than the buyers could make of it without 
spending additional time and attention in the management of the property” (Veblen, 1905, p.463).  
However Chypher (1988) interpreting Veblen does not distinguish financers from undertakers 
remarking on the possibility of a direct management of industry by the financial sector. On this point 
Chypher (1988, p.78) states that “the Veblenian dichotomy between “Captain of industry” and 
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The leisure class is the main “pecuniary class” in the society; in addition if Veblen 
defines the leisure class as the pecuniary class then it is reasonable to think that the 
primary good sought by the leisure class is money and money is accumulated and used 
by the leisure class for purposes of ostentation; in the same time members of the 
leisure class are excluded from productive activities; this necessarily calls for different 
activities from which the leisure class can obtain money. The simplest way of 
accumulating money without engaging in productive labour is the accumulation of 
money from money and the activity of financing – by the monetary and financial 
market – appears to be the first way in which the leisure class, in line with its own 
traits, obtains money.  As Veblen remarks: 
 
“The relation of the leisure class [..] to the economic process is a pecuniary relation – a relation of 
acquisition, not of production; of exploitation, not of serviceability” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.209).  
 
He also adds: “indirectly their economic office may, of course, be of the utmost 
importance to the economic life process” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.209; italics added) 
and in a context of a current credit economy the most important “economic office” is 
the monetary-financing sector. There is another interesting quotation that can be 
considered for the purpose of extending the role of the leisure class to the banking 
sector. Veblen stresses that: 
 
“The changed industrial life requires changed methods of acquisition; and the pecuniary classes have 
some interest in so adapting the pecuniary institutions as to give them the best effect for acquisition 
of private gain that is compatible with the continuance of the industrial process out of which this 
gain arises” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.209).  
 
On the above quotation it is possible to remark that the process of exploitation of the 
leisure class derives from the adaptation of “pecuniary institutions” to the “industrial 
process”; without such adaptation exploitation is not ‘justifiable’. In other words, if 
money did not have an institutional role as a habit of the production and distribution of 
income then the social role of leisure class would be nil. In consequence the money-
goods-money relation in Veblen seems to have a strong institutional base. It is a 
                                                                                                                                   
“Captains of Finance” no longer existed [since] investment bankers who dominated the financial sphere 
intermingled with those who operated the [..] industries”. 
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“habit” and – expanding Veblen’s thought – a habit of thought instrumental to the 
current perseverance of the leisure class.  
Hence – interpreting and expanding Veblen’s idea – the control of the 
monetary-financial sector is the task of the leisure class for two main reasons: a) the 
leisure class owns money and b) the financing activity is a concrete example of 
unproductive labour typical of members of the leisure class. The execution of a pure 
credit activity suits the leisure class since it is both a deserving activity and a font of 
income; moreover, it supplies a font of income without the need to make any kind of 
effort. In particular, monetary-financial activity is a non-productive activity in a strict 
sense; at the same time it is “decent” since it is ‘serviceable’ to the collectivity in the 
sense that it serves for financing production; in addition it is “conventional evidence of 
wealth” since the leisure class has money which conventionally represents the 
fundamental resource for the economy and sign of social status. In brief the 
conventional right to the abstention from labour is a consequence of the possession of 
money, which is a conventional trait of conspicuous leisure.  
The above leisure class and  undertakers are allocated in the circuit. More 
specifically undertakers meet financers in the monetary-financial market selling 
promises of payment (by bonds, loans, etc.) and company shares in exchange for the 
financers’ money: “pecuniary capital”. The aim of undertakers and financers is to 
increase the value of money capital bought and sold in the monetary-financial market, 
in other words undertakers want to have profits, financers want to have monetary gains 
(interest, dividends)39. The demand for monetary capital is in the hands of undertakers 
and depends on expected profits and on the cost of financing; moreover the 
expectation of profit depends on the expected demand and also on conjectures on the 
behaviour of its competitors. In the monetary-financial market undertakers establish 
the monetary capital of their own firm, then they invest this capital acquiring tools for 
generating income. This point will be investigated in greater depth in the section 2.2.2 
but here it is useful to notice that Veblen divides capital into “intangible” – think for 
instance of brand-names - and “tangible” goods or assets (mechanical equipment); at 
the same time undertakers employ a number of workers proportionate to the 
necessities imposed by the management of mechanical equipment and to the execution 
                                                   
39 Dividends being portions of profit, financers also formally become undertakers; however if their 
contribution to the management of the firm is purely nominal then in practice they continue to play the 
role of financer of the firm.    
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of business activities. The capital owned by undertakers is then used for producing 
goods and services which are then sold on the commodities market. Here the 
pecuniary capital is recovered.  
The role of workers is simply instrumental for undertakers since the concrete 
management of machines and the execution of business activities is attributed to 
technicians, while the choice of entity of capital and its strategic differentiation 
between tangible and intangible asset is at the basis of the making of profits. In view 
of what has been said, three main variables affect the quantity of financing: the supply 
of financers40, the price of financing and the expected profits of undertakers. The 
initial process of production depends on the undertakers’ decisions on the type and 
size of tangible and intangible capital chosen for the firm’s activity. The number of 
workers and technicians employed will just depend on the necessities connected to the 
management of tangible and intangible capital. In Veblen therefore the labour market 
is a ‘residual’ market in the sense that the level of employment is not set via the 
intersection between the demand for labour and labour supply; moreover, wages are 
different for workers and technicians, in fact, two wage levels are identifiable: a) a 
money wage for the payment of workers which is negotiated by undertakers and 
workers 
_
w  and b) a wage for technicians wT which is negotiated by undertakers and 
technicians and is higher than the subsistence wage. Technicians and workers are 
subordinated to undertakers since they are dependent workers while workers are 
subordinated to technicians since they depend on the instructions of their technical 
managers. Note that wage is paid by the monetary capital of undertakers and/or by 
monetary capital of leisure class. When workers and technicians receive their wage – 
which is paid in advance – they start production of goods and services41; when 
production is completed the output is allocated in the market at a profitable price fixed 
by the firm. All the classes contribute to the consumption of output whose quantity is 
however maintained at a level lower that the real needs. The limitation of production 
maintains prices at a high level and also helps to recover the pecuniary capital in a 
brief time. The pecuniary capital recovered on the commodities market will be paid 
back to financers (owners of bonds and credit agreements) or eventually maintained 
                                                   
40 Although Veblen also recognizes the possibility that the financing of production is guaranteed by the 
firm itself by the process of self-financing, re-investing the profits realized (see Veblen 1904, ch.5 and 
ch.6). 
41 Supposing that firms are vertically integrated. 
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within the firm (if financers are joint owners of the firm). In both cases the pecuniary 
capital recovered will be used afresh for new capitalization and production.  
Different authors look at Veblen’s circuit of income production in terms of 
monetary-credit economy. Dillard (1987) for example argues that in Veblen’s vision 
the money supply is in fact endogenous, the interest rate is a pure monetary 
phenomenon and production starts with the demand for ‘initial finance’ on the part of 
firms. Moreover the author finds significant analogies between Veblen’s and Keynes’s 
views of the functioning of monetary economies. On this point Dillard (1987, p.1646) 
writes: “Money is a form of private property that wealth holders in business enterprise 
economy at times treasure more than income itself. It is a device for limiting losses in 
a profit-and-loss economy. The moral of Veblen’s teaching is that in a pecuniary 
economy, monetary values dominate industrial values” (Dillard, 1987, p.1646)42. 
Moreover Parker Foster and Ranson (1987, p.228) maintain that “The conclusion 
reached by both Veblen and Keynes is that the traditional theory of production is 
flawed. Production is governed not by real exchanges but by the institution of money. 
Production continues only as permitted by the creation of new credit to finance new 
investment”. In line with Dillard and Parker Foster and Ranson, Mouhammed (2003, 
p.279) concludes that Veblen developed a model of the monetary theory of production, 
where although “a lucid explanation for the interest rate determination” is not 
provided, the pricing markup can be used to determine it within the Veblenian 
theoretical framework43. Rutherford (1980, p.439) expands this argument by arguing 
that: “No firm can survive in the ‘credit economy’ of the New Order that fails to fully 
extend its credit; and so become dependent on the banker”44.   
The above schema however can be developed; Veblen in fact divides the 
commodities market into two sectors: a) one sector producing luxury goods and b) 
another producing wage goods. These parallel commodities markets are not integrated 
– differently from the sector of capital goods – in the same firm because of different 
                                                   
42 In comparing Veblen’s and Keynes’s thought, Mouhammed (2003, p.268) stresses that “Veblen believes 
(as Keynes does) that the interest rate and the money supply are used to control the economy by the 
vested interests”. He also attributes to Veblen the Keynesian principle of effective demand, arguing that 
a ‘vent for surplus’ argument via imperialism is relevant in Veblen’s thought (pp.273 ff.). 
43 See Graziani (2003) for a general description of the monetary theory of production. 
44 Phillips (2002) builds a Veblenian model of financial instability where the dynamics of credit market 
significantly affects the path of production. In particular, the author shows that “a rise in price of capital 
will have two effects: one will be to lower the demand for capital and the other will be to induce banks to 
increase loans since from their point of view there is an apparent increase in net wealth”. As a result, due 
to the functioning of the credit market, economies are intrinsically unstable. 
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technical and business competences required by the two sectors and because of the 
peculiarity of demand expressed by the leisure class and workers (see §§ 2.2.1.1 and 
2.2.3)45.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Veblenian circuit of income II 
 
The main difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2 mainly concerns the circuit of 
consumption. In particular this figure shows that the level of financing and its price are 
defined on the basis of type and quantity of consumption. In particular while the 
leisure class mainly consumes luxury goods – since it is interested in conspicuous and 
competitive consumption (see § 2.2.1.1) – technicians and workers just consume wage 
goods. In addition, no consumption is made by undertakers; these are mainly 
interested in accumulating monetary profits46. An observation can be made here: while 
the leisure class is interested in accumulation for consumption, undertakers are 
interested in accumulation for the sake of accumulation. So Veblen’s capitalist system 
is a system that acts for the reproduction and enlargement of the capital of the leisure 
                                                   
45 WT = wage of technicians and WW = wage of workers. 
46 In fact Veblen is not clear on the utilization of profits; he clearly stresses that undertakers work to obtain 
profits but he does not discuss their subsequent utilization. There are two possibilities: a) undertakers 
re-invest profits and b) undertakers consume profits both in the market of luxury and wage goods. Since 
the aim of undertakers is to obtain profit then in the present work the main hypothesis remains that 
undertakers continually re-invest their profits.  
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class and for the reproduction and enlargement of undertakers’ capital where 
consumption is the determinant of accumulation for the leisure class while profit is the 
determinant of accumulation for undertakers47. Another observation is useful here: 
even if Veblen does not directly define the luxury good, this can be seen as an 
expression of symbol and trophy in a logic of conspicuous consumption. Even though 
the question will be more clearly examined in the section 2.2.1.1 here it is important to 
give some anticipations. Luxury goods are prevalently goods conveying information 
about the purchaser’s social status, standard of living and lifestyle and success in 
society48. So the motive of the consumption of luxury goods is neither “the consumer’s 
physical wants” nor the “higher wants – spiritual, æsthetic [or] intellectual”; it is 
simply a tool for the demonstration of conspicuous social position, whether this is 
provisional or not (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], pp.25-26). Veblen tries to give such 
features to these goods. In particular in his vision, luxury goods must be at the same 
time: beautiful, qualitatively superior to others, futile, with low reproducibility and 
costly (see Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.176).  On these points, for example, “hand labour 
is a more wasteful method of production” writes Veblen (1975 [1899a], p.159). Then 
he adds: “let us remember that our higher appreciation of the superior article is an 
appreciation of its superior honorific character” (Veblen 1975 [1899a], p.128). 
Actually the character of non-reproducibility – or limited reproducibility – is a 
necessary condition for assigning a high value to things but it is not sufficient since the 
high value is mainly recognized in the capacity of the thing to supply high gratification 
which can be of different kinds such as gratification for its “futility” (Veblen, 1975 
[1899a], p.137) and gratification of our “sense of costliness masquerading under the 
name of beauty” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.128). In addition since “the utility of 
articles [..] depends closely upon the expensiveness of the articles” (Veblen, 1975 
                                                   
47 In the Veblenian schema the aim of production is twofold: consumption and accumulation and it is 
different from the Marxian schema of capitalistic production and from the Marxian schema of pre-
capitalistic production. Unlike the Marxian capitalistic schema of production – in which the aim of 
production is the increase of exchange values – in the Marxian pre-capitalistic schema the aim of 
production is the increase of use values. More in detail, in the Marxian pre-capitalistic schema 
production only serves for the satisfaction of needs. In the commodities market the productive unities 
meet in order to sell the goods produced in exchange for money, which allows the purchase of other and 
different goods which in turn increase the level of satisfaction (and therefore the use values. In brief, use 
value is the reason for exchanges in the pre-capitalistic phase and the circuit becomes goods-money-
goods.      
48 The standard of living can be defined in different ways; amongst others, Waite and Cassidy (1949, 
pp.216-217) define the standard of living “the goods, services, and conditions which an individual or 
group earnestly strives to attain, to maintain if once attained, and to regain if lost”. 
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[1899a], p.126), the higher the admiration of one or more particularities of a thing, the 
more willing one is to pay a high price for that thing.  As Veblen writes:  
 
“The mark of expensiveness come to be accepted as beautiful features of expensive articles (Veblen, 
1975 [1899a], p.130) [..] The consumption of expensive goods is meritorious, and the goods which 
contain an appreciable element of cost in excess of what goes to give them serviceability for their 
ostensible mechanical purpose are honorific” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.154). 
 
The above quotation certainly reflects the aspect of Veblen’s thought that has strongly 
inspired neoclassical literature to furnish original interpretations of his theory. The 
already mentioned Veblen effect of Leibenstein (§ 2.2.1.1) is the main example of this.   
While the author gives useful information about the features of luxury goods 
no particularity is given to the concept of wage goods. Here a wage good is simply 
identifiable as a good prevalently consumed by workers and with features different 
from luxury goods; in generic terms wage goods are identifiable as ‘basic’ goods. 
However, according to Fisk (1959, p.53) in his interpretation of Veblenian thought, a 
good is identifiable as a wage good if it is “directly conducive to the furtherance of 
human life” while a luxury good is simply an embellished wage good. Moreover, he 
adds that if a luxury good derives from the embellishment of a necessary good then - 
“on a continuum of products and services” (Fisk, 1959, p.53) – the luxury good 
becomes a necessity. 
 
2.2 Income distribution 
 
In the previous chapter it has been seen how the internal conflict of the firm can 
generate unemployment. On this point Veblen seems to maintain a consistent line of 
thought in most of his writings. It is more complicated however, to trace a possible 
Veblenian theory of economic growth and employment via the Veblenian theory of 
income distribution. More specifically, Veblen does not have a clear and precise 
theory of income distribution and the effects of a different income distribution on 
economic growth and employment can be both positive or negative for him. It will be 
argued how a distribution or income in favour of the leisure class can have a positive 
effect on the level of output and employment by the working of a virtuous process via 
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the increase of demand, production and employment. Moreover it will be shown that 
such a process is in fact a revaluation of the Malthusian effect of unproductive 
consumption and for this reason it can be called the Malthusian element in Veblen. At 
the same time it will be argued how a distribution of income in favour of the leisure 
class determines a reduction of output and unemployment via the increase of financing 
costs. Before examining such points let us try to order Veblen’s thought on the 
composition of income and on its distribution. Recently Tilman (2003, p.xx) has 
remarked: “although [Veblen] never specifically articulated a theory of income 
distribution, his evolutionary view of social change suggests an unending process of 
adjusting means to ends, and ends to means, with community serviceability (social 
usefulness) as the standard of value for economic activity. Income should thus be 
distributed so as to facilitate the instrumentally adaptive efforts of society to achieve 
the generic ends of life as well as successfully cope with unending change”. Tilman 
means that Veblen’s theory of income distribution seems to follow a logic of natural 
selection, in other words income is naturally distributed amongst classes on the basis 
of their capacity of adaptation to environmental conditions. Apart from this 
interpretation, it is difficult to find comprehensive analytical reconstructions of 
Veblen’s theory of income distribution in the contemporary literature. As has been 
said, Veblen does not build a specific theory of income distribution but a theory on this 
topic can be found in Veblen by the parallel reading – at least – of the following 
works: a) The Theory of the leisure class, b) The Theory of Business Enterprise and c) 
On The Nature of Capital, d) The Engineers and the Price System.  
More specifically the Veblenian theory of income distribution has different 
traits: a) income distribution does not reflect the contribution to production of the 
production factor; so Veblen opposes the idea that “whatever yields an income is a 
productive factor”; b) incomes are assigned on the base of the social recognition of the 
social status of workers and they derive from ownership rights; on this point Veblen 
remarks that income is distributed merely on the basis of a formal and institutional 
recognition of participation of production factors in production; the formalization is a 
purely institutional matter and makes reference only to the legal possession of a 
production factor and not to its effective use. In these terms he does not think that “any 
legally defensible receipt of income is a sure sign of productive work done” (Veblen, 
2001 [1921], p.21); he also remarks that an effective factor of production does not 
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concretely receive the due income if it lacks of the possibility of being owned. Finally 
c) the origin of categories of income – rents, profits and wages – is not economic but 
institutional. More specifically, rents originate in conspicuous consumption, profits in 
the institution of ownership and finally wages in ‘institutionalized’ subsistence. Let us 
see in more detail the economic categories of income in Veblen in the specific form of 
financial rents of the leisure class, profits of undertakers and the wages of technicians 
and workers.  
 
2.2.1 Financial rent as leisure class income     
 
With particular reference to the income of the leisure class, interpreting and expanding 
Veblen’s thought it is reasonable to think that the main source of income for the 
leisure class is rent in the specific form of financial rent49. Financial rent is definable as 
                                                   
49 Even though Veblen is not particularly interested in the analysis of land rent, he does not shy away from 
saying something on the topic. As he writes “rent is of the nature of a differential gain [..]. The differential 
advantage attaching to agricultural land [..] rests on certain broad peculiarities of the technological 
situation (Veblen, 1908a, p.529; italics added) [as well as] the preferential position of the landlord [which] 
consists in his legal right to decide whether, how far, and on what terms men shall put this technological 
scheme into effect in those features of it which involve the use of his parcel of land (Veblen, 1908a, 
p.530)”. From the above quotation it appears that Veblen does not add new interpretations of land rent as 
regards the classical interpretation. He only tries to expand his institutional theory of rent to land rent. 
Even if Veblen had little interest in the question of land rent the matter was not absent in the debate of his 
times. Note that the American agrarian policy mainly aimed at  the transfer of land ownership into private 
hands to ensure a better use of it. In 1862 the Homestead Act for example granted 160 acres free to 
farmers whose only obligation was to cultivate the land for at least five years (see Cameron 1993 ch.12). 
Certainly the Homestead Act had positive effects on the distribution of land to the population with the 
intent to increase productivity and production but some economists were convinced that such a policy was 
not enough to guarantee development. The American economist Henry George for example in his 
“Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with 
Increase of Wealth: The Remedy” (1879) also stresses the effectiveness of policies of taxation of land rent 
for the country’s development and economists (see for example Schumpeter, 1990 [1954], vol. III, p. 
1063-1064) remember him mainly for his purpose of  nationalising land rent. Land rent in fact is seen by 
George as part of wealth that does not serve to reproduce or increase the conditions of production of a land 
but mainly as part of wealth that is appropriated by a simple right – or rather a privilege – to the possession 
and use of the same land. As George writes: “rent or land value does not arise from the productiveness or 
utility of land. It represents in no wise any help or advantage given to production, but simply the power of 
securing a part of the results of production. No matter what are its capabilities, land can yield no rent and 
have no value until someone is willing to give labour or the results of labour for the privilege of using it; 
and what any one will thus give depends not upon the capacity of the land but upon its capacity as 
compared with that of land that can be had for nothing” (George, 1912 [1879], ch.8). If land rent is taxed 
production and productivity is not depressed since its taxation does not affect the land-input, as well as 
wages and capital but simply a right of landlords. Moreover, according to George, the higher the taxation 
of land rent, the higher the economic growth. As he writes “the whole value of land may be taken in 
taxation, and the effect will be to stimulate industry, to open new opportunities to capital, and to increase 
the production of wealth. [In fact] if land were taxed to anything near its rental value, no one could afford 
to hold land that he was not using; and consequently, land not in use would be thrown open to those who 
would use it. But the whole value of land may be taken in taxation, and the effect will be to stimulate 
industry, to open new opportunities to capital, and to increase the production of wealth” (George, 1912 
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the remuneration of money capital given on loan and can include: a) interest on 
banking loans, b) interest on bonds and c) dividends. In Veblen it is not the nature of a 
security that qualifies it as credit security or as representative security of registered 
capital, but who the owner is. In other words if stocks and bonds are owned by 
outsiders then these stocks and bonds are credit securities. In the same times if stocks 
are owned by insiders then stocks are representative securities of registered capital.  
Veblen does not specify who the outsiders and insiders are but it is reasonable to think 
that when he speaks about outsiders he is referring to external investors that place their 
own money at undertakers’ disposal like members of the leisure class; in this case the 
leisure class has no interest in managing firms but just in having a money income. On 
the other hand insiders are those undertakers that own stocks with the purpose of 
effectively managing firms and having profits. Remember that the leisure class (see § 
2.1) is assumed to control the monetary-financial market in the sense that in the 
monetary market it is able to fix the interest rate since it owns the right to the 
production of money whose supply depends on its demand expressed by firms. In the 
financial market members of the leisure class buy stocks and bonds. Here the leisure 
class can decide the quantity of stocks and bonds but not – at least directly – their 
remuneration. Dividends depend on the quantity of profits produced by firms while 
interest on bonds depends on the interest rate fixed by undertakers. However at the 
same time both the dividend rate and the interest rate on bonds necessarily have to be 
‘competitive’ with the interest rate fixed in the monetary market. It is therefore 
possible to say that the leisure class in fact controls quantity and remuneration of 
money taken on loan both in the monetary and financial market because when the 
leisure class fixes the interest rate in the monetary marker undertakers have to borrow 
a quantity of money at least sufficient to generate profits that are able to pay a 
dividend rate and an interest rate on bonds at least equal to the interest rate fixed on the 
monetary market. This is probably the implicit reason why the interest rate is a 
financing cost in Veblen. Along with interest on banking loans and interest on bonds. 
also dividends are financing costs since they are part of profits that undertakers have to 
give investors for their loan reducing the firms’ possibility of self-financing. 
                                                                                                                                   
[1879], ch.17). Moreover he adds (1912 [1879], ch.12): “unlike taxes upon commodities, or exchange, or 
capital, or any of the tools or processes of production, taxes levied upon the value of land do not bear upon 
production [..]. Taxes may be imposed upon the value of land until all rent is taken by the state, without 
reducing the wages of labour or the reward of capital one iota; without increasing the price of a single 
commodity, or making production in any way more difficult”.  
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Moreover, since dividends, interest on banking loans and interest on bonds are all 
financing costs they are in fact a “charge”, a ‘bounty’ on profits. As he writes:   
   
“Productive industry yields a margin of net product over cost, counting cost in terms of man power 
and material resources; and under the established rule of self-help and free bargaining as it works out 
in corporation finance, this margin of net product has come to rest upon productive industry as an 
overhead charge payable to anonymous outsiders who own the corporation securities” (Veblen, 
1964 [1919a], p.48; italics added).  
 
Then he adds 
 
 “The net product is the amount by which this actual production exceeds its own cost, as counted in 
terms of subsistence, and including the cost of the necessary mechanical equipment; this net product 
will then approximately coincide with the annual keep, the cost of maintenance and replacement, of 
the investors or owners of capitalised property who are not engaged in productive industry; and who 
are on this account sometimes spoken of as the "kept classes". Indeed, it would seem that the number 
and average cost per capita of the kept classes, communibus annis, affords something of a rough 
measure of the net product habitually derived from the community's annual production” (Veblen, 
1964 [1919a], pp.55-56). 
 
Veblen does not build a precise theory of financial rents. A better understanding of his 
theory of interest – for example – can be traced by the connected reading of his theory 
of credit with his critiques of the Austrian and American theory of interest (see 
Veblen, 1892; 1908d; 1909b). As the author writes: “Interest is, strictly, a 
phenomenon of credit transaction alone. [It is a] business proposition [which] is to be 
explained only in terms of business” (Veblen, 1909b, p.299). In other words interest is 
simply the remuneration of financing investments aimed at the realization of monetary 
gains. So interest has no relation with the real productivity of capital or with the 
intertemporal choices of consumption. More specifically unlike Austrian and 
American school of capital (Böhm-Bawerk, Fisher, J.B. Clark), Veblen looks at 
interest as a “business proposition [explainable] only in terms of business” so he 
interprets interest as a “pecuniary phenomenon” (Veblen, 1909b, p.298) not as a real 
one. Consequently Veblen is far removed from the neoclassical interpretation of the 
nature of the interest rate. In fact he does not consider the interest rate the price of 
 76
waiting for “roundabout processes” as in Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk or the optimal rate 
of substitution of future income with the current one as in Irvin Fisher.  
 
2.2.1.1 On the nature of financial rent: conspicuous leisure  
 
In view of what has been said above, financial rent is definable as remuneration of the 
money capital given on loan. This gives rise to an important question: what does the 
origin of rent depend on? Rereading Veblen it is possible to say that the origin of 
financial rent is in the traits and working of the main activity of the leisure class, that is 
to say conspicuous leisure. This mainly means that the origin of financial rent is not 
economic but institutional. The leisure class is recognized by Veblen as a class 
continuously affected by an internal competition amongst its members for the reaching 
of the excellence of their own status. Such competition is played out through 
conspicuous consumption, in other words, on a consumption involving luxury goods 
ostentatiously displayed to others and for this reason also called “competitive 
consumption” or “waste” (see Veblen 1969 [1915], p.379). The ostentation of 
consumption is addressed to generating envy seen as a social tool for the  
acknowledgment of the pecuniary superiority of others. As Veblen writes:  
 
“Customary expenditure must be classed under the head of waste in so far as the custom on which it 
rests is traceable to the habit of making an invidious pecuniary comparison” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], 
p.100; italics added). 
 
It is important to notice that Veblen speaks about envy in “a technical sense” (Veblen, 
1975 [1899a], p.34). More specifically, Veblen considers envy as “process of 
valuation of persons in respect of worth” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.34). In these terms 
he “[has no] intention to extol [it] or depreciate [it]” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.34). 
Conspicuous consumption is therefore consumption driven by an institutional motive: 
obtaining social esteem via the mechanism of “invidious comparison”. In the 
Veblenian vision an individual is socially esteemed if s/he has a “conventional 
standard of wealth”. To obtain social esteem the same individual must takes steps to 
reach the conventional standard of wealth, and then display in order to be envied. If 
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the conspicuous consumption is envied then the individual has achieved his/her aim: 
social success. As Veblen writes: 
 
“In order to stand well in the eyes of the community, it is necessary to come up to a certain, 
somewhat indefinite, conventional standard of wealth [..]. Those members of the community who 
fall short of this [..], suffer also in their own esteem, since the usual basis of self-respect is the 
respect accorded by one’s neighbours” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.30).  
In order to guarantee a given “conventional standard of wealth” members of the leisure 
class - owners of banks - fix an interest rate in the monetary market at least sufficient 
to cover their consumption50. The additional way of guaranteeing the conventional 
standard of wealth is the purchase of stocks and bonds Veblen’s aim of constructing a 
theory of conspicuous consumption is mainly addressed to showing the serviceability 
of luxury goods for social well-being. As Veblen writes:  
 
“The serviceability of goods for consumption has come to be the most obtrusive element of their 
value [as] honorific evidence of the owner’s prepotence” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.24). 
 
Hence Veblen uses the term waste as synonymous of competitive consumption and 
conspicuous consumption. With these terms – as in the concept of envy – Veblen does 
not mean to give value judgements to the concept; he merely wants to identify a 
particular kind of consumption rather than judging it (see Veblen, 1899b, pp.107-108). 
As he remarks: 
 
“[Waste] is here used for want of a better term that will adequately describe the same range of 
motives and of phenomena, and it is not to be taken in an odious sense, as implying an illegitimate 
expenditure of human product or of human life” (Veblen 1975 [1899a], p.97). 
 
So with the concept of waste he wants to maintain a neutral analysis for the purpose of 
showing its utility for social well-being. On this point he stresses: 
 
                                                   
50 Veblen is unclear on the structure of the money market. One can argue that their structure is similar to 
the structure of the market for goods, so that banks work in a monopolistic competition environment. 
As a result, due to the low elasticity of the demand for money on the microeconomic plane, bankers are 
able to gain money revenues, i.e. financial rents, by means of interest rate increases. 
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“It is here called waste because the expenditure does not serve human life or human well-being on 
the whole, not because it is waste or misdirection of effort or expenditure as viewed from the 
standpoint of the individual consumer who chooses it” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], pp.97-98; italics 
added).  
 
In the above quotation Veblen argues that waste is not criticisable at a microeconomic 
level. From the micro point of view he calls the utility of consumption, which is 
subjective and not censurable, “relative utility” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.98). He 
remarks that waste “has utility to [the individual] by virtue of his preference” (Veblen, 
1975 [1899a], p.98) so it cannot imply “deprecation of the motives or of ends sought 
by the consumer under this canon of [..] waste” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.98). On the 
other hand, on the macro plane he replaces the idea of relative utility with “the test of 
impersonal usefulness” (Veblen 1975 [1899a], p.98). So Veblen does not admit value 
judgements on an individual level as regards preferences; however the collectivity 
expresses value judgements when the sum of individual behaviours produces negative 
outcomes for the collectivity itself (see Veblen, 1899b, p.108). It could be argued that 
the implication is that the Veblenian individual is an agent who tends to state value 
judgements on economic variables. Accordingly, individuals would seem to see 
society not as an aggregation of individuals but as an autonomous and impersonal 
entity whose only reference for conduct is the human life of the whole, that is to say 
the “point of view of the generically human”. So from the point of view of society, 
waste “does not serve” collectivity since the use of social resources for “invidious [..] 
comparisons” limits “enhanc[ing] human life on the whole” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], 
p.99). Actually Veblen does not clearly explain the effect of waste on social well-
being. He confines himself to accepting and describing the effect of waste according to 
the conventional sense of waste for common man: the use of resources for futile 
motives (see also Bush, 1999, pp.136-137). On the macroeconomic plane Veblen 
clearly identifies four categories of waste, grouped by Rutherford (2001, p.175) into 
four main classes: “monopoly restrictions, business cycle, unemployment, and 
competitive advertising” even if the effective classes of waste are identified by Veblen 
in the following terms:  
 
“(a) Unemployment of material resources, equipment and manpower, in whole or in part, 
deliberately of through ignorance; (b) Salesmanship (includes, e.g. needless multiplication of 
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merchants and shops, wholesale and retail, newspaper advertising and bill-board, sales-exhibits, 
sales-agents, fancy packages and labels, adulteration, multiplication of brands and proprietary 
articles); (c) Production (and sales-cost) of superfluities and spurious goods; (d) Systematic 
dislocation, sabotage and duplication, due in part to businesslike strategy, in part to businesslike 
ignorance of industrial requirements (includes, e.g. such things as cross-freights, monopolization of 
resources, withholding of facilities and information from business rivals whom it is thought wise to 
hinder or defeat)” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.68). 
 
Historians have tried to investigate in more detail the topic of conspicuous 
consumption with particular reference to its methodological aspect and its effects. 
Some of this literature is critical of Veblen on the possibility that consumption is 
driven by macro choices rather than by micro choices (see for example Cummings, 
1899; Flux, 1923; Mills, 1956; Leibenstein, 1950; Meek 1963; Hamilton, 1987; 
Campbell, 1995) while some supports the idea and tries to expand it in different ways 
(see for instance Edgell, 1992; 2001; Mason, 1995; Eby, 1998; Tilman, 2003; Forges 
Davanzati, 2006a). Generally speaking a controversial matter in literature – well raised 
by Campbell (1995) – regards the exact, commonly-agreed definition of conspicuous 
consumption. The definition of conspicuous consumption would seem to be simple but 
actually it is extremely complicated. By his theory on consumption Veblen – as 
Tilman (2003, p.xvi) remarks – identifies two kinds of parallel consumption: a) 
“conspicuous [and competitive] consumption”, and b) consumption “aimed at the 
satisfaction of functional and biological needs”. This is important for drawing attention 
to the fact that Veblen’s theory of consumption regards a particular kind of goods – 
luxury goods – and it is not applicable to all categories of goods and consumption. In 
other words he does not set out to analyse consumption in all its forms but only in one 
specific form.  
On the concept of waste John Cummings raised his famous critique in the same 
year of publication of the Theory of the leisure class. The author particularly wants to 
critically debate the concept of waste on the macro plane. In particular he remarks that 
the Veblenian idea of society as an impersonal entity “is an imaginary and fictitious 
phantom which has no existence at all apart from the individual conceiving it” 
(Cummings, 1899, p.428); so “impersonal usefulness” cannot have any logic sense. 
According to Cummings what serves all individuals is equal to what each of them 
wants; so if waste is not criticisable at a micro level, it automatically cannot be 
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criticisable at the macroeconomic level either, since “enhanc[ing] human life on the 
whole” is the enhancing of all the single lives. Cummings feels waste in Veblenian 
terms is perfectly compatible with social well-being; in fact as he writes – in 
Cummings (1899, p.430) - “[the] invidious distinction comes to identify itself with the 
desire to live” in an excellent manner so an aggregate behaviour that follows such 
logic necessarily improves the human life on the whole.  
Some years later Flux (1923) critiques Veblen’s intent to macro-found the 
theory of consumption stressing that conspicuous consumption is not an expression of 
competition amongst individuals so it has no institutional nature. Following Flux 
conspicuous consumption is – like other kinds of consumption – an expression of 
individual choice. More specifically, according to the author conspicuous consumption 
concretely represents the expression of the desire of each individual to go beyond the 
limit of “needs of existence” (Flux, 1923 [1904], pp.24-25). So interpreting Flux, the 
aim of an individual is maximizing the “desire for distinction” which is micro-founded 
by the increase in the consumption of luxury goods. 
Leibenstein (1950) is not interested in investigating the internal consistency of 
the Veblenian theory of consumption. He tries to absorb the Veblenian theory of 
consumption into the neoclassical logic of consumption theory, concentrating on the 
possibility of building the demand function of goods in the presence of what the author 
himself calls the Veblen effect. In particular Leibenstein (1950, p.189) defines “the 
Veblen effect” in the following terms: “by the Veblen effect we refer to the 
phenomenon [for] which the demand for a consumer good is increased because it 
bears a higher rather than a lower price”. With the aim of building up the demand for 
goods subject to “conspicuous consumption” the author makes reference to two kinds 
of prices, namely: a) the “real price” and b) the “conspicuous price” (Leibenstein, 
1950, p.203)51. As he writes “by the real price we refer to the price the consumer paid 
for the commodity in terms of money” (Leibenstein, 1950, p.203). On the other hand 
“the conspicuous price [is] the price that the consumer thinks other people think he 
paid for the commodity” (Leibenstein, 1950, p.203, footnote 1). Demand increases if 
the real price decreases and increases if conspicuous price increases. A reduction of 
                                                   
51 Alongside the “Veblen effect” Leibenstein (1950, p.189) adds two other external effects on the utility 
function: a) the “bandwagon effect” and b) the “snob effect”. As he writes: “by bandwagon effect we 
refer to the extent by which the demand for a commodity is increased due to the fact that others are also 
consuming the same commodity”, while “by snob effect we refer to the extent to which the demand for 
a consumers’ good is decreased owing the fact that others are also consuming the same commodity”.  
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real price of a good can produce an increase or a reduction of demand. This depends 
on the difference between the real price and the conspicuous price. In particular if real 
prices are higher than a given conspicuous price, demand for goods increases when 
real prices decrease – or rather demand increases in a less proportional manner. On the 
other hand, if real prices are lower than the given conspicuous price, demand decreases 
when real prices decrease – or rather demand decreases in a highly proportional 
manner. In the first case the price effect prevails while in the second case the Veblen 
effect prevails. So demand can be negatively inclined, positively inclined or “a mixture 
of both” (Leibenstein, 1950, p.204). The prevalence of one kind of inclination rather 
than another depends on the prevalence of one effect over the other; in other words if 
the price effect is higher than the Veblen effect, demand for goods will be negatively 
inclined; on the other hand, if the Veblen effect is higher than the price effect, the 
demand will be positively inclined. In 1996 Bagwell and Bernheim made a critique of 
Leibenstein’s model, arguing that the Veblen effect is a misunderstanding of the 
original vision of conspicuous consumption. In their interpretation demand for 
conspicuous goods is not a function of prices but a function of status, which is 
technically the informative signal of wealth also stressing that each “individual’s status 
depends upon perceptions of his wealth among social contacts” (Bagwell and 
Bernheim, 1996, p.351)52.  
Apart from Leibenstein’s model, in those years the literature continued to 
analyse the internal consistence of the Veblenian theory of conspicuous consumption. 
Mills (1956) for example stresses that Veblen implicitly builds his theory on the bases 
of precise hypotheses: the perfect knowledge of the sense of honorific consumption 
and its stability. In other words individuals know a priori the aim of consumption, in 
terms of the prestige-goal, and they know that this goal is stable over time. But if 
individuals know a priori the prestige-goal and if such a goal is also stable then 
competing with others in consumption is not necessary. It is sufficient for the same 
individuals to autonomously build an individual consumption plan to achieve their 
goal. In this case the micro foundation of conspicuous consumption is maintained as in 
Flux. However Mills does not appear completely opposed to a macro foundation of 
                                                   
52 Cullison (1978) shows that conspicuous consumption is perfectly compatible with neoclassical 
methodology and that neoclassic economists – contemporaries of Veblen – failed to explain such 
consumption only because they did not consider the hypotheses of possible interdependence of 
consumer preferences.  For a critique of the neoclassical approach to conspicuous consumption – based 
on the idea that mainstream “moral agnosticism” should be rejected – see Tilman (2006).  
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conspicuous consumption. As remarked by the author, Veblen’s theory works if 
people do not have a clear idea of the meaning of prestige, honour, social status, etc., if 
this idea is so extremely relative and not objectively definable and also if this idea is 
not stable over time then people live in “an unstable system of prestige”. If society is 
permeated by an unstable system of prestige then the competition with others to 
consume is possible. In other words, Mills argues the competitive consumption in 
Veblenian terms could naturally be induced from those conditions for which people do 
not exactly perceive the sense of honourableness. In this case each individual lives 
within an uncertain state – which Mills (1956, p.240) calls  “the virtual status panic” – 
as regards the effective sense of honourableness, so they continuously consume simply 
because they trust in what others do, thinking that such consumption is meritorious. 
The social instability of the sense of prestige therefore becomes the sufficient 
condition for the setting up of continuous consumption among individuals as in 
Veblen for the search for a state of certainty about the sense of prestige. However 
since the individual lives in a continuous state of uncertainty, the reaching of a level of 
prestige is not the end of conspicuous consumption since society continually re-
discusses the level itself, pushing individuals into the pursuit of the new level of 
prestige by fresh consumption.       
In addition Meek (1963, p.317) critiques the idea that conspicuous consumption 
is consumption aimed at invidious comparison. The author remarks that conspicuous 
consumption is always an expression of social relationships and of the pursuit of social 
acceptance. Social acceptance works on friendly relations rather than on envy, i.e. on 
grudge relations. In fact Meek’s interpretation is built considering invidious 
comparison – and therefore envy – in a non-technical sense as Veblen would like to do 
but with a common meaning as Veblen in fact does when he tries to explain the effect 
of waste.   
The micro foundation of conspicuous consumption reappears in 1987 in the 
Hamilton model. The author points out that Veblen’s conspicuous consumption – 
unlike other kinds of consumption – presents  two main traits: the “ceremonial” and 
“the instrumental” trait. As the author writes “we use goods as symbol of status and 
simultaneously as instruments to achieve some end-in-view” (Hamilton, 1987, 
p.1541). In Hamilton’s opinion, Veblen rightly builds his theory of conspicuous 
consumption assuming that the ceremonial utility of the good is surpassed by the 
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instrumental utility (cf. Merton, 1957). But if the instrumental utility surpasses the 
ceremonial utility then conspicuous consumption is no different from other kinds of 
consumption. In fact Hamilton believes that each kind of consumption works by a 
common rule: the “if-then context” rule (Hamilton, 1987, p.1548). To explain this rule 
he presents the example of the wrench. As he writes “if [..] my attention is focused on 
the removal of a series of hexagonal nuts of varying sizes [then] I [..] value an 
adjustable wrench. My judgement of its goodness is how effectively it functions in 
conjunction with my skilled use of it in removing the set of nuts. I do not choose a 
pipe wrench because it would score the heads and render unfit any kind of wrench for 
their removal in the future. We judge according to present and future known 
consequences” (Hamilton, 1987, pp. 1547-1548; italics added). So according to 
Hamilton conspicuous consumption is not institutionally derived and it is perfectly 
compatible with the rule of “if-then context”. It is therefore always subject to 
judgement as regards its consequences and depends: a) on knowledge of the objective 
features and on the functionality of a good and b) on knowledge of the subjective 
potentiality of utilization of the same goods. In turn the subjective potentiality of 
utilization supplies “style” which in fact – for Hamilton - is the “major symbol of 
status”. In conclusion with the Hamiltonian interpretation of conspicuous consumption 
it can be said that the status symbol is not the final point of the competition in 
consumption, it is the starting point of consumption which cannot be competitive since 
nobody would start a competition in consumption if s/he had no “style”, in other words 
if s/he knew that s/he did not know how to consume: the competition would in fact be 
already lost before starting. So competition is excluded a priori since status is not the 
aim of the consumption, it is a concretisation of a manner of consuming.     
As seen above Veblen discusses conspicuous consumption in terms of motives 
and consequences. But according to Campbell (1995, p.37) Veblen fails to integrate 
them. First of all Campbell (1995, p.40) argues that: “conspicuous consumption is a 
form of conduct with two different sets of consequences: a) those [..] which have 
occurred in the attitudes and opinions of others, and b) those which the aspirant [..] 
consumer imagines have occurred”. Then Campbell argues that Veblen’s incapacity to 
integrate the motives with the consequences of conspicuous consumption invalidates 
his theory as “workable theory” (Campbell, 1995, p.37).  What is lacking in Veblen – 
Campbell stresses – is the integration between his “two conceptual formulations” 
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which the author defines as “contrasting”. As he writes “these are first, an 
interpretative [..] version that conceives of conspicuous consumption as action marked 
by the presence of certain [..] motives, and second, a functionalist formulation in 
which conspicuous consumption is viewed as a form of behaviour characterized by 
particular [..] outcomes” (Campbell, 1995, p.37).  
Eby (1998, p.692) tries instead to expand the theory of conspicuous 
consumption by investigating its relation with institutional change. In particular Eby 
stresses that conspicuous consumption is concretely an example of institutional inertia. 
As she writes: “conspicuous consumption encourages one to experience her life 
according to a particular temporal paradigm, as if life never ‘is’ but can only be 
experienced as ‘becoming’, by acquiring goods [s/he] desires but does not yet own”. 
Eby argues that conspicuous consumption could be considered a stimulating and 
gratifying institution for individuals and for this reason it is not subject to change. 
Concretely she remarks that the continuous stimulation and gratification  - to which 
conspicuous consumption is subject and which does not affect the modification of the 
institution itself – depends on the fact that “a desired object does not [only] result in 
present satisfaction but [mainly] in the immediate desire for a new object” (Eby, 1998, 
p.692). The institutional inertia produced by conspicuous consumption is for Eby 
(1998, p.692) an outcome of “forward-looking thrust”. It is interesting to notice that 
Eby (1998, p.692) does not limit her analysis to conspicuous consumption as a self-
sustaining process created by the leisure class but she extends it to the process nurtured 
by the firm’s activity, remarking that institutional inertia is not only generated by the 
leisure class but also by firms in advertising activities. The possibility that conspicuous 
consumption maintains institutional inertia is concretely present in Veblen. The leisure 
class – due to its typology and features of consumption – imposes decorous styles of 
living on the whole of society. As Veblen writes “[purchasing] is the need of 
conforming to established usage and of living up to the accredited of taste and 
reputability” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.168). He also adds: 
 
“The leisure class stands at the head of the social structure in point of reputability; and its manner of 
life and its standards of worth therefore afford the norm of reputability for the community. The 
observance of these standards, in some degree of approximation, becomes incumbent upon all 
classes lower in the scale” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.84). 
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It is reasonable to think that the leisure class is not opposed to admitting the working 
class to luxury. If luxury is also accessible to the working class then it is more 
probable that institutional inertia will be maintained. On this point Edgell (1992, 
p.209) writes: “In fact Veblen claimed that the norm of conspicuous consumption is 
mandatory for all classes”.  However because the working class lives at a subsistence 
level the accessibility to luxury is relative; it is relative for typology and cost of gods, 
it is only from the bottom towards the top and fundamentally it regards the next higher 
social classes53. As Veblen remarks: 
 
“The norm of reputation imposed by the upper class extends its coercive influence with but slight 
hindrance down through the social structure to the lowest strata. The result is that the members of 
each stratum accept as their ideal of decency the scheme of life in vogue in the next higher stratum, 
and bend their energies to live up to that ideal” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.84; italics added).  
So in view of this it is possible to notice that two kinds of emulative processes are 
present in Veblen: a) one intra-group (competitive consumption and certainly the 
most important for Veblen) and b) one infra group (accessible luxury) which is 
recognized by Tilman (2003, p.xvii) as competitive consumption like for the intra-
group emulation competitively emulate the social strata next above them”54.       
Modern literature has tried to furnish a rereading of the motives and effects of 
Veblenian waste. According to Edgell (2001, p.105) for example waste originates 
when consumption is in excess of the level which guarantees “reasonable physical 
comfort”. In “economic terms” – Edgell (1992, p.214) remarks – conspicuous 
consumption involves different kinds of waste: a) “conspicuous waste”- that is to say 
“loss of resources”, b) “conspicuous expense” – that is to say “poor economic value” 
                                                   
53 This is the reason workers mainly consume wage goods as indicated in chapter 1.  
54 Bilkey in 1956 tested the hypothesis of the equitable income distribution upon consumption expenditure 
in particular upon conspicuous consumption expenditures between the 1920s and the 1950s in the United 
States. The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of a fair income distribution on the composition 
of consumption and on the process of infra group emulative consumption. The author starts from the 
following consideration: the emulative infra group consumption is the expression of income differences 
between the social classes since the upper class – without a conspicuous level of income – cannot have a 
particular standard of life and consequently it cannot impose models of consumption on the lower classes. 
Symmetrically – he adds – it should happen that when there is a fair income distribution emulative infra 
group consumption disappears. In fact his results confirm his hypothesis. Moreover, the author adds (1956, 
p.82): “an increase in the equality of income distribution (since it reduces the income disparity between the 
various socio-economic classes) [reduces] the social pressure on consumers to spend for conspicuous [..] 
consumption (such categories as clothing, transportation, personal appearance, shelter, etc.), and 
consequently results in an increased allocation to non-conspicuous categories (e.g. food). The reverse 
[occurs] when income become less equally distributed”.     
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and c) “conspicuous abstention from useful effort – that is to say “inhibited productive 
work”. Mason (1995, pp.871-872) supports Veblen’s original idea arguing that 
“conspicuous consumption” in Veblen’s vision is a “status-driven consumption” and it 
is not “utilitarian but social with individuals attempting to secure social status through 
consumption”.  
Forges Davanzati (2006a, ch.3.) has recently tried to expand the theory of 
waste in the following terms: he argues that competitive consumption is identifiable as 
a game in which the final position for each consumer-competitor is equal to her/his 
own initial position but with a higher utilization of resources (like time, income, 
consumption, etc.) which – since his/her position has not changed – are in fact wasted. 
On the macroeconomic plane one could argue that waste limits social well-being due 
to three factors: a) because of waste in time and effort, part of the collectivity employs 
its time and effort in non-productive activities, b) since consumption of ‘wasteful’ 
goods is concentrated in the hands of a small part of the collectivity, c) because it is 
characterized by a continuous consumption of resources without limits or pause (see 
also Forges Davanzati, 2006b). On this point Veblen remarks:  
 
“It is much more difficult to recede from a scale of expenditure once adapted than it is to extend the 
accustomed scale in response to an accession of wealth (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.102). [In addition] 
any retrogression from the standard of living which we are accustomed to regard as worthy in this 
respect is felt to be a grievous violation of our human dignity” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.156). 
As we have seen, the literature on conspicuous consumption has mainly concentrated 
on the internal consistency of Veblenian waste and little has been said instead about its 
effects. The last part of the present chapter and chapter 3 will present a rereading of 
conspicuous consumption in terms of its relation with  financial rent with the aim of 
investigating its effects on economic growth and institutional change. However, it 
should be anticipated that a problem of internal inconsistency in Veblen has been 
identified since he is not so inflexible on the negative effects of waste for collectivity 
(see § 2.5).   
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2.2.2 Profits and capital      
 
The Veblenian theory of profits and capital requires a preliminary observation on the 
nature of the firm. In Veblen’s view, the firm is not a ‘black box’: it is an organization 
which exploits common knowledge via the existing property rights and which aims at 
obtaining money profits. Recently Viano (2003, p.354) has written: In “his mind firms 
[are] no more than bureaucratic and commercial structures that exploit[..] their formal 
ownership of raw materials and the means of production to unduly appropriate the 
stock of knowledge and competences that these embody”. Even if the sense of Viano’s 
considerations on Veblen’s thought will be clearer in the course of treatment here the 
focal point is the firm/“formal ownership” relationship. Let us see why: Veblen 
formally looks at firms as a form of undertaker’s investment whose traits have an 
institutional nature. Veblen sees the firm as a speculative matter connected to the 
institution of ownership (see Cutrona, 2005). As he writes: 
“The ownership of the capital goods affords a discretionary power of misdirecting in the industrial 
process and perverting industrial efficiency, as well as inhibiting or curtailing industrial processes 
and their output, while the outcome may still be profitable to the owner of the capital goods” 
(Veblen, 1908b, p.108). 
 
The firm is simply the object of the undertaker’s pecuniary investment by which s/he 
acquires the right to use his/her ownership to increasing his/her pecuniary wealth. In 
other words firms are legitimate tools for the realization of monetary gains – profits – 
in favour of their owners. So investment is strictly linked to the ownership of wealth, 
and in turn, to the natural proclivity that has determined it: the predatory instinct. As 
will be explained more clearly below, the ways profits are made – as with the 
utilization of industrial capital – concretely have a predatory nature; when an 
undertaker obtains profits s/he concretely removes something from others at a higher 
level concerning a thing that may be transferred to them. Predatory instinct pushes the 
individual to act in such a way as to for have more and ownership represents the right 
to benefit from extraneous things. It could be argued that investment is a peculiar form 
of predatory act aimed at obtaining profit. On investments Veblen writes:  
 
“Investment is a pecuniary transaction, and its aim is pecuniary gain. [..] Invested wealth is capital 
[..] measured in terms of value and determined [..] by a valuation which proceeds on an 
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appraisement of the gain expected from the ownership of this invested wealth” (Veblen, 1908b, 
pp.104-105; italics added).   
 
So investment “represent[s] expected income-streams” (Veblen, 1908b, p.124); the 
firm is therefore the object of  “the [capitalization of] prospective gain” (Veblen, 1964 
[1919a], p.104). In the eyes of undertakers, the firm is merely a fund of value and its 
aim is to furnish new value. The main purpose of the firm is to change pecuniary 
expenditure into pecuniary gain, namely an “item of wealth” into an “income-stream”.  
The main variable that can affect the investment by undertakers is the 
expectation of income-streams. The inverse relation between interest rate and 
investments holds in contexts where uncertainty does not exist, or, in other words, an 
increase in the interest rate reduces investments only insofar as entrepreneurs’ 
expectations are not significantly optimistic55. On the role of expectations Veblen 
simply remarks: 
 
“The market fluctuations in the amount of capital proceed on variations of confidence on the part of 
investors, on current belief as to the probable policy or tactics of the guild of politicians, and of the 
indeterminable, largely instinctive, shifting movements of public sentiment and apprehension. So 
that under modern conditions the magnitude of the business capital and its mutation from day to day 
are in great measure a question of folk psychology rather than of material fact” (Veblen, 1904, 
p.149)56. 
                                                   
55 The expectations are relevant in Veblen even if he does not spend as much time on the elaboration of a 
clear theory of expectations and uncertainty as John Maynard Keynes. It is interesting to notice that the 
comparison of Veblen’s theory with that of Keynes is not new in literature; at the same time such 
literature is not as numerous or as rich as the literature which has tried to compare Veblen with Marx. 
Actually many points of Keynesian theory can be found in Veblen, or it would be better to say that 
many points of Veblenian theory are traceable in Keynes; in fact Keynes started to publish his more 
important works after the 1920s, so five years after the publication of Veblen’s Theory of Business 
Enterprise, that is to say the main Veblen work on which a comparison with Keynes can find a concrete 
validity. Rutledge Vining in 1939 published the work entitled “Suggestions of Keynes in The Writings 
of Veblen” stressing that “much of Keynes’s theory of employment can be dug from Veblen’s 
institutions” (Vining, 1939, pp.692 ff.; see also Mouhammed, 2003): from “the notion of effective 
demand” to the “schedule of marginal efficiency of capital”; from “the rate of interest which is wholly 
pecuniary” to the “rate of investment [as function] of [expectations and of] rate of interest”; from “the 
increased national income in response to capital expenditure” to “the propensity to consume”. 
56 Veblen does not present a clear, organized theory of uncertainty either in neoclassical terms or in 
Knightian or Keynesian terms (see Knight, 1971 [1921]; Keynes 1973 [1937]). At the same time the 
author does not escape the persuasion to also offer an institutional interpretation of uncertainty. The 
topic is approached in particular in The Theory of Business Enterprises (1904) and in The vested interest 
and the common man (1919). Here Veblen clearly writes about “imponderable article[s]”. More 
specifically, he writes: “an imponderable is an article of make-believe which has become axiomatic by 
force of settled habit” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.9). This quotation supplies some hints: First of all 
uncertainty seems to be a human outcome. In fact, it is an outcome of thought and action. Consequently 
uncertainty is not in the real state of things but in the states of thought. Imponderability does not mean 
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The above quotation gives rise to an important consideration: Investments mainly  
depend on expectations on future profits, expectations on government policy and on 
“movements of public sentiment and apprehension” 57,58. Even if the question is not 
                                                                                                                                   
impossibility to know or to foresee. At the same time imponderability does not mean riskiness. 
Uncertainty in Veblen’s thought just means absence of subjective or objective evaluation towards which 
institutions can lead. Institutions supply regular and fixed lines of conduct and thought which assume 
the form of axioms. In a static condition of an institutional order uncertainty becomes the rule since 
imponderability is actually in the state of things (see also Jennings and Waller, 1994, p.1016). In brief 
uncertainty seems to be a human limit, not a limit of the reality of things. In view of this, 
imponderability does not mean impossibility or limitation on knowing; rather it is a particular way of 
knowing facts; it is a way based on the role of institutions rather than on individualistic an rational 
calculus. It could be argued that uncertainty becomes a particular form of knowledge itself, a 
knowledge based on beliefs and actions which acquire the figure of axiomatic principles and where the 
axiomaticity is intended in a relative sense. In fact it regards principles and actions conventionally 
accepted: This is the reason why they do not need evaluation. If uncertainty works following the logic 
presented above then it could be added that uncertainty is first of all a feature of institutional inertia: in 
fact institutional inertia limits the ponderability of thought and action. In a dynamic process of 
institutional change the axioms in fact change and uncertainty changes form. However this does not 
mean that institutional change leads to certainty because ponderability is just momentary. In conclusion, 
in Veblen’s view, uncertainty is never eliminable since it is the cause-effect of institutions both in the 
static and dynamic condition of an institutional order. The above considerations may lead us to ask 
whether such a theory can be compared with the theory of Keynes. Actually there are at least two points 
of convergence of the two theories: a) uncertainty is in the state of things, and b) uncertainty cannot be 
removed. However the meaning of the state of things is different in the two authors as well as the 
reasons for which the condition cannot be removed. As Keynes writes in The end of laissez-faire in 
1926 “[…] many of the greatest economic evils of our time are the fruits of risk, uncertainty, ignorance” 
(Keynes 1971 [1926], p. 291). In particular, according to the author, uncertainty is a completely 
different phenomenon from risk, in the sense that, given an uncertain event, no simulation tool is 
completely effective because of the intrinsic nature of the events themselves, or simply because the 
actual occurrence of some events depends on some modality that we cannot know (see also King 2002, 
ch.9). In fact, as Keynes writes: “[…] by uncertain[ty] I do not mean merely to distinguish what is 
known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject in this sense to 
uncertainty [..]. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war 
is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a 
new invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these 
matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever: we simply do 
not know it (Keynes 1973 [1937], pp. 113-114)”. The Keynesian definition of uncertainty has a deep-
seated characteristic: the problem of uncertainty concerns the impossibility of forming knowledge about 
something before the thing itself occurs (see Keynes, 1973 [1921], p.3, p.19).  If knowledge cannot be 
formed before acting a problem arises: upon what does a decision to act depend? Keynes gives 
particular emphasis to the role of expectations stressing that “the state of [..] expectation, upon which 
our decisions are based, does not depend [only] on the most probable forecast we can make. It also 
depends on the confidence with which we make this forecast (Keynes 1973 [1936b], p. 148; italics 
added; see also Keynes, 1973 [1936a], 1973 [1936b], 1973 [1937], 1973)”. The literature on Keynesian 
uncertainty is extremely varied and although this is not the place for a complete review of it, 
recommended works are, amongst others: Kregel (1987), O’Donnell (1991). Runde (1991), Dequech 
(1997, 1998, 1999), Ferrari Filho (2001), Pacella (2006b).  
57 On this point it is interesting also to consider this quotation in the Theory of Business Enterprise (ch.4): 
“notoriously, business men are jealous of any attempt to change the value or lessen the stability of the 
money unit, which goes to show how essential a principle of business traffic is the putative invariability 
of the money unit”. Here it is possible to notice that Veblen recognizes  monetary stability as an 
additional requisite of investments. It has been seen in the previous sections that undertakers act to 
maintain high prices, but at the same time this quotation allows us to say that undertakers oppose 
monetary polices that can induce increased prices which the  undertakers themselves do not want if 
demand decreases. In other words undertakers oppose exogenous processes of price increases since this 
can have a negative effect on the level of demand, and for this reason undertakers call  for monetary 
stability. 
 90
clearly followed through by Veblen it is interesting to notice that in his vision 
uncertainty does not permeate – at least at the same level – all social classes. 
Uncertainty would seem a typical trait of undertakers and the association of the 
“magnitude of business capital” as “question of folk psychology” would support this 
thesis. Probably the attribution of uncertainty prevalently to the undertaking class is 
not incidental in Veblen; economic-historical events from the late 1860s to the early 
1900s could have inspired Veblen in assigning uncertainty to the undertaking class. In 
fact in these years America experienced its impressive industrial revolution with 
continuous processes of industrial and economic change which made undertakers live 
in a constant state of uncertainty about the profitability of their investments.   
Given the above premises let us see more in detail the relationship between 
profits and capital. According to Hopkins (1933), Veblen – like other American 
economists since the 1860s such as Frances Walker (1883), Frederick Hawley (1890), 
John Bates Clark (1892) and Frank Knight (1921) – structures a theory of profit with 
an intent common to the above economists, that is to say to propose different theories 
of profit in opposition to a common theoretical background: the theory of profit of 
John Stuart Mill. In fact all the above economists rejected Mill’s idea of profit as 
income composed by interest, wages of management, and the prize for the riskiness of 
the investment59. Some of them separate interest from profit. In those years for 
example Walker made a distinction between capitalists and entrepreneurs; the income 
for the use of capital is the interest – determined in the capital market – and goes to 
capitalists while entrepreneurs obtain profits by the Ricardian rent principle, 
Consequently profit becomes an expression of the entrepreneur’s efficiency. In other 
words, profit is quantifiable as the wage of alternative employment payable to the least 
efficient entrepreneur. On the other hand Hawley argues that profit is simply the prize 
for the risks entailed by the investment and which cannot be externalised; so from 
profit he removes interest and the wage of the entrepreneur’s work. John Bates Clark 
                                                                                                                                   
58 The Veblenian idea of investment is next the Keynesian theory of investment. Here it is sufficient to 
make reference to the following quotation from Keynes to point out a common vision between the two 
authors. Keynes writes in the Treatise on Money: “Upon what does the demand price of capital goods 
depend? It depends on two things: on the estimated net prospective yield from fixed capital (estimated 
by the opinion of the market after such allowance as they choose to make for the uncertainty of 
anticipation) measured in money, and on the rate of interest at which this future yield is capitalised. [..] 
It follows that the price of such goods can change for either of two reasons, because the prospective 
yield has changed or because the rate of interest has changed” (Keynes 1971 [1930], pp.180-181; italics 
added).  
59 In these terms Mill quantifies profit; however the nature of profit is the abstinence from consumption, 
which finds its materialization in the capital advanced to the production (see Gootzeit, 1995).  
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instead builds a theory of profit assuming that profit is not a matter of interest or of the 
entrepreneur’s wage or of a prize for risk; so no element of Mill’s original theory of 
profit is retained by him. In his vision profit is a matter of productivity and input costs; 
analytically the firm maximizes profit when marginal productivity of inputs (labour 
and capital) is equal to their marginal cost (wages and interests). More specifically, 
Clark sees labour productivity as depending on the entity of capital, and the 
productivity of capital as the residual of labour productivity. In other words the 
effective productivity of all workers – and consequently their wage – is equal to the 
productivity of the last employed worker; this is due to the fact that the sum of 
outcomes realized by the preceding workers is not an expression of productivity of 
labour but of capital. When Clark looks at profit he is looking at the profit of the firm; 
in other words profit is a firm’s outcome which is absorbed both by entrepreneurs and 
workers. This phenomena is evident in a dynamic context since in the static one the 
entrepreneur has the right to profit – calculated as the residual between revenues and 
costs – since s/he is the owner of saleable commodities; but in the dynamic context 
profit is reinvested by the entrepreneur in capital, and the increase of capital increases 
the worker wage bill since an increase in capital in fact increases the labour 
productivity of the last worker, and therefore of all workers at the same level, and 
consequently the wage bill increases at the same level for all workers60. On the other 
hand, Knight argues that profit must be understood as the guarantee of entrepreneurs 
for their liability connected to negative and unexpected events. According to the 
author, risk is a calculable factor since it is connected to expected adversities whose 
costs can be transferred to others; on the other hand, profit – which is expressed as a 
residual of income – covers the cost of the non-expected or unforeseeable adversities 
(uncertainties) which are not calculable and cannot be transferred to others.  
In contrast with the above theories Veblen puts forward a theory of profits 
connected to the capitalization of firms and technically Veblen defines capital as the 
capitalization of expected profits (see Veblen, 1904, ch. 5) speaking about “items of 
capitalized wealth” (Veblen, 1908b, p.124). It is interesting to note that a characteristic 
of profit is the institutional use of the capital. Given the same capital, different profit 
                                                   
60 It is important to notice that Clark builds his theory using a precise assumption: the ‘reshuffling’ of 
workers; this means that the order in which workers enter and are employed in the production process is 
not relevant. As Clark writes “if the first unit of labour claims more than the amount [of the last one] 
employers will let him withdraw and will substitute for it the last unit” (Clark, 1965 [1899], ch.XII). On 
this particular point see also Robinson (1934) and Samuelson (1962). 
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levels and features are possible if the ways of using the same capital change. In Veblen 
the ways of capital utilization are institutional. In these terms the institution of 
ownership leads capital towards one kind of capital utilization while the institution of 
industry leads capital towards another kind of utilization. In the first case the 
utilization of capital is for monetary profit, in the second case it is for real profit. 
Hence the concept of profit is first of all an institutional concept and historically 
contextualized. As he writes: 
 
“The concept of capital is, substantially, a habit of thought of the men engaged in business, more or 
less closely defined in practice by the consensus of usage in the business community” (Veblen, 
1908e, p.113; italics added).  
 
In addition since capital has an institutional origin then its meaning is historically 
contextualized. As he remarks:  
 
“[The term of capital] does not remain the same from generation to generation; and it cannot, at least 
as regards present usage, be identified and defined by physical marks. [Then he adds] “Capital” in 
the usage of current business, undoubtedly has not precisely the same meaning as it had in the 
corresponding usage of half a century ago; and it is safe to say that it will not retain its present 
meaning, unimpaired and unimproved, in the usage of ten years hence” (Veblen, 1908e, p.114; 
italics added). 
 
Note that Veblen’s theory of capital is different from those presented by Eugen von 
Böhm-Bawerk in 1884 and 1889 in his volumes of Kapital un Kapitalzins, and by 
Irvin Fisher in his 1906 work The Nature of Capital and Income and in The Rate of 
Interest: Its nature, Determination and Relation to Economic Phenomena of 1908. 
Veblen is also critical towards John Bates Clark and his The Distribution of Wealth 
published in 1899. Veblen builds his theory on capital during the first decade of the 
1900s and the above works certainly provided him with interesting hints for sustaining 
his own ideas (see Veblen, 1892; 1908d, 1908e, 1909b). While Böhm-Bawerk 
identifies capital as a “roundabout process” – that is to say as productive input formed 
by a given quantity and time of utilization of work and raw materials employed in its 
production in the past – Fisher sees it as a fund of real wealth owned by each 
individual, where the real wealth is intended as a totality of real owned goods. So 
differently from Böhm-Bawerk, Fisher does not look at capital just in terms of 
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industrial equipment, and he does not see capital just as a matter for undertakers. 
However it can be said that of all of them, the theory that interests Veblen the most is 
that of John Bates Clark since it divides the concept of capital from the concept of 
capital-goods; in Veblen’s vision these terms are “conceptually distinct, though 
substantially identical” in Clark (Veblen, 1908d, p.162). Clark regards capital as a 
fund of productive goods with capital-goods as the single component of this fund. In 
Clark’s idea, capital is a system of productive goods  - that is to say as industrial 
system  - whose value is different – but not independent – from the sum of values of 
the single components. Veblen interprets the meaning of capital in Clark in the 
following way:   
 
“Mr. Clark’s conception of capital, should be the generalization that industrial capital – capital 
considered as a productive agent – is substantially a capitalization of technological expedients, and 
that a given capital invested in industrial equipment is measured by the portion of technological 
expedients whose usufruct the investment appropriates” (Veblen, 1908d, p.166; italics added). 
 
Moreover the value of capital in Clark maintains its relationship of productivity with 
its single components, so the matter of its monetary valuation is irrelevant. As we have 
seen, the concept of capital is wider that the concept of capital goods and the 
transferring of capital is different from the transferring of capital goods. In the first 
case the object transferred is a complex production system while in the second case the 
object is just a mechanical good. In fact the transferring of capital is equal to a change 
of investment while the transferring of a capital good is simply the substitution of a 
physical thing. Consequently while the transferring of capital goods can be done 
without transferring capital, the transferring of capital cannot be done without the 
transferring of capital goods since while capital is necessarily made by capital goods, 
capital goods do not necessarily make capital. 
More specifically, the relationship that Veblen shows between capital and 
profits is quantitative in the sense that the higher the investment, the higher the profits. 
Veblen tries to explain why this happens in the Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) 
arguing that the higher the capitalization, the higher the turnover and the lower the 
capital rotation, so the higher the profits. In particular Veblen assumes the turnover as 
the product of the speed of capital rotation by the capital where capital is equal to the 
sum of private capital plus a fraction of it which represents credit. Consequently the 
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capital rotation time is expressed as fraction between capital and turnover. Given the 
private capital an increase of credit determines an increase of turnover and the 
capital/turnover ratio decreases. Veblen (1904, ch.5) uses the following equation to 
express the turnover: 
1 cT c
t n
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
61. Apart from this analysis, in the Theory of 
Business Enterprise Veblen does not clearly explain the economic reasons that allow 
the firm with a high level of capitalization to gain more. Some answers can be traced 
in his “Credit and Prices” (1905). Here Veblen finds several reasons why firms act in 
favour of new capitalizations by increasing their size and Veblen calls this tendency 
“speculative advance” (Veblen, 1905, p.461) since their enlargement is motivated by 
the aim to make more money profits62. Veblen specifically makes reference to three 
reasons stressing that: 
 
“[the] presumed greater earning capacity of the corporations [..] may be due to economies of 
production, superior management, economies of sale, or what not” (Veblen, 1905, p.463). 
 
In fact Veblen is implicitly assuming that the earning capacity of firms increases when 
they increase their size thanks to the achievement of monopolistic positions on the 
market which are presumably positions of natural monopolies, that is to say what he 
calls “efficient monopoly” (Veblen, 1905, p.464). As he writes: 
 
“Price changes [..] will probably be regarded as the effects of monopoly rather than of the credit 
transactions which initiate the monopoly” (Veblen, 1905, p.463; italics added). 
 
It therefore seems that the pursuit of larger sizes increases demand for money because 
of the presumed reaching of scale economies which allow the firm to increase its 
volume of business and thus its profits. Apart for the possibility for firms to reach 
natural monopolistic positions, a larger size allows firms to reach  monopolistic 
positions and this is thanks to the investment in “tangible and intangible assets” (see 
                                                   
61 with 1= the time taken as reference (year, month, days, etc.), c = private capital, c/n = fraction of private 
capital taken in credit form, T = turnover. If we consider 12 months as time of reference we can write 
( )(12 / ) /T t c c n= +  and the time of rotation of capital becomes ( )( / ) / *12t c c n T= + . 
62 On the phenomenon of the firm’s capitalization Rutherford (1980, p.437) stresses that the distinction 
“between large corporations with market power [favoured by addition capitalizations] and small 
undertakings such as independent farmers” is a key feature of Veblen’s picture of profit in the 
capitalistic economies. 
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below). In fact Veblen then goes into detail of the kind of investment that firms can 
make with new capitalizations63. On this point he mainly makes reference to the 
following kinds of investments: a) mechanical equipment, what Veblen calls “tangible 
assets” or “capital goods” or industrial capital and b) the immaterial capital, what 
Veblen calls “intangible assets” (see Veblen, 1908b, p.105). Tangible and intangible 
assets represent the capital owned by undertakers on which Veblen spends a 
considerable part of his study (see also McCormick, 1989). Hence he makes a 
difference between profit generated by the ownership of tangible assets and profit 
generated by ownership of intangible assets. Let us see the two points in more detail 
with a necessary comment: both intangible capital and industrial capital generate 
profits via economic and institutional sources.  
a) Intangible capital. “Intangible assets are immaterial items of wealth” 
(Veblen, 1908b, p.105) that is to say immaterial goods – like patent rights, 
monopolistic control, advertising, brands, business signs, licences, benefits, 
                                                   
63 It is important to notice that Veblen gives particular emphasis to the role of capitalisation also for the 
economic cycle. In his view, the economic cycle first involves monetary values – monetary capital and 
prices – and after this it becomes a matter of industrial production (see Veblen, 1904, ch.7). In addition 
the economic cycle is endogenously determined by undertakers via the blockage and expansion of 
production. The upward phase of the cycle is characterized by: a) capitalisation, b) high prices and c) 
free selling. On the other hand the downward phase is characterized by: a) low prices, c) forced sales 
and d) contractions of capitalisations (see Veblen, 1904, ch.7). Positive expectations of monetary profits 
generate expansive phases via the enlargement of capitalisation (creation of credit). With the use of new 
capital undertakers increase demand for capital goods; employment increases and production rises; 
income increases and demand for goods increases too; sales become free during this phase for Veblen 
in the sense that demand is fully satisfied by the increase in production. The effect of the enlargement of 
capitalisation is the increase in turnover and reduction of capital rotation time, so profits increase. The 
firm’s earning capacity thus increases and consequently the market value of the “business property 
submitted as collateral” rises (see Veblen, 1905, p.462). If the value of collateral increases, new capital 
can be created and firms obtain an expansion of capitalization. The higher the value of the firm’s 
capital, the less the firm’s creditors perceive a loss (see Veblen, 1904, ch.7). So the working of the 
system in the above structure leads creditors to imprudently examine the possibility of getting their 
money back (see Veblen, 1904, ch.7) and pushed by positive expectations they continue to supply new 
capital. In view of this, the new capitalisation appears to be the effect of a price increase, just as prices 
appear to be the cause of the first capitalisation, or as Veblen argues credit and prices “are mutually 
related as cause and effect” (Veblen, 1905, p.461). The expansive phase is therefore characterized by an 
inflationary process that affects both the price of capital and the prices of goods; however the system 
cannot absorb such a process for long for two main reasons: a) the price of capital exceeds the effective 
possibility of profit, b) and the prices no longer maintain their profitability. So in a given point of the 
cycle the system starts to produce “in excess of what the market will carry off at a sufficient profitable 
price” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.8), and consequently there is a crisis with the concomitance of the 
phenomena of overproduction. As a consequence the system changes its tendency: profits decrease; the 
reduction of profits – and the presence of any losses – push undertakers to reduce investments and to 
increase the number of dismissals; the reduction of profit determines an increase in unemployment as 
well as a reduction of capital value and consequently the risk of insolvency increases (contraction of 
capitalization). Creditors are less inclined to renew their own credit and they quicken the time of 
liquidation of credits discounting them with the bank (liquidation of credits). In addition the reduction 
of profits  - or the presence of losses - pushes firms to sell their own products at lower prices with the 
aim of recovering money and squaring their own debts; Veblen calls the sale of products at undesired 
prices forced sales.  
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copyrights, etc needed for the setting up of a firm and useful since they are 
“pecuniarily serviceable” to undertakers (Veblen, 1908b, p.105). Intangible assets in 
fact are not useful for the collectivity since they cannot produce real goods so they are 
useful only for the owner (see Veblen, 1904, ch.6) since they reduce the degree of 
competition amongst firms and produce a differential of profits. They have an 
institutional character since they are products of “use and wont, law and custom” 
(Veblen, 1908b, p.112) and they have a value proportional to their capacity to control, 
manage and develop the profit differential; their institutional trait is more marked in 
their capacity of creation and consolidation of powers, ‘rights’, etc. via the 
“capitaliz[ation] [of] habits of life [like] habits, propensities, beliefs, aspirations, 
necessities” – institutional sources (Veblen, 1908b, p.116; p.123). Let us look for a 
moment at advertising. Advertising is an intangible asset whose aim is that of 
“diverting credulous customers from one seller to another” (Veblen 1964 [1919a], 
p.95; see also Veblen 2001 [1921], p.70). So advertising is a source of continuous 
conditioning – and for this reason a source of capitalization – of consumer habits 
towards goods and services of one firm rather than another. Consequently intangible 
assets “represent assured income which can not be assigned to any specific material 
factor as its productive source” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.69) and they assure the right 
to obtain a differential gain as regards their own competitors and for this reason they 
are institutional forms of profit (see Veblen, 1904, ch.6). Actually Veblen is 
particularly interested in the analysis of advertising as a peculiar kind of intangible 
asset (see Veblen, 1904, ch.3). Veblen sees advertising in terms of business technique 
of a speculative kind aimed at the acquisition of differential profits on the market to 
the competitor’s detriment. This acquisition is not the result of action by firms on the 
technological side but on the business side. More specifically, Veblen configures 
advertising as the main technique of persuasion to purchase. It is mainly based on 
psychological and communicative techniques. Veblen opposes the idea that sees 
advertising as informative tool, since the purpose of advertising is not to inform but 
rather to convince. Consequently it does not set out to reduce the information gap 
between consumer and firm; so its purpose is not to help the consumer make a rational 
choice. It could be argued that not being an information tool, advertising does not act 
as an auxiliary tool to the decisional autonomy of consumers but in fact appears to be a 
tool aimed at the handling of the consumer and at the control of his/her decisional 
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autonomy. So advertising works by predefining and maintaining consumers’ choices 
and, according to the author, the effectiveness of advertising depends on the ability of 
firms to construct a product image in line with “the points of view” of the consumers, 
in other words in line with his/her habits of thought. The higher the convergence 
between communicative image of the product and consumers’ habits of thought, the 
higher the automatism of purchase (see Veblen, 1904, ch.3 footnote 20). Veblen 
classifies advertising in a two ways: a) competitive advertising, b) monopolistic 
advertising. The first kind of advertising is addressed to a virtual differentiation of 
products for the purpose of making products less replaceable, and therefore facilitating 
the formation of “differential monopolies”. Instead the second kind is a consequence 
of the first one; firms use it with the aim of consolidating their positional advantage by 
the consolidation or amplification of their own market (see Veblen, 1904, ch.3). 
Advertising investment serves to create and maintain a consolidated state of trust 
between consumers and therefore to reduce the degree of replacement of the product 
and have more chance of raising prices. The Veblenian theory of “intangible assets” 
has been used by the literature in proposing an interpretation of a possible market 
model on the lines of Veblen’s idea. Sweezy (1957) and then Arrow (1975) stress that 
Veblen indirectly thinks of monopolistic competition. As Arrow (1975, p.7) writes 
“Veblen puts great stress on product differentiation as an economic strategy and 
recognizes that trademarks, brand loyalty, advertising and other selling costs are 
significant elements of competition. These expenditures [are seen by him] as waste; 
they yield indeed a competitive advantage but no social advantage”. Interpreting 
Veblen and as also remarked by Arrow, the investment in intangible capital – in 
particular in advertising activities – is a form a waste for the collectivity. Even though 
Veblen is not clear on this point, the concept of waste could be extended from the 
leisure class to undertakers. Let us see why: Advertising investment is in fact used to 
reduce competition, but continuous investments in advertisings first began from 
undertakers’ competition to reduce competition. In other words in order to reduce 
competition undertakers compete with other undertakers on the level of advertising, 
spending large part of their resources in this area. So undertakers contend for 
consumers by increasing advertising investment, in other words by simple 
communication costs and image costs. In Veblen’s thought such costs represent waste 
for the collectivity. Expanding interpretations on the theory of waste for the leisure 
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class it is also possible to see the waste of advertising both at a microeconomic and a 
macroeconomic plane. As in waste in consumption, undertakers’ struggle to excel – 
the reaching of higher profits – is triggered by their investment in advertising which 
determines a final position for each competitor equal to his/her own initial position but 
with a higher utilization of resources, mainly money capital. Not having modified 
his/her position, the use of money capital is in fact wasted. On the other hand on the 
macroeconomic plane the waste is triple: a) firms invest in a virtual capital rather than 
in industrial capital; b) workers are moved from industrial sectors towards non-
industrial sectors, principally in commercial activities and intermediation c) 
advertising supplies just one form of utility: the saleableness of the product; so it 
furnishes utility only to the undertaker but not to the consumer since it is an additional 
cost without an additional benefit for the consumer and in this way it simply reduces 
the purchasing power of the consumer via a due price increase (cf. Forges Davanzati, 
2006a, ch.3). Although Veblen includes commercial intermediation in the category of 
waste activities he does not want to assume intermediation as complex of activities 
that necessarily produce waste. In other words commercial intermediation produces 
waste only if it is used for competitive selling independently from the network of 
product distribution to which it makes reference (see Veblen, 1904, ch.3). Steiner 
(1976, p.3) criticizes Veblen’s theory on advertising, arguing that “Veblen does not 
entertain the idea that [this] marketing [input] might increase purchasing power by 
generating an increase in output”. According to Steiner (1976, p.11) Veblen assumes 
that material productivity is just a technical matter and marketing activities cannot 
increase output; consequently, in Veblen, employment depends on industrial 
production and not on commercial activities. On the contrary Steiner argues that 
marketing activities reduce prices and increase output at least for two reasons: a) they 
“bring[..] the manufacturer economies of scale by enlargement of the market”, b) they 
increase the efficiency of the distribution process by reducing trade mark-ups and 
retail prices and therefore increasing consumption and production.          
b) Industrial capital. Let us remember that undertakers invest with the aim of 
obtaining monetary profits, so also industrial capital must be used for such purpose. In 
fact when undertakers look at capital goods they are looking at tangible assets which 
are “pecuniarily serviceable” to the owner (Veblen, 1908b, p.105). Tangible assets 
generate profits through their degree of utilization and turnover. More specifically a 
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way of obtaining high profits is to reduce the duration of the process involving the 
production of the profit. If profits depend on the reduction of capital rotation time then 
undertakers must find some ploy for reducing this time. More specifically, the 
reduction of this time depends on the increase of turnover and to increase the turnover 
undertakers rely on different tools such as a) business activities like advertising, and b) 
the employment of advanced industrial processes (see Veblen, 1904, ch.5). 
Technicians are therefore important for undertakers since their activity helps to find 
new technical solutions for increasing the turnover. However the level of technological 
development wanted by undertakers may not necessarily be equal to that desired by 
technicians; undertakers in fact aim at the introduction of new technology when it 
appears to be advantageous in terms of expected profit, while technicians aim at an 
introduction of technology under the non-bankruptcy condition. The reduction of 
turnover, due to technical improvements, allows the individual firm to increase its 
revenues, and – given the costs – the firm will exploit the technical improvements until 
the maximum exploitation of technical knowledge is reached.  
 
2.2.3 The institutional basis of the subsistence wage      
 
Differently from profits and rent Veblen does not consistently discuss the issue of 
wages. However, his writings can be seen to argue that workers are paid by a monetary 
wage that may - or may not - be in line with the subsistence wage. Probably Veblen’s 
best work in which some general considerations on wages can be found is Böhm-
Bawerk’s Definition of Capital and The Source of Wages” (1892). The trigger for his 
analysis came from the wages-fund doctrine, not in its original version by John Stuart 
Mill in his Principles of Political Economy (1848) but mainly in Böhm-Bawerk’s 
subsequent reconsideration for his theory of capital.  
According to the wages-fund theory, the source of wages is real capital. It 
would be more accurate to say that according to this theory, the wage bill paid to 
workers is a fixed fund of wage goods at the starting period of production and its size 
is equal to the surplus resulting form the previous period of production. Consequently 
the wage is simply equal to the capital/workers ratio64. Veblen agrees with the wages-
                                                   
64 Forges Davanzati (2002) has summarized the internal inconsistencies of the wages-fund doctrine. As 
stressed by the author the wages-fund doctrine can give rise to a paradoxical result. As he writes (2002, 
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fund theory as regards the idea that wages are paid in advance – since he rules out the 
possibility that workers have savings to use for their consumption – but he does not 
think that wages are advanced in real terms, but in monetary ones by the monetary 
capital of firm. In addition since the wage is paid in advance it cannot be paid by the 
product and no meritocratic criteria enter the logic of determination and awarding of 
wages. Consequently in Veblen’s thought it is clear that: a) wages are paid in advance, 
b) wages are anticipated by monetary capital, c) wages are not  paid by the product of 
the labour force65.  
In addition through Veblen’s writings it is possible to investigate the process 
of wage determination. More in detail, in Veblen the process of wage definition is 
subject to atomistic bargaining in the absence of regulation and given an institutional 
level of real subsistence wage, i.e. a subsistence wage shared by the community and 
known by workers and undertakers when they bargain for the monetary wage. As he 
remarks:    
 
“Wage is a fact incident to the relation of employer and employed. It is [..] fixed by colloquial use, 
an economic category whose scope is entirely within the theory of production as carried on by the 
method based on that relation” (Veblen, 1892; italics added).   
 
In Veblen’s vision, the subsistence wage – in real terms – is given on the institutional 
plane, i.e. it is derived from the standard (or desired) habits of life. Since workers and 
                                                                                                                                   
p.465): “when an excess of labour supply occurs, the average real wage tends to decrease because of 
competition among workers, and as a result, the wage bill drops below the wages-fund. Consequently 
the wages-fund would be fixed and variable at the same time”.  
65 As a consequence, the wage is not paid in relation to some kind of productivity. However it is important 
to notice that Veblen himself seems to accept the criterion of productivity-wage even if limited to the 
field of commercial intermediation. On this point he writes “the gains from these employments must 
plainly be accounted for on other grounds than their productivity, since they need have no productivity 
(Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.303). [In particular] since the ground of payment of wages is the vendibility of 
the product [..] it follows that wherever the difference in vendibility rests on a difference in the 
magnitude of the product alone, there wages should be somewhat in proportion to the magnitude of the 
product” (Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.304, footnote n.9). From the above quotations it can be concluded that 
a) commercial activities “have no productivity” because they do not produce real goods or services, b) 
any remuneration is paid as a function of the “vendibility of the product”; but in fact this should require 
a recognition of efficiency in commercial activity. However the same author writes: “it might, 
therefore, be feasible to set up a theory to the effect that wages are competitively proportioned to the 
vendibility of the product; but there is no cogent ground for saying that the wages in any department 
of industry, under a business régime, are proportioned to the utility which the output has to any one 
else than the employer who sells it. When it is further taken into account that the vendibility of the 
product in very many lines of production depends chiefly on the wastefulness of the goods [..], the 
divergence between the usefulness of the work and the wages paid for it seems wide enough to throw 
the whole question of an equivalence between work and pay out of theoretical consideration” 
(Veblen, 1904, ch.3, footnote 27).  
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firms bargain over the money wages, the equality between the exogenous subsistence 
wage and the current real wage is not ensured by endogenous market mechanisms. The 
equality of the real wage with the real subsistence wage is just incidental, or – as 
shown in § 3.3c – it  can be guaranteed by social conflicts. Veblen writes: 
 
“In the ideal case [..] the output of production should be held to such a volume that the resulting 
price of the limited output will take up the entire purchasing power of the underlying population, at 
the same time that the livelihood which the owners allow their working force of technicians and 
workmen is held down to the “subsistence minimum” (Veblen, 1967 [1923], p.67; italics added).  
 
So the subsistence wage is conceived by Veblen in real terms and has an institutional 
base and it is taken as a reference point in the bargaining for the monetary wage. In 
addition it is reasonable to argue that a level of the market wage systematically higher 
than the subsistence wage can modify the subsistence wage itself: since it is 
nonsensical to assume a market wage systematically higher than the subsistence wage 
the only possible effect of a systematic payment of higher wages than what is required 
for subsistence is that the standard of living adjusts itself to that imposed by the higher 
market wage. Veblen implicitly assumes that the subsistence wage is exogenously 
given and not variable; the comparison is made between the market wage and the 
subsistence wage when the market wage is lower than the subsistence wage. 
 
 
2.3 The determinant of economic growth: technology and industrial “sabotage”   
 
In the section 2.2 a reconstruction of the theory of income distribution has been given. 
Here instead let us see what variables affect economic growth according to the author. 
Veblen builds a theory of economic growth starting from the distinction between 
productive and unproductive labour stressing that productive labour produces real 
well-being, and therefore economic growth while unproductive labor does not 
contribute to economic growth since it does not produce real income, but just 
monetary income via the mechanism of prices; at the same time however it receives 
income thanks to the social recognition of the status of unproductive workers. There 
are several activities that can be excluded from the category of productive activities. 
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Amongst these, Veblen pays particular attention to financing and business activities on 
the one hand and to the activity of acquisition and spread of erudite knowledge on the 
other. It is interesting to notice that unlike erudite knowledge, Veblen attributes a 
productive effect to technical knowledge since this is materialized in real goods (see 
Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.19). If technical knowledge contributes to economic growth 
then workmanship and idle curiosity play a significant role in such a process. So 
Veblen builds his theory of economic growth mainly relying on the concrete 
application of good instincts.  
Technology is a necessary factor of production and economic growth in 
Veblen. Let us see why. Veblen regards the current production system as an 
“industrial system”, that is to say as an organization acting within a wide complex 
system and at the same time as an organization with complex structures inside it. More 
specifically, the industrial system is a complex organization in which a circular 
concatenation of interdependent mechanical and communicative sequences supplies 
conditions of working and of equilibrium. Each element of the industrial system 
(“section, group or individual unit”) does not act independently from the action of 
other elements which precede and follow it. Consequently each element of the system 
- if seen outside the system itself - is not self-sufficient and it is not precisely a 
“production factor” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.52; see also Veblen, 1904, ch.2). 
Defining the industrial system in the above terms Veblen emphasises – as O’Hara 
(1999, p.157) remarks – the social role of production. In such terms production is not 
just a matter of transformation of inputs into outputs. It is something wider. As O’Hara 
(1999, p.157) writes: in Veblen, “production is fundamentally a social process [..] 
where the material product [is in] unison in the labor process [..] due to the collective 
origins of knowledge and the industrial arts”. So the reciprocal dependence of each 
link in the industrial chain is the necessary condition for the working, survival and 
“equilibrium of the forces in action”. So this interdependence induces the system to 
impose a forced process of “co-partnership” of each element with the others (see 
Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.87) in processes characterized by regular standardized actions 
(see Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.38).  
So in the industrial system production follows standardized sequences with 
features of specialization, impersonalization and mechanization (see Veblen, 2001 
[1921], ch.III). Given these characteristics the practical management of the industrial 
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system is entrusted to technicians who show natural proclivities and attitudes in line 
with the process described above. While technicians manage the technical aspect of 
the industrial system, undertakers manage its business plan. In other words the 
undertakers take over the strategical management of the industrial system. 
Standardization of processes in fact is functional to the action of undertakers since it 
brings financial, commercial and mechanical activities into line, assuring greater 
possibilities of controlling business trends (see Veblen, 1904, ch.3). However the mere 
reciprocal dependence of the elements within the industrial system is not sufficient for 
the efficient use of the same. The obligatory mechanism of “co-partnership” assures 
working, “industrial salvation” and stability but not necessarily ‘efficiency’. In 
particular the industrial system is ‘efficient’ if it works by “faultless equilibrium”, in 
other words if: a) it produces at its maximum possible level, b) it is immune to 
external interference and c) it is “conditioned on a reasonably good coordination of 
[its] working forces” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.88). In addition Veblen states that: 
 
“Any dislocation, derangement or retardation of the work at any [..] point [..] in this balanced system 
of work will cause a disproportionately large derangement of the whole” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], 
p.88). 
 
With particular reference to points a and c Veblen stresses that they are technical 
matters, in other words matters for technicians (see Veblen 1964 [1919a], p.89). 
Actually he remarks that these points should be matters for technicians – the “men 
skilled in [..] matters of technology” – since it is “reasonable to expect” that control 
and coordination of mechanical processes are entrusted to people: “experienced in the 
ways and means of technology and [..] who are in the habit of thinking about these 
matters” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.89; italics added). Veblen remarks on the necessity 
for the industrial system to be entrusted to technicians since they have the adequate 
and disinterested knowledge and skills for its efficient administration, since the 
efficient administration of industrial capital allows their full utilization, and since the 
full utilization of capital goods allows the community to reach its potential growth. As 
Veblen comments: 
 
“The material welfare of the community is bound up with the due working of [..] the industrial 
system which depends on the expert knowledge, insight, and disinterested judgement with which it is 
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administered. It should accordingly have seemed expedient to entrust its administration to the 
industrial [technicians]” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.89).  
 
Thus according to Veblen it is clear that economic growth is a matter of technology – 
or rather a matter of the best administration of technology – and in Veblen technology 
is only apparently a matter of capital goods. It is something more. More specifically 
capital goods, i.e. materially productive goods, are a “matter of mechanical 
efficiency”; mechanical efficiency is then a matter of technology and technology is a 
matter of the cumulative process of development of knowledge and practice (see 
Veblen, 1908a, p.517). More specifically, industrial capital is for Veblen “a 
mechanical application of industry”, so it is first of all the material application of a 
peculiar kind of habit of thought (Veblen, 1908a, p.526; see also Veblen, 1964 
[1919a], p.68) which in turn is a material expression of technological “cultural 
continuity” between human generations. In fact – as Veblen remarks – capital goods 
are “an affair of the collectivity” (Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.103). In other words,  they 
are an expression of the evolution of the community’s technological knowledge over 
time – “industrial art” (see Veblen, 1964 [1911], p.68). Veblen specifically defines the 
state of “industrial art” in the following terms: 
  
“The state of industrial art is a joint stock of knowledge derived from past experience, and is held 
and passed on as an indivisible possession of the community at large” (Veblen 2001 [1921], p.19). 
 
We can limit the concept of industrial art to technological knowledge accumulated 
over time66. So the stock of existing industrial capital cannot be intended as the 
product of current technological knowledge since the current technological knowledge 
in fact adds to something that already exists. Veblen first of all looks at industrial 
capital in an evolutive and immaterial sense. So industrial capital is an expression of 
the instinct of workmanship and idle curiosity. These instincts provide the collectivity 
with a particular manner of viewing the world so current industrial capital can be seen 
as the material, mechanized stock of accumulated worldviews concerning in particular 
the use of resources and the serviceability of outputs for tackling the unfriendly and 
                                                   
66 Edgell (2001, p.145) – using the Veblenian terminology about tangible and intangible assets – compares 
industrial art to a social asset both as an intangible asset – expressed by technological knowledge – and 
then as a tangible asset through the materialization of technological knowledge into technical 
equipment.   
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constraining environment. In brief, capital goods are the evidence of the development 
of instincts and institutions in the direction of matter of fact logic. So development of 
technological knowledge – materialized into the current industrial capital – is the result 
of past and current innovation of habits of thought addressed toward the factual 
interpretation of reality. It is firstly a continuity of “immaterial [and common] assets” 
and only later of material assets. Consequently industrial capital and its efficiency is 
first of all a matter of mental habits and proclivities; so technological development and 
thus economic growth is assured when proclivities are addressed towards a particular 
kind of reasoning and behaviour. In particular, reasoning must be structured in mental 
processes of learning, evaluation and judgement in terms of cause-effect, while 
behaviour must follow precise, standardized processes (see Veblen, 1904, ch.4). In 
conclusion industrial capital materially shows the evolutive state of the instinct of 
workmanship, of idle curiosity that is to say the evolutive state of “experience, 
experimentation, habits, knowledge [and] initiative” (see Veblen, 1908a, p.518; p.521) 
and it is industrial art on which instincts and institution will continue to advance (see 
Veblen, 1908a, p.525). Hence, industrial capital has a clearly instinctual origin: the 
good instincts or, to use other terminology, the group oriented instincts or simply the 
non-predatory instincts, namely the instinct of workmanship and idle curiosity67.  
However in the Veblenian vision the development of industrial capital is 
dissociated from its control. In fact even if the development of industrial capital is the 
outcome of the development of good instincts, its control is in the hands of 
undertakers. In fact Veblen points out that the real problem for the collectivity is not 
the evolution of industrial capitalism but its control. In other words the question is: 
Who has the right to access the common stock of knowledge involved in industrial 
capital? And what are the effects of such access? The question is extremely relevant 
for Veblen because the peculiarity of access to the common stock of knowledge 
involved in industrial capital is a source of profit and the peculiarity of access is 
institutional. The current institutional mechanism of access to technological 
knowledge is the right of ownership of industrial capital. So the ownership of capital 
goods gives the right to take advantage of common knowledge but undertakers possess 
capital goods for the purpose of gaining private benefits: profits. In Veblen’s vision the 
                                                   
67 The connection between technology and social knowledge in Veblen’s thought is also pointed out by  
Hodgson (2004, p.183) who writes “The individual and the social aspects of knowledge are connected, 
because the social environment and its ‘common stock’ of experience provide the means and stimulus 
to individual learning” (see also Lawson, 2006).  
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ownership of industrial capital is a consequence of the very evolution of knowledge. 
As he writes: 
 
“As the common stock of technological knowledge increases in volume, range and efficiency, the 
material equipment whereby this knowledge of ways and means is put into effect grows greater, 
more considerable relatively to the capacity of the individual” (Veblen, 1908a, p.524).            
 
In other words, the higher the technological knowledge, the greater the material 
equipment involved - since “technological development require[s a] large unit of 
material equipment for the effective pursuit of industry” (Veblen, 1908a, p.524) - and 
therefore, the smaller the number of individuals that are able to own such equipment. 
In other words, the greater the number of individuals involved in the production and 
development of technological knowledge, the smaller the number of individuals that 
can actually use it. Two important observations derive from this: a) technological 
development is always associated with an extension and growth of material tools; b) 
the enlargement of material equipment is the cause of dissociation between producers 
of technological knowledge and users. The last point requires a detailed explanation: 
Interpreting Veblen, it can be argued that the institution of ownership was born as the 
natural right to own what one has produced. Veblen shows that at low levels of 
technological development there could be no dissociation between producers and users 
since the production required a low level of technological knowledge so the individual 
who produced something naturally became the owner of what s/he had produced. 
She/he was therefore naturally both producer and user. Then technological 
development started to characterize production in terms of the co-presence of different 
knowledge supplied by different individuals. So production was not the outcome of a 
single type of knowledge but of different ones and consequently it was actually the 
outcome of different individuals. However, the co-presence of knowledge was not 
associated with the evolution of co-ownership. Such equilibrium could be guaranteed 
by the prevalence of good instincts. In fact only the instinct of workmanship combined 
with the instinct to solidarity could allow ownership to maintain its natural character. 
Instead the prevalence of the predatory instinct changed the perspective, so the co-
presence of knowledge was associated to ownership and not to co-ownership. In other 
words when someone becomes the owner of what is collectively produced, this 
individual becomes the only one that has the right to use what it is collectively 
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produced. Having the right to use technology – and therefore having the right to use 
industrial capital – is equal to having a market advantage as regards those individuals 
that are excluded from its use (Veblen, 1908a, p.524). Industrial capital is not only 
owned under the influence of the predatory instinct, but it is used for business 
purposes so it is controlled for the purpose of obtaining profits. Following this line, 
Veblen sees the ownership of capital goods as a source of profit and power:  
 
“To engross [..] the usufruct of the commonplace knowledge of ways and means by taking over such 
the requisite material as may be relatively scarce and relatively indispensable for procuring a 
livelihood under the current state of the industrial arts” (Veblen, 1908a, p.525).   
 
As a consequence:  
 
“[The business man] can, of course, not create or initiate methods or aims for industry; [..] but he can 
decide whether and which of the known processes and industrial arts shall be practiced, and to what 
extent” (Veblen, 1961 [1901], p.298). 
 
In view of the above, ownership ensures that undertakers can take advantage of social 
technological knowledge. We need to investigate the way in which undertakers use 
such “usufruct” to make profits, in other words, it is interesting to look in detail at 
what Veblen calls the “sabotage” of industrial efficiency, often called “conscientious 
withdrawal of efficiency” (see Veblen, 1969 [1917], p.755; Veblen, 2001 [1921], 
ch.1]; Veblen, 1967 [1923], p.285), consisting in the reduction of the “net of 
productive capacity” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a] p.94)68. The main tool for increasing 
profits is the mechanism of prices, in other words, the under utilization of capital 
which is recognized by Veblen as a manifest tool of sabotage of the concrete 
possibility of production of collective industrial capital whose effect is unemployment 
(see ch.1). As he remarks: 
                                                   
68 Actually the term sabotage of the industrial efficiency is not a definition created by Veblen. He makes 
reference to a definition given by The Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) an American trade 
union with insurrectionary aims (see Veblen, 1932, p.798). The Industrial Workers of the World was 
established in Chicago in 1905. The main supporters were unskilled workers, low wage workers, 
emigrants, farm workers, miners and loggers. The I.W.W. sustained the class struggle and the 
destruction of capitalism. They used strikes and boycotts to achieve their ends, but were opposed to the 
use of collective bargaining and political action. However the number of IWW supporters was always 
limited (see De Domenico 1969, p.909) and due to a series of internal conflicts, its life was short. In fact 
the organization had lapsed by the mid 1920s and only recently (mid 1990s) it has been reorganized. On 
the history of I. W. W. see Brissenden, 1957; Renshaw, 1967 and Dubofsky, 1969).  
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“[The] earning-capacity [of  capital] is determined by what the traffic will bear, that is to say by 
curtailing production to such an amount that the output multiplied by the price per unit will yield the 
largest net aggregate return” (Veblen, 1967 [1923], p.68).  
“By historical necessity” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.89) the effective administration of 
the industrial system is entrusted to undertakers who have institutional tools – money – 
for the effective use of the industrial capital and who are interested in the business side 
of the industrial system, not its mechanical side69. Consequently:  
 
“The conditions of life for the variegated mass are determined by what the traffic will bear, 
according to the calculations [..] which guide the [upper classes]” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.175).  
 
The predatory action of the undertaker pushes him/her to act merely for a “vested 
interest” in the industrial system. In other words s/he takes steps to gain:  
 
“By obstructing, retarding or dislocating [the industrial system] at some critical point in such a way 
as will enable [them] to get the best of the bargain in his dealing with the rest” (Veblen, 1964 
[1919a], p.93). 
 
Consequently the action of undertakers affects the working of the industrial system. 
Actually it could be argued that the industrial system loses its characteristic of a 
system that grows; this is due to the fact that the circular concatenation of 
interdependent mechanical sequences always undergoes “interruption[s] and 
dislocation[s]” which affect its regular working towards potential growth. Its working 
therefore is often irregular and below the potential growth since each link of the chain 
of the system is in fact the rival of the preceding and following ones (see Veblen, 
1904, ch.3). 
                                                   
69 The historical necessities are described thus by Veblen: “as the volume of industry grew larger, 
employing a larger equipment and larger numbers of workmen, the business concerns necessarily also 
increased in size and in the volume of transactions, personal supervision of the work by the owners was 
no longer practicable, and personal contact and personal arrangements between the employer-owner 
and his workmen tapered off into impersonal wage contracts governed by custom and adjusted to the 
minimum which the traffic would bear. [..] The employment owner [..] shifted more and more to a 
footing of accountancy in its relations with the industrial plant and its personnel, and the oversight of 
the works passed by insensible degrees into the hands of technical experts who stood in a business 
relation to the concern, as its employees responsible to the concern for working the plant to such a 
fraction of its productive capacity as the condition of the market warranted for the time being. So the 
function of [..] the captain of industry, gradually fell apart in a two-fold division of labor, between the 
business manager and the office work on the one side and the technician and industrial work on the 
other side. [..] Gradually [..] by this shift and division, the captain of industry developed into a captain 
of business, and that part of his occupation which had given him title to his name and rank as captain of 
“industry” passed into alien hands” (Veblen, 1967 [1923], pp.l05-106; see also Veblen, 1908b). 
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In order to investigate this issue in greater depth, let us think of the following question: 
What is the relationship between ownership and industrial capital? Is ownership 
indispensable for economic growth? Does the accumulation of industrial capital 
necessarily require its ownership? Veblen assumes industrial capital as materialisation 
of immaterial “stock of knowledge and practice” (Veblen, 1908a, p.519). Since 
industrial capital is a stock of knowledge and since “knowledge [..] is a product of the 
life of the community” (Veblen, 1908a, p.519) then industrial capital is a product of 
the community. Consequently industrial capital does not need ownership, whereas on 
the contrary, ownership needs industrial capital. Ownership is an institution; more 
specifically, it is a “dominant and typical method of engrossing” (Veblen, 1908a, 
p.527) industrial capital and outcomes of capital goods. Ownership is a “self-
regarding” institution based on “personal, invidious, differential, emulative” factors 
(Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.172). The dominance typical of ownership finds its nature in 
the prevailing predatory instinct and in its subsequence acceptance as a reputable 
institution. Ownership needs industrial capital since it supplies its business profits. The 
owner does not need industrial capital for itself but for its ‘efficiency’ in terms of 
pecuniary gains. As Veblen remarks “[his/her] business endeavors depend, other 
things equal, on the efficiency [of the production process]” (Veblen, 1908a, p.538). 
Actually the owner needs the immaterial knowledge which is behind capital goods. On 
this point Veblen stresses that ownership assigns (to the owner) - the right to take – in 
“usufruct [the] industrial art” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.69; see also Veblen, 1967 
[1923], p.67). The possession alone of capital goods is not sufficient to obtain profits 
in business. However the owner should have technical knowledge and training to 
produce capital goods and to use them. But “[his/her] knowledge and training [..] is of 
business, not of industry” (Veblen, 1908a, p.536) so s/he needs to own external 
knowledge; in other words s/he needs the service of technicians (see Veblen, 1908a, 
p.536). As Veblen remarks: 
 
“He [..] needs in his business the service of persons who have a competent working mastery of this 
immaterial technological equipment, and it is with such persons that his bargains for hire are made” 
(Veblen, 1908a, p.536).  
 
When the owner owns the service of technicians then capital goods become “means of 
production”. As Veblen stresses “without them, or in the hands of men who do not 
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know their use, the goods in question would be simply raw materials” (Veblen, 1908a, 
p.537). So the service of technicians is functional to the action of undertakers for two 
main reasons: a) undertakers have no technical knowledge of using technology, b) 
undertakers look for efficient technicians since undertakers need more efficient 
industrial processes not in order to expand real production – which they do not want – 
but to save time in the rotation of capital. On this point Rutherford (1984, p.338; see 
also Cochran, 1970) interpreting Veblen writes: “under business institutions the 
problem is that new technology will only be introduced if there is a perceived 
pecuniary advantage in introducing it”. Hence undertakers positively support 
continuous technological development only if it is to their advantage. If this does not 
occur technological innovations are not welcomed and a possible conflict can be 
generated. Although Veblen does not directly clarify this point, one could argue that 
conflict is possible when technicians notice that their knowledge does not find 
concrete application; in fact it is reasonable to think that technicians are not interested 
in the improvement of knowledge for any intellectual aim but for a concrete 
materialistic application. Since the goal of ownership is always a predatory aim, 
Veblen stresses that ownership of the means of production:  
 
“Gives the owner not only the right of use over the community’s immaterial equipment, but also the 
right of abuse [of community’s industrial efficiency] and of neglect or inhibition” (see Veblen, 
1908b, p.106). 
 
So the inhibitory process of undertakers gives rise to the  under-utilization of capital 
goods for the purpose of profits - “capitalisation of inefficiency” (Veblen, 1908b, 
p.108). More specifically, the inhibitory process entails the utilization of production 
capacities below the maximum level is the effect of “restraint of trade” followed by the 
undertaker (see Veblen, 1908b, p.106). With the aim of gaining monetary profits, 
undertakers limit the production of goods. The limitation of production determines 
high price levels. Profit is therefore achieved by acting on the price side rather than on 
the quantity side (see Veblen, 1908b, pp.106-107). So undertakers act directly on 
quantity control so as to influence prices. In addition since industrial capital is a 
component of a complex system and since an interdependent part of the industrial 
system, the effective production capacity of each form of industrial capital affects the 
productive capacities of the other forms of industrial capital. The under utilization of 
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some industrial capital is enough to generate under-utilization of the whole industrial 
system (see Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.88). In other words sabotage of efficiency is not 
mainly intended on the microplane but on the macroplane. A micro sabotage 
determines a macro sabotage that is to say a sabotage of the system (see Veblen, 2001 
[1921], ch.I).   
However, independently from the way undertakers act on the inhibitory 
process, the effect of this process is to the detriment of economic growth and 
employment since production and occupation are generally maintained at a lower level 
than their potential. In other words, since industrial capital is not used efficiently – to 
full capacity – the economic system always will work with “ordinary” and “normal” 
conditions of unemployment (see Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.97) and with an economic 
growth rate lower than the potential. As Veblen remarks: 
 
“The recurrence of hard times, unemployment [..] goes to show how effectual is the inhibition of 
industrial exercised by the ownership of capital under the price system” (Veblen, 1908b, p.108). 
 
So “sabotage” of industrial efficiency is a “natural right of investment”. Since 
investment is a matter of pecuniary capital and of ownership then “ownership confers 
a legal right of sabotage” (Veblen, 1967 [1923], pp.65-66). Being the owner of his/her 
firm the undertaker has an absolute and exclusive use of it. This means that s/he has 
the right to do what s/he wants with the firm. Restrictions, postponements, and 
abstentions from the production process represent legitimate choices on the part of 
owners (see Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.99). Having the right to control the entity of 
production, undertakers in fact have the right to control employment and economic 
growth both of industrial equipment and of workers. In the Veblenian logic of profits, 
the system tends to spontaneously produce low economic growth rates and 
unemployment since production is maintained at a level that assures a profitable price, 
so at a lower level than its potential. It could be added that there is an inverse 
relationship between profits, economic growth and employment70. The volume and 
trend of production are managed according to the market logic. Availability and 
productivity of inputs and/or social needs are not significant variables for the choices 
of firms. They are simply functional to firms’ choices. Indirectly it could be argued 
                                                   
70 The higher the level of unemployment, the higher the level of profits, and the lower the level of 
economic growth. 
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that the sabotage of industrial efficiency is a sabotage of workmanship, that is to say of 
knowledge and skills. So sabotage concretely reveals itself in the following terms:  
“It consists [a)] in stopping down production to such a volume as will bring the largest net returns in 
terms of price, and [b)] in allowing so much of a livelihood to the working force of technicians and 
workmen, on the other hand, as will induce them to turn out this limited output” (Veblen, 1967 
[1923], p.67). 
 
Consequently the right to sabotage – guaranteed by ownership – becomes a convention 
by which undertakers define and dictate the quantity of goods to produce and 
distribute. It is canny conduct, or rather “[..] a shrewd balancing of production against 
price, such as is best served by a hard head and a cool heart” (Veblen, 1967 [1923], 
p.67; italics added). He also writes: 
  
“Profitable sales can be made only if prices are maintained at a profitable level, and prices can be 
maintained only if the volume of marketable output is kept within reasonable limits [where] 
reasonable means what the traffic will bear, that is to say what will yield the largest net return” 
(Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.91 italics added; see also Veblen, 1904, ch.3 and ch.5; Veblen, 2001 
[1921], p.66).  
 
Veblen in conclusion recognizes technology, the industrial art, as the effective and 
indispensable factor of growth or rather as an intergenerational and collective factor of 
economic growth. However, the possibility of the system reaching its potential growth 
depends on the actual state of ownership of technology and, in view of what has been 
said above, private ownership appears to be the institution that in fact limits growth.  
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2.4 Income distribution, economic growth and employment: the role of “wasteful 
expenditures”  
 
The literature has recently returned to the Veblenian theory of income distribution and 
economic growth, pointing out how a particular distribution of income can positively 
or negatively affect economic growth. There are three significant works that can be 
considered here: a) “Veblen’s analysis of social wealth, industry-business, and crises 
of capitalism” by Phillip Anthony O’Hara (in O’Hara, 2000, ch.4), b) “Emulation, 
Inequality, and Work Hours: Was Thorstein Veblen right” by Samuel Bowles and 
Yongjin Park (2005), and c) “Conspicuous consumption and unemployment: a re-
reading of Thorstein Veblen’s theory of income distribution” by Guglielmo Forges 
Davanzati (2006b). O’Hara argues that a redistribution of income in favour of non-
productive sectors reduces the “efficient working of technology” which determines 
reductions in aggregate production and therefore defining an endogenous condition of 
limitation of capitalism. On the contrary Bowles and Park show that an unequal 
distribution of income has a positive effect on economic growth.  Forges Davanzati 
agrees with O’Hara, adding that a redistribution of income in favour of the leisure 
class increases the demand for luxury goods which determines a reduction of 
aggregate production and an increase in unemployment. A more detailed description 
of these three re-interpretative approaches to Veblen’s income distribution and 
economic growth will be shown below. Let us start with O’Hara’s model. 
a) The contrast of productive-unproductive activities as the limits of capitalism. 
O’Hara’s assumes an economy composed of two main activities, industrial and 
business activities, and makes use of the ‘corn’ model assuming that “everything is 
made of corn”71; he uses the ‘corn’ model for emphasis on material production, as in 
Veblen. The production of corn is a function of workmanship which – in his view – 
depends on the existing level of technology, on “worker’s skills and knowledge and on 
                                                   
71 As he writes: “corn is the material substance of the economy: it is used as food, means of production in 
the form of seed, plus it forms the building blocks of the motor vehicle industry, [..] fuel, capital 
goods.[..] Productive workers plant and water the seeds, tend to their growth and development as plants, 
harvest the corn, transport the corn to market, compress the corn, and use the produce fixed and 
circulating capital, plus consumer durables and nondurables. Imagine that there are also unproductive 
workers such as accountants, advertisers, public servants members of parliament, owners of land and 
capital, banks, and sales workers, all of whom receive corn as payment and deal with numerical data in 
units of corn. Corn is also used as money: exchange, saving, and credit are undertaken with units of 
corn as the standard of value. Workers are paid [..] on subsistence wage in the form of credit. [..] 
Owners of land and means of production, and some of other unproductive agents, save corn in banks”.     
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the stock and rate of utilization of the available capital stock” (O’Hara, 2000, p.72)72. 
A distribution of corn from industry to business produces a reduction of output and an 
increase in prices. In this case – he writes – the “additional corn distributed to business 
is smaller than the net reduction of corn available to industry. A redistribution of corn 
to business interests [therefore] reflects an increase in wealth ‘de jure’ and a decline in 
wealth ‘de facto’, either ‘use-values’, or ‘livelihood’”. More specifically, O’Hara 
assumes that the industrial sector is able to produce a surplus of corn since the costs of 
subsistence and replacement of inputs are lower than the contribution to production of 
the instinct of workmanship. This assumption is in line with Veblen’s thought since:  
 
“Industrial efficiency is presently carried to such a pitch as to afford something appreciably more 
than a bare livelihood to those engaged in the industrial process” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.25). 
 
The surplus can have several destinations: it can be conserved and given on loan by 
capitalists to generate new surplus, it can be re-invested in new production, it can be 
consumed by technicians to expand their knowledge and it can be consumed by 
workers of unproductive sectors. The issue of distribution of surplus between 
productive and unproductive sectors is extremely relevant for O’Hara (2000, p.74) 
since it influences “the degree of stability, regeneration, and expansion of capitalism 
(in the reproduction process)”. In line with Veblen’s thought, O’Hara stresses that 
since unproductive sectors do not contribute to the material production of corn, their 
gains derive from the removal of corn from the productive sector and he adds that the 
minimum condition for reproduction is that the maximum gains in the unproductive 
sector are not higher than the surplus itself. This is what O’Hara (2000, pp.82 ff.) calls 
“the bar of critical maximum exploitation” over which capitalistic reproduction is in 
fact compromised “and new systems could emerge (for example socialism or 
fascism)”. In this way, O’Hara (2000, p.76) then tries to define a “rate of business 
exploitation of industry” expressed as the ratio of “the amount of the surplus [..] 
utilized for unproductive activities” to “the total product distributed to the productive 
sector”. Consequently, the higher the costs of the unproductive sectors (interest, 
wages, etc), the higher the exploitation in industry,  and the higher the workmanship – 
so the higher the proportion of production distributed in favour of technicians, and the 
                                                   
72 All such variables are measured in the quantity of corn necessary to their realization. 
 115
lower the rate of exploitation in industry73. The corn model proposed by O’Hara shows 
various limits that the author himself explains in the course of his analysis. As he 
argues, there are many qualitative factors involved in the production process that 
cannot naturally have a quantification in terms of corn, so the transformation of 
everything into corn invalidates the possibility of an exact definition of the “rate of 
exploitation in industry” and the “bar of critical [..] exploitation”. At the same time this 
does not completely rule out the possibility that a distribution of income in favour of 
unproductive classes reduces the rate of exploitation instead of increasing it, allowing 
capitalist reproduction; this is what the author himself calls “the Keynesian element of 
effective demand” (O’Hara, 2000, ch.4). In this case a distribution of income in favour 
of the unproductive class can increase the demand for material goods and since 
unproductive workers are not employed in the productive sectors then the increased 
demand increases the production and employment of the productive sector. The 
variation of total product distributed to the productive sector can exceed the reduction 
of the total product given to the unproductive classes; the consequence is that the “rate 
of [..] exploitation” is reduced and capitalist reproduction is guaranteed.   
b) Emulation and economic growth. Bowles and Park (2005) have shown how 
infra group emulation has a positive effect on the worker’s allocation of time between 
labour and leisure. They build a model making reference to a consumption function for 
the worker whose components are: a) “effective consumption” – defined as difference 
between worker’s income (assumed as the product of wage by working hours) and the 
average income consumed by the higher reference group, b) the hours of work. The 
choice’s variable is the hours of work and the individual maximizes his/her utility 
function under the constraint of a given wage and consumption of the higher class. 
Given this function the individual should choose the optimum level of working hours, 
that is to say the working hours that equalize the “marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and effective consumption to the wage rate” (Bowles and Park, 2005, 
p.400). According to the authors the consequence of a distribution of income in favour 
to the upper class is an increase of income produced by workers; in fact each increase 
of income for the upper class is consumed by it; an increase in upper class 
consumption reduces the utility of the single worker and increases the marginal utility 
of his/her effective consumption as regards the marginal utility of leisure, therefore 
                                                   
73 The reduction of exploitation in industry also occurs if the surplus is accumulated, or given in loans, or 
re-invested.  
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pushing the worker to increase his/her hours of work. The authors remark that their 
model works if two important assumptions are assured: a) workers have freedom to 
choose their hours of work, b) workers are engaged “in a conscious optimising process 
in selecting their working hours” so workers are rational agents; however as they also 
add, “a more plausible view is that [workers] have norms concerning the appropriate 
division of their time between family, friends, work, and other activities, and that these 
norms differ from group to group and evolve over time” (Bowles and Park, 2005, 
p.401); in their model the supply of working hours must not be limited by institutional 
or relational constraints; in addition – and as an implicit assumption – no conflictual 
propensity exists in their mode when income is unequally distributed; in fact if 
propensity to social conflict is assumed, workers could decide to withhold income 
from the upper class rather than increase working hours in order to maximize their 
utility function. 
c) waste and unemployment. Forges Davanzati shows that the “Keynesian 
element of effective demand” in O’Hara does not in fact produce economic growth. 
The author particularly wants to investigate how the level of aggregate production and 
employment is negatively affected by an increase in demand for luxury goods via an 
income distribution process in favour of the leisure class. The hypotheses from which 
the author starts his analysis are: a) the economy is divided into two sectors, the luxury 
goods sector and the wage goods sector; b) the macroeconomic system is made up of 
four social classes, i.e. the leisure class, businessmen, technicians and workers; in 
particular the leisure class is involved in conspicuous consumption via an income 
gained in the form of rent; in this case the author regards the rent of the leisure class as 
the ‘reward’ for profits whose level is equal to a slice of profit where this slice is called 
“index of the degree of exploitation” of workers. In the model in fact the  leisure class 
is considered a class composed of individuals that do not contribute to the production 
but that have ownership ‘rights’ on capital since they contribute to the formation of 
capital – or rather of monetary capital – by “banking and financial intermediation”, 
which gives them the right to an income. In fact this right is directly established by 
them through the setting of prices (such as the interest rate). Consequently they 
remove part of the income produced by workers without contributing to its production, 
therefore exploiting workers; workers work in the luxury goods sector and in the wage 
goods sector at a subsistence wage, while businessmen are interested to money profits 
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and technicians are interested in improving the technical conditions of production so 
as to expand it. Finally c) full employment is assumed. His idea is that an exogenous 
increase in the income of the leisure class pushes the same class to increase their 
demand for luxury goods. Thanks to the increase in demand for luxury goods, 
businessmen increase the demand for labour in that sector. Given the condition of full 
employment, an increase in the demand for luxury goods moves workers from the 
wage goods sector to the luxury goods sector. The production of wage goods decreases 
and firms both in the luxury and in the wage goods sector do not have enough ‘basic’ 
goods to pay their workers. In fact since the subsistence wage is fixed, then to 
maintain the same real level of payment for their own workers businessmen must 
reduce the number of workers both in luxury and in wage goods sector. The 
conclusion is that “the higher the rent/wage ratio, the higher the unemployment”74. 
 
 
2.5 The supply and the demand side-effect of rent increases on economic growth 
and employment   
 
In the above sections a reconstruction and rereading of the economic process of 
income production and its distribution has been put forward. In addition it has been 
seen how Veblen builds his theory of income circuit within a schema of credit 
economy. At the same time he transfers his vision on the traits and working of 
institutions in the system of income distribution. This allows him to structure a theory 
of income distribution based on the fundamental assumption that the origin of the 
economic categories of income – rents, profits and wages – is not economic but 
institutional. In other words, rents, profits and wages are the outcome of habits of 
thought and do not have their source in some form of contribution to the production. In 
addition Veblen seems particularly interested in tracing the foundation of economic 
growth to technology and its full utilization. Also in this case institutions can slow or 
quicken the process of growth, labelling ownership as the institution unable to 
guarantee an effective growth in line with its potential. Ownership structures a habit of 
thought addressed to the pursuit of monetary profits via the mechanism of prices and 
capitalization, with the aim of expanding firm size and therefore  reaching 
                                                   
74 On the same lines see also Forges Davanzati (2006c). 
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monopolistic positions. The result is that ownership leads the system to keep the 
quantity of production below its potential.  
In addition, even though Veblen does not express himself on the effects of a 
policy of income distribution in favour of undertakers it is interested to note that the 
author in fact appears critical of the positive effects of such a policy since the 
increased profits may not be reinvested. As Veblen writes: 
 
“Business principles, leading to saving and shrewd investment, are too ingrained in the habits of 
modern men to admit an effective retardation of the rate of saving” (Veblen, 1904, pp.255-256; 
italics added). 
 
On the other hand, what can be said as regards an income distribution in favour of the 
leisure class? In particular does the waste of the leisure class contribute to economic 
growth or limit it? In view of what has been said above, the waste of the leisure class 
is a peculiar kind of consumption characterized by its not being strictly serviceable for 
“community” but just for an institutional motive: envy. In fact in the Theory of the 
Leisure Class Veblen confines his analysis to the nature of ostentatious consumption 
without investigating its effects. The effects of ostentatious consumption – in 
particular on economic growth – are instead mainly traceable in the Theory of Business 
Enterprise. The comparison of the effects of waste with its nature is not so simple as 
might be thought. The reader of the Theory of the Leisure Class probably expects a 
critical reconstruction of the effect of waste on economic growth, so probably thinks 
that the higher the financial rents, the higher the macroeconomic waste, and so the 
lower the economic growth. Instead Veblen in the Theory of Business Enterprise 
extols rent as  a factor of economic growth. As he remarks: “the wasteful expenditures 
enhance demand [...] increase profits and raise capitalization” (Veblen, 1904, p.252; 
italics added). As can be seen, with this quotation Veblen accepts in fact the 
Malthusian theory of capital accumulation and for this reason such theoretical 
compatibility can be called the Malthusian element of Veblen. There are different 
quotations that can be taken into consideration to define the Malthusian element. 
Veblen in fact writes    
        
“The persistent defection of reasonable profits calls for a remedy. The remedy may be sought in [..] 
an increased unproductive consumption of goods [..]. If enough of the work or of the output is turned 
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to wasteful expenditures, so as to admit of but a relatively slight aggregate saving [..] profitable 
prices can be maintained on the old basis of capitalization. If the waste is sufficiently large, the 
current investment in additional industrial equipment will not be sufficient to lower prices 
appreciably through competition” (Veblen, 1904, pp.255-256; italics added). 
 
First of all waste is intended as a remedy for economic stagnation. In addition if 
undertakers react to the increase of demand via new investments – in particular 
reinvesting the accumulated profits – then their possibility of new profits increases 
since they enlarge their control of the market, maintaining prices at a high level as 
regards a more competitive system. Moreover, the higher the waste, the higher the 
expectation of profit, so the higher the tendency to make new investments.   
So, from the above quotations it can be argued that Veblen has an idea of economic 
growth led by the demand side and by a distribution of income in favour of the leisure 
class, who show the highest propensity to consumption. Such an idea is extremely 
close to the relationship between unproductive consumption and economic growth in 
Thomas Malthus’s Principles of Political Economy (1820)75. Malthus points out the 
positive effect that an increase in unproductive consumption has on capital 
accumulation. In fact given a level of productive workers, and therefore given a level 
of production, an increase in the income of the unproductive classes determines an 
increase in demand which firstly absorbs the same production, then makes prices and 
profits rise, thus pushing firms to increase their investments76. More specifically, 
Malthus stresses that production may reach levels that may not be absorbed by 
workers and capitalists because of the capitalists’ excessive tendency to savings and 
investments and due to the fact that workers cannot consume more than what they 
receive in wages. Output that is not absorbed by workers and capitalists can lead the 
market to a situation of overproduction and Malthus finds the solution to this problem 
in the unproductive consumption of landlords. Veblen directly expresses the 
acceptance of Malthusian theory of growth in the following way:    
 
                                                   
75 It might be useful to recall here that classical economics makes reference to productive consumption to 
identify the consumption of workers employed in the material goods production sector while with the 
term ‘unproductive consumption’ classical economists identify the consumption of individuals not 
directly employed in the sector of production of material goods.   
76 On the Malthusian theory of income distribution and economic growth see, amongst others, Eltis 
(1980); Costabile (1980; 1983), Costabile and Rowthorn (1985). 
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“It will be seen that on this view of the effect of wasteful expenditure the position occupied by [..] 
Malthus [..] is substantially well taken, although the defence of waste which [this economist offers] 
may be incomplete. Waste seems necessary to keep trade brisk, and therefore to keep the industrial 
processes working at their full capacity. The ulterior reason for this state of the case being the fact 
that the decisive ground which determines the margin of activity in business, and therefore in 
industry, is the business men's reluctance to accept a reduction of profits as measured in terms of 
price. The opponents of the Malthusian view failed to appreciate the decisive importance of price, as 
contrasted with serviceability, among the motives on which business proceeds” (Veblen, 1904, 
p.253, footnote 37). 
 
From the above quotations it can be said that the tendency to under-utilize  capital 
perpetuated by undertakers can be neutralized by an increase of leisure class rent and 
at the same time undertakers do not suffer a fall in prices – “the decisive [..] motives 
on which business proceeds” – if  the leisure class keeps its demand high.  
The Malthusian element of Veblen can be expanded in the following terms. 
Let us assume an initial condition where unemployment exists. The increase in rents 
produces an increase in the demand for luxury goods which produces an increase of 
investment in this sector. The effect is growth and employment in the luxury goods 
sector; in addition since the number of workers is increased in the luxury goods sector, 
the demand for wage goods also increases, so undertakers increase investment and 
employment also in the wage goods sector. Thus the increase of rent has produced an 
increase in global demand via the increase in consumption which then pushes 
undertakers to increase investments and so to increase production and employment in 
the system. The same result occurs if the Veblen effect is in operation. In fact when 
rent increases, the leisure class increases its consumption. Given an increase in 
demand for luxury goods, undertakers raise prices. If prices of luxury goods go up, 
members of the leisure class increase their demand for them. Production becomes 
profitable since undertakers increase investments and demand for labour in the luxury 
goods sector increases. Given an increase of employment in the luxury goods sector, 
the demand for wage goods increases and undertakers increase investments and 
employment also in the wage goods sectors. In conclusion the effect of an increase of 
rent combined with the Veblen effect is: increased employment, production and profits 
in the system. Note that the Malthusian element of Veblen cannot be intended as the 
“Keynesian element” mentioned by  (O’Hara, 2000, ch.4) for at least two reasons: a) 
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the positive effect of rents is not driven by public interventions aimed at the increase 
of employment, b) the multiplier effect is absent in Veblen. 
However at the same time it has been seen that financial rent is a cost – a 
“charge” on profits – for firms which can reduce investments, so it can slow  economic 
growth. Veblen remarks for example that the interest rate “diminishes the aggregate 
net profits [..] in that it requires them to pay interest” (Veblen, 1904, p.112). His 
critical position about financial rent on economic growth is then particularly clear in 
his The Vested Interests and the Common Man. Here in fact the author writes:   
 
“Productive industry yields a margin of net product over cost [..]. This margin of net product has 
come to rest upon productive industry as an overhead charge payable to anonymous outsiders who 
own the corporation securities” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.48; italics added).  
The following quotation appears clearer:  
 
“Rent is [..] a case of charging what the traffic will bear; and rental values should properly be classed 
with these intangible assets [..] which are due to their effectual control of the rate and volume of 
production” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.74). 
 
In comparing the Malthusian element of Veblen with his approach on rent as a 
financing cost, a problem of internal consistency might be noted in Veblen’s thinking. 
In fact the parallel reading of the Malthusian element with rent as a financial cost can 
lead towards this conclusion. However, a different perspective can be gained if the 
reading of the two effects is seen in sequential terms from the Malthusian element to 
that of rent as a financial cost. The key is in the following quotation: “Waste seems 
necessary to keep trade brisk, and therefore to keep the industrial processes working at 
their full capacity” (Veblen, 1904, p.253, footnote 37; italics added). In other words 
the positive effect of the Malthusian element on  economic growth is continuous as 
long as capital is fully used, so until full employment is reached. Expanding Veblen’s 
thought on the topic, it is possible to continue in the following terms: further increases 
in rents reduce production and employment. Let us see why: an increase in rent 
determines an increase in financing costs both in the luxury and in the wage goods 
sectors; increased rent means increased demand but since there is a condition of full 
employment undertakers cannot increase investments and production. Rent therefore 
prevails as a cost in the sense that financing costs reduce profits; if profits decrease, 
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investments decrease too and the effect of a reduction of investment is a reduction of 
production and unemployment. In addition since financing costs are rising, firms raise 
prices both in the luxury and wage goods sectors. In the luxury goods sector the 
influence of the Veblen effect again pushes the leisure class to increase rent via the 
increase in interest or buying stocks and bonds; this again determines a reduction of 
profits, investments, production and employment. On the other hand, the increase in 
prices and the reduction of investments reduces the workers’ real wages; the direct 
increase in prices reduces real wages while if investments decrease, real wages 
decrease since total output decreases and prices increase. A cut in the real wage has a 
negative effect on the level of expected demand which leads to a drop in investment, 
production and employment. As a result, when the full employment condition is 
assured, rent stops economic growth and increases unemployment.     
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C h a p t e r  I I I  
DISTRIBUTIVE DYNAMICS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
 
3.1 The evolutionary analysis of institutional change   
 
Edgell (2001, p.76) has argued that the Veblenian theory of evolutionary change is “a 
neglected aspect of his corpus” but “central to an understanding of the coherence of his 
overall contribution” (see also Edgell, 1975). Edgell (1975, p.76) remarks that the lack 
of interest about Veblen’s theory of evolutionary change has a well defined historical 
contextualization: evolutionary theories in general were particularly in vogue in the 
nineteenth century and the theoretical debate in the following century naturally lost 
interest in them in apart from the debate in a sector of economics (see for example 
Hodgson, 1994) and in sociology (see for example Sanderson, 1994). In accordance 
with Edgell’s view of the centrality of Veblen’s theory of institutional evolution to his 
thought, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the institutional change – which is 
substantially a change in the habits of thought – in the specific form of a change driven 
by income distribution in the Veblenian perspective. This is not a direct line followed 
by the author in the explanation of the institutional change. He in fact directly 
followed other pathways mainly based on the role of technology and technicians. 
Before structuring a Veblenian theory of institutional change via distribution dynamics 
it is useful to look at the author’s vision of the evolutions of institutions until his time 
and his vision on the perspective for new changes.   
With particular reference to his evolutionary analysis of past institutions, 
Veblen uses a methodology based on historical study77 and mainly makes reference to 
four eras, each of them characterized by different environmental conditions, by 
peculiar instincts and by a different technological development. These eras were: a) 
primitive savagery, b) the barbaric era, c) the period of the handcraft economic system, 
and d) the ‘current’ time of mechanical technology (see Anderson, 1933; Bowman, 
                                                   
77 Veblen defines history – in particular the history of economic life – in the following terms: “[it] is a 
cumulative process of adaptation of means to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, 
both the agent and his environment being at any point the outcome of the last process” (Veblen, 1961 
[1898c], p.74). 
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1973, p.xvi; Edgell, 1975; 2001, p.77; Uselding, 1980; Jamison, 1989). 
Geographically they mainly cover Northwestern Europe and – but some of them  - 
North America. Veblen describes these eras in terms of cyclical movements of 
instincts and institutions combined with cyclical movements of conflicts and peaceable 
periods. In Veblen’s analysis the reasons such eras alternate seems to be outside the 
scope of his inquiry, and nor is it clear why conflicts alternate with peaceable periods 
and vice versa or why such conditions are external rather than endogenously 
determined. Consequently some matters remain open, such as whether conflicts and 
peaceable periods are driven by instincts and institutions or vice versa. In addition he 
often regards technological changes as the main variable of institutional changes, 
however, if we assume that technology is an instinctual and institutional matter itself – 
originating from the instinct of workmanship and institution of industry – then   
institutional change is in fact the outcome of institutions. This point is well explained 
by Banks (1959, pp.234-235) who remarks that “since workmanship is to be 
conceived of as the product of interaction between normative and conditional elements 
in economic behaviour, changes in the purely technological side [..] will result in 
change in the norms governing workmanship practices”. In brief, in the evolutionary 
analysis of institutional change Veblen is not clear in the structure of the cause-effect 
relations between the socio-economic variables entailed in the changes. Given the 
above premises let us now see these eras in more detail:  
a) The peaceable era. Temporally, Veblen places the peaceable era between an 
undefined beginning and the Neolithic period. Geographically it involved only 
Northwestern Europe and was characterized by small social communities, agricultural 
activity, shared inputs and absence of ownership. As Anderson (1933, p.606) writes 
“[people] entered the [Veblenian peaceable era] with only the most meager stock of 
knowledge and the crudest of economic technique, but emerged at its end with an 
imposing body of technology applied with marked success”. Moreover, as Edgell 
(1975, p.273) adds: “during the [Veblenian] peaceable era [..] the low level of 
technology preclude[d] a surplus [..] and ensure[d] that workmanship, upon which the 
survival of the group depend[ed], prevail[ed] as the major force shaping the cultural 
life of that period”. More specifically in this era people improved agriculture and 
breeding techniques and started to manufacture objects both for use and for decorative 
purposes. On the instinctual plane, this period saw the prevalence of the following 
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instincts: the parental bent, idle curiosity and workmanship and on the environmental 
plane, people lived in a peaceful state.  
b) The barbarian era. This era characterized the process of development of 
Europe between the end of the Neolithic and the Middle Ages. The environment 
context in which people lived was one of war and the production of surplus (see also 
Edgell, 1975, p.274). Such a context – as it is summed up by Anderson (1933, p.607) - 
“gave rise to a general attitude of belligerence” and to the appropriation of things by 
aggression. As a result, people developed the predatory instinct and the mental attitude 
to ownership which in turn spread the concept of “status” and therefore the concept of 
social superiority and inferiority. The predatory instinct changed the method of 
acquiring things: from production and exchange to simple aggression. A change in this 
direction makes the need for “useful effort” irrelevant – and as Anderson (1933, p.610) 
says - there was no “stimulus to technological progress”.  
c) The handcraft era. Veblen recognized the handcraft era as a relatively 
peaceable era. Geographically it involved both Northwestern Europe and North 
America but for different time periods. More specifically, it covered the period 
between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the eighteenth century in 
Europe and the early nineteenth century in North America. On the instinctual plane the 
predatory instinct and the instinct of workmanship moved in parallel. In particular the 
era can be divided into two phases of development. First of all, and unlike the previous 
eras, the system of production moved from an atomistic system to a corporative one 
with limited exchanges. The second phase featured a marked development of large 
scale industrial technology and of the means of transport and communication. 
Correspondingly the scale of production and exchange increased and the single 
production unit gave way to industry and to international trade. The enlargement of 
production units and the expansion of trade changed the ‘physiognomy’ of the market 
in the sense that market relationships started to become impersonal. In addition, in 
such a phase, ownership spread further to involve in a strict sense the ownership of 
firms which started to change their nature and goal: from investment for real profit to 
investment for monetary profit (see Anderson, 1933, pp.610 and ff.) As Edgell (1975, 
p.275) writes, in this phase “work in order to gain a livelihood is transformed into 
work in order to gain a profit”. In addition it gave rise to the first wage work. The 
possibility of directly owning industrial techniques was limited to a small part of the 
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community, so the majority of the community could only exchange its own activity for 
an income. It was therefore the era of the beginning of the current social divisions: 
capitalists on one side and workers on the other.  However the activity of workmen 
was mainly that of using mechanical tools.  
d) The machine era. New wars and a new technological revolution 
characterized the environmental context of the machine era. Industry organized itself 
in a system and workmanship was subjected to the predatory instinct. Impersonal 
relationships became the market rule and using the words of Arrow (1975, p.6) “the 
impersonal relationships characteristic of the modern [Veblenian] market[..] impl[y] 
much more possibility for irresponsibility on the part of sellers”. Consequently there 
were in fact no checks to inhibit undertakers’ predatory instinct. In addition workers 
lost their active role in the production becoming “assistants”. As Anderson (1933, 
p.613) writes “rather than [..] user[s] of machines, [they are] used by them” and Edgell 
(1975, p.276) adds that the “worker ceases to be an individual, creative productive 
agent and becomes a machine attendant”. Moreover, “in contrast to the handcraft era 
in which the owner-worker surveyed and regulated the productive process personally, 
in the machine era the financial aspects of production become [more important] for 
businessmen” (Edgell, 1975, p.276).   
From this evolutionary analysis of institutional change Griffin and Karayiannis 
(2002) point out that Veblen identifies two kinds of capitalism: a) a pro development 
capitalism and b) an anti development capitalism. In the first case the entrepreneur is 
at the same time owner, manager and innovator while in the second case the 
entrepreneur is just the owner. Pro or anti development is the effect of the different 
nature of profits and role of innovations. The owner being simultaneously also 
manager and innovator means that profit has the nature of income of labour income 
and innovations serve to increase profits, while if the capitalist is just the owner then 
profit simply becomes capital income, pure investment return. Here innovations are 
not strictly needed – think for instance of intangible assets – or if needed they are not 
large enough: think for instance of the related need for undertakers to reduce the 
rotation of capital  and at the same time to under-use it (see chapter 2).            
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3.2 The Veblenian perspective of future institutional change: the role of 
technicians   
  
The secondary preliminary part of Veblen’s thought that requires particular attention – 
before looking at the relationship between the distributive dynamic and the 
institutional dynamic – is his vision of the role of technology and technicians in new 
institutional changes. As seen in the preceding chapters social well-being is a complex 
matter for Veblen; it in fact depends on institutional-economic and ethical matters such 
as a) development of technological knowledge and b) elimination of waste. In 
particular in Veblen’s thought the elimination of waste is driven by the development of 
technological knowledge. Technology therefore appears to be the fundamental social 
variable that can change habits of thought in favour of the collectivity since it spreads 
the habits oriented to efficiency. As the author remarks the well-being of the 
community is an industrial matter: it “depends on the state of industrial arts” he writes 
(1964 [1919a], p.55). Well-being therefore concretely depends on the “maximum 
production of which the community is capable” (Veblen, 1964 [1919a], p.55); 
however the maximum production is a necessary condition for Veblen for the 
improvement of the well-being of the collectivity but it also needs a particular use, 
control and management which are institutional factors. Since each economic 
development is always a matter of habits and of changes in habits (see Veblen, 1961 
[1898c], p.75), the potential and actual material well-being is always a consequence of 
the effective state of institutions (see Veblen, 2001 [1921], ch.V)78. So social well-
being on the part of workers is an outcome of an institutional trade-off; and as a result 
the prevalence of the institution of ownership leads society towards a particular well-
being – in favour of the “upper classes”- while the prevalence of the institution of 
industry leads towards another – in favour of the “inferior classes”. In Veblen’s view, 
the institution of ownership does not favour social well-being for workers; it just 
assures well-being for a small part of society and the current institution – ownership – 
is a concrete obstacle to the well-being of society as a whole. In order to guarantee 
social well-being there must be an institutional change, or rather Veblen thinks of 
institutional changes that lead to the elimination of the institution of ownership and to 
                                                   
78 The control of the sector of transport of resources, goods, services and people is objectively one of first 
strategic elements for an increase in well-being according to Veblen. More in general, social mobility 
and mobility of resources represent the first step for a process of changing the existing situation (see 
Veblen, 2001 [1921], ch.VI).     
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the setting up of a new order in which capital is managed in favour of the collectivity 
and not for single social classes. So in Veblen’s vision such a new social order is 
implemented by institutional changes the basis of which lie in technological change. 
As Rutherford (1984, p.126) argues – in Veblen’s vision – “new technology 
significantly affects the conditions of livelihood for some portion of the population in 
such a way as to induce new habits of thought and action which run counter to the 
existing institutional norms and vested interest”. According to Bush (1987, p.1087) 
Veblen’s sense of technology must be understood in a broad sense, not only as a 
strictly technical and mechanical matter. As the author stresses when Veblen speaks 
about technological change he is not referring simply to mechanical innovations. In his 
vision the term ‘technological’ is used in a technical-institutional sense; in other words 
technological change is first of all a change that affects “the problem solving 
processes” which then is reflected in “a given state of the arts and sciences” and not 
vice versa. Consequently a mechanical innovation cannot exist if a priori innovation 
of “the problem solving process” does not occur. On this point Bush (1987, p.1087) 
writes “the problem-solving processes of the community generate innovations in the 
ways of bringing material things to account, thereby changing the industrial 
environment in which the community works and this changed environment produces 
further changes in prevalent habits of thought about how to conduct the community’s 
affairs”. In other words, Veblenian institutional change is driven by technological 
change following a precise logical chain: institutional changes lead to technical 
changes which in turn lead to new institutional changes; in particular the first step of 
institutional change is connected to changes in “problem solving processes” and it is a 
matter of a small part of society, identified by Veblen as the technicians; then new 
technology produced by technicians – an expression of an institutional change –  
changes institutions again but differently from the first step, in this last step the whole 
collectivity is affected by the change. The basis of institutional change is the change in 
the “problem solving process”; in fact this change has an instinctual source, being a 
consequence of the instinct of workmanship and idle curiosity, and since Veblen 
attributes these instincts to technicians, then institutional change is driven by 
technicians.          
Technicians technically manage the regular working of the industrial system. The 
regular working of the industrial system does not mean necessarily efficient working. 
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Efficient working means full utilization of capital which is not a matter for 
undertakers. In addition, the peril of micro sabotage is its spread into the whole system 
(see Veblen, 2001 [1921], ch.III) which means sabotage of collective knowledge. 
Consequently through sabotage undertakers control technicians’ knowledge and skills; 
if undertakers – in business matters – use the industrial capital at a level below its full 
capability then they in fact use knowledge at a level below its potential, the effect of 
which is reduction of growth potential and unemployment. Consequently, according to 
Veblen, the strategic control of a single component of the system - given to 
undertakers - determines strong perturbations of the same; on the other hand, the well-
being of society is connected to the regular and efficient working of the industrial 
system which depends on technicians’ realistic possibility of managing the single 
components of the system itself. So Veblen thinks that a society’s possibility of 
development – in terms of collective well-being – depends on technicians 
conscientiously taking over the industrial system following the recognition of their 
social role. The role of technicians is not only addressed to the best technical 
management of the industrial system but also to institutional change thanks to the 
spread of habits oriented to efficiency; the strategic and operative working of the 
industrial system in such a direction should be concretely managed by a complex 
organization of technicians provided they act as technicians of production and not as 
speculators. In this sense Veblen argues that unfortunately his perspective of 
institutional change is not simple since technicians are not immune from business 
habits of thought: the closeness of technicians to undertakers and the achievement of 
large gains for their activity concretely reduces the possibility that technicians will 
voluntarily change the state of things. So an additional condition of institutional inertia 
can be generated by the behaviour of the technicians themselves rather than the leisure 
class. A concrete negative example of such an additional condition of institutional 
inertia is described by Veblen in reference to the actual management of “Federation of 
Organized Trade and Labor Unions”, a union of technicians created in 1881 in 
Pittsburgh79. Describing, among other things, the management of this union (see also 
                                                   
79 It is important to notice that Veblen does not directly deal with the Federation of Organized Trade and 
Labor Unions; he discusses the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.). However in the Italian edition 
of Veblen’s Engineers and the Price System edited by Francesco De Domenico (1969, p.961, footnote 
1) the author clarifies that the A.F.L. was in fact the same organization which was born using the name 
of Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions but then changed its name to the American 
Federation of Labor.    
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Walker, 1977, pp.231-232) Veblen remarks that society lost an opportunity for change 
since the Federation was characterized by speculative conduct towards undertakers. Its 
leadership was entrusted to bargaining technicians rather than to production 
technicians. The organization in fact was a business organization dominated by a 
predatory instinct against undertakers, so its actions were mainly aimed at obtaining 
high gains by defeating employers. It acted exactly like the undertakers since its main 
object was to sell its products at a high price: In other words this organization acted 
precisely to keep technicians’ wages high in the same way as undertakers act to keep 
the prices of their products high. The consequent favouritism of its members went 
against the interests of the community (see Veblen, 2001 [1921], ch.IV). The negative 
experience of the social role of such organizations makes Veblen lay down possible 
lines of conduct for technicians for the correct changing of the institutional order. In 
chapter VI of his The Engineers And the Price System, the author draws up what he 
calls “a memorandum on a practicable soviet of technicians”. In Veblenian thought the 
point of departure of an efficient use of resources is the control of processes of 
production and distribution of goods and services. For this purpose it is necessary to 
set up a national or “central directorate” of technicians – helped by “sub centers and 
local councils” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.89); such a “directorate” would be composed 
of “several thousand technically trained men scattered over the face of the country, in 
one industry and another” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.86). In particular the “directorate” 
takes the form of a “tripartite executive council” composed of three groups of 
engineers with different skills: a) “Resource Engineers” with competences on raw 
materials, b) “Production Engineers” with competences on mechanical equipment and 
industrial processes, and b) the group of engineers with competences on the 
“transportation system” and the “distributive traffic in finished products and services” 
(see Veblen 2001 [1921], pp.89-90). The activity of this “directorate” is made up of 
several tasks; first of all it must implement the preliminary “cadastration of the 
country’s industrial forces” and then a precise classification of the existing industrial 
system based on type and size of “energy, resources, materials, and manpower” 
(Veblen 2001 [1921], p.86). Given such information the “directorate” must then order 
the system on the basis of three particular activities: “productive industry, 
transportation, and distributive traffic” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.89). On the basis of 
such preliminary operations the “directorate” is involved then in drawing up a plan of 
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efficient “administration of industry” at least of “greater primary industries” and of the 
“country’s transportation system” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.88) which must establish: 
 
“the due allocation of resources and a consequent full and reasonable proportioned employment of 
available equipment and man power; [b] the avoidance of waste and duplication of work”; [and c] an 
equitable and sufficient supply of goods and services to consumers” (Veblen 2001 [1921], p.88). 
 
In the above policy of change, the role of economists – named “consulting 
economists” – is not neglected by Veblen. As he remarks “it is also evident that in its 
continued work of planning and advisement the directorate will require the services of 
an appreciable number of consulting economists” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], pp.89-90). 
Finally Veblen gives some indications on the modalities of the take-over by 
technicians. In particular the technicians’ take-over is a result of social conflict brought 
about by technicians via general strikes but after the realisation of two preliminary 
conditions: 
 
“(a) An extensive campaign of inquiry and publicity, such as will bring the underlying population to 
a reasonable understanding of what it is all about; and (b) the working-out of a common 
understanding and a solidarity of sentiment between the technicians and the working force engaged 
in transportation and in the greater underlying industries of the system” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], 
p.103).  
 
The Veblenian “memorandum” places emphasis on the role of technicians in 
institutional change, or the “revolutionary overturn” as it was called by Veblen (2001 
[1921], p.96). However, technicians realistically remain a potentially revolutionary 
class (see Layton, 1962; 1971; Maier, 1970) and not an effectively revolutionary class; 
in other words technicians have the basic instinctual and institutional qualifications 
needed for the change, but the potentiality does not find concrete form because of their 
concomitant closeness to business culture. This point is also remarked by Layton 
(1962, pp.70-71) who suggests that technicians just remain a potentially revolutionary 
class; in his vision Veblen attributes an excessive revolutionary capacity to 
technicians; Layton criticizes Veblen because he was too confidence that the evolutive 
state of the instinct of workmanship and the historical state of  “conditioning of the 
machine process” were at an ideal level for a revolutionary action. On the contrary, in 
Layton the facts thwarted Veblen’s positive vision since technicians in practice 
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maintained a concomitant radical-conservative position in the sense that they did not 
completely reject the business culture, implying that the “conditioning of the machine 
was not complete”. Walker (1977, p.229) adds  “[technicians] are motivated by a 
desire for monetary gain, which leads them to pursue pecuniary principles of 
efficiency [..]. Businessmen are still in authority, but their inability to exercise their 
responsibility competently prevents the attainment of efficiency. This does not offend 
the technicians. Their pecuniary motivations lead them to cooperate willingly with the 
businessmen in limiting the productiveness of the industrial system”. The 
concomitance of radical and conservative traits in technicians are actually present in 
Veblen himself; in fact when he critiques the activity of the “Federation of Organized 
Trade and Labor Unions” he is expressing perplexities on the effective possibilities of 
creating a revolutionary class of technicians.  
Interpreting Veblen’s thought on the revolutionary role of technicians, Edgell 
(2001, p.139) remarks that actually the main problem is not to look at technicians’ real 
capacity to be a revolutionary class but to answer the following question: Was Veblen 
really pervaded by an ideal of a  “society of engineers” (Edgell, 2001, p.139) or by the 
“engineering of society”? (Layton, 1962, pp.70-71). Edgell (2001, p.145) interprets the 
Veblenian view of technicians’ role in a different way. In his interpretation Veblen 
sees technicians as “the best-qualified group to initiate and direct the [necessarily 
institutional] change” rather than as the social class designated to a direct control of 
society: in brief, technicians as masters of change rather than rulers of society. As 
Edgell (2001, p.145) writes, “Veblen consistently argued that what was the best 
interest of the community, was that production should be managed by those 
technically qualified”. So technicians must be seen as masters of “technological 
knowledge” and their positive role in the society is only that of spreading such 
knowledge and not directing society. Veblen apparently seems to think about a 
“society of engineers” but this interpretation is only true if the reading of Veblen is 
limited to the Engineers and the Price System80. A wider reading of Veblen’s writings 
leads to another interpretation. In fact as Bell (1963, p.27) remarks, Engineers and the 
Prices System “can [just] serve as a simplified introduction to his ideas”, so 
interpreting the whole of his thought it is possible to say that Veblen is more interested 
in the “engineering of society”, in other words in the spread of the instinct of 
                                                   
80 Cf. Tilman (1972, 1973, 1988, 1992, 1996) and Stabile (1984, 1986, 1987, 1988) on the debate about 
the consistency/inconsistency of Engineers and the Price System with other writings by Veblen. 
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workmanship rather than in a “society of engineers”. The ways such a spread can 
occur are not clear in Veblen since the main social class delegated by the potentiality 
of action – technicians – is not concretely able to act.   
Finally some authors (see for example Bell, 1963; Layton, 1962, 1972; 
Dorfman, 1973; Hodgson, 1999; Edgell, 2001) argue that the debate about the theory 
of institutional change in terms of society of engineers or engineering of society is in 
fact a debate about Veblen’s utopia. His theory of institutional change managed by 
technicians is in fact unrealistic and therefore utopian. Bell (1963, pp.33-34) for 
example calls Veblen a “technocratic utopian”81. Edgell (2001, p.154) adds: “Veblen’s 
analysis of engineers in EPS and elsewhere is clearly utopian, since it involves a 
withering critique of the existing price system”. In addition he writes “[Veblen] 
developed [his utopia] by conveying the idea of a better society, one that gave free 
reign to the instinct of workmanship, and by speculating on the problem of agency”82.   
 
 
3.3 Income distribution and institutional change: the “limit of tolerance” 
 
In the preceding section the description of Veblen’s theory of institutional change has 
been presented. It has been pointed out that Veblen traces the lines of development of 
institutions for the past, he describes the current condition and then he traces the lines 
for possible new changes making reference to technology as the driving force of this 
change and to technicians as the social class primarily involved. The aim of the 
following section is to present a different perspective of change in which the dynamic 
of income distribution plays an important role and in which the social groups directly 
involved are workers and the leisure class. The investigation into the dynamics of 
income distribution and institutional dynamics calls for some important premises 
elaborated by Veblen. According to the author any institution is cause and effect of 
‘natural’ selection and the process of selection follows the criterion of efficiency. 
Interpreting Veblen it is possible to say that an institution is efficient if it allows the 
“enhanc[ing of] human life on the whole” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.99). Pragmatically 
                                                   
81 For a reconstruction of the debate on  utopia in Veblen see Edgell (2001, pp.151-156). 
82 Edgell (1975, p.268) also argues that the utopian influences in Veblen are due to the contribution of the 
utopian reformer Edward Bellamy (1951 [1888]). 
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the enhancing of human life is a matter of material well-being in Veblen. In the 
Veblenian vision an institution is subject to reform when the well-being of some social 
classes produced by the use of the institution itself is obtained to the systematic and 
intolerable detriment of the well-being of some other classes.   
In addition Veblen elaborates a logic of institutional change according to which 
institutions at time t are the effect of selection of institutions at time t0 and the cause of 
selection of institutions at time t1 since they are “[..] the result of selective and adaptive 
process [and] efficient factors of selection” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.188). On this 
point Bowman (1973, p. xvii) remarks that “social change or evolution according to 
Veblen [is] a product of a complex process in which human thought and behaviour – 
by adapting to a changing social environment – [transforms] the institutional basis for 
later selection”. 
Life in an unfriendly environment in fact requires both an individual adaptation 
to given circumstances and a change of the circumstances themselves; the concomitant 
hypothesis of institutions as cause-effect of natural selection finds its grounds in the 
idea that natural selection - to which Veblen makes reference - has a social rather than 
natural nature. The environmental circumstances are social, and being social they are 
institutional circumstances; consequently adaptation and development is a social 
process not a natural or biological one. As Veblen remarks, institutional change is a 
process of selective adaptation of habits of thought under the stress of the 
circumstances of associated life (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.213; italics added). In this 
way, the hostility of the environment is a human hostility: it is the outcome of human 
action and interrelation. More briefly, environmental hostility is a hostility of 
institutions and it results from the diffusion of particular institutions rather than others. 
On this point Veblen writes:  
 
“For the purpose of my inquiry – an inquiry as to why and how the habits of life and thought of the 
individual come to be modified – for this purpose customs, conventions, and methods of industry are 
no less effective elements in the environment than climate and topography, and these vary 
incontinently” (Veblen, 1899b, p.111). 
 
On institutional change the following quotation is particularly interesting:   
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“The growth and mutations of the institutional fabric are an outcome of the conduct of the individual 
members of the group, since it is out of the experience of the individuals, through the habituation of 
individuals, that institutions arise; and it is in the same experience that these institutions act to direct 
and define the aims and end of conduct” (Veblen, 1961 [1909a], p.243). 
 
From the above quotation it is possible to structure a logic of the concatenation of 
events within the process of institutional change: a) institutional change is first of all 
an outcome of conduct when the same is not supported by any experience; b) 
institutional change forms a new institution when the initial conduct without 
experience becomes routine conduct and therefore when it is supported by experience; 
c) finally the institution formed by the conduct manages the conduct that has formed 
the same institution. Following Jennings and Waller (1994, p.1002) in this way Veblen 
builds a theory of institutional change in terms of “endogenous cumulative causation”; 
consequently a new institution will be born from the previous one and its hereditary 
characters – “usages, customs, conventions [and] preconceptions” (Veblen, 1922 
[1914], p.39; italics added) - (Veblen, 1922 [1914], p.38-39) are transferred by “the 
discipline of habituation” in terms of “tradition, training [and] education” (Veblen, 
1922 [1914], p.38-39) to subsequent new institutions.  In addition Veblen remarks: 
 
“Institutions are products of the past process, are adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore 
never in full accord with the requirements of the present” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.191).  
 
From the above quotation it can be seen that social well-being is always historically 
contextualized. Its historical contextualization does not naturally supply complete 
efficiency to institutions since they have adapted to a different and outdated sense of 
well-being. Then Veblen adds:    
 
“[..] The law of natural selection, as applied to human institutions, gives the axiom: “Whatever is, is 
wrong”. Not that the institutions of to-day are wholly wrong for the purposes of the life of to-day, 
but they are, always and in the nature of things, wrong to some extent. They are the result of a more 
or less inadequate adjustment of the methods of living to a situation which prevailed at some point in 
the past development; and they are therefore wrong by something more than the interval which 
separates the present situation from that of the past” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.207; italics added). 
 
 136
Veblen does not deny efficiency to past institutions – the cumulative process of 
development of institutions in fact would not allow it – but such efficiency is not 
enough for current conditions; so when he says that “whatever is, is wrong” he means 
that the current institutions are efficient to some extent just as they are wrong to some 
other extent. An important consequence is the identification of the individuals that 
judge the extent of what is right or wrong in an institution as regards the current 
necessities. Veblen attributes such judgement to technicians who, however, are not 
completely able to act ‘rightly’, so an alternative could be proposed, i.e. the evaluation 
of the extent of what is right is up to the common man at least due to the simple fact 
that s/he – as the first level of the social hierarchy – immediately perceives possible 
perturbations of the state of well-being as regards the other chains of social hierarchy. 
As Veblen remarks: 
 
“The underlying population is dependent on the working of [the] industrial system for its livelihood; 
and their material interest therefore centers in the output and distribution of consumable goods, not 
in an increasing volume of earnings for the absentee owners. Hence there is a division of interest 
between the business community, who do business for the absentee owners, and the underlying 
population, who work for a living” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.67).  
    
Cummings (1899, pp.437-438) critiques Veblen’s sense of “whatever is, is wrong” 
stressing that it might be better to say “whatever is, is imperfect”. Coherently with his 
critique of Veblen’s theory of institutional inertia (see chapter 1) Cummings remarks 
that whatever is, is not wrong, it is just imperfect because if it were wrong than all 
cumulative process of development would be wrong too. So what is now is right as 
regards what has been until now but it is wrong – or rather it is imperfect – as regards 
what will be from now onwards. The imperfection of current institutions is connected 
to the imperfection of knowledge and experience as regards current conditions; in 
other words in Cummings knowledge and experience are aimed at improving the 
present condition not at destroying it. So the existing protected institutions at a given 
time are the best result of what the society has known from the beginning of evolution 
until now, but they are imperfect as regards what the same society will know from 
now onwards.  
Given the above premises now let see more specifically the matter of dynamics 
of income distribution and institutional dynamics. As it has been said, the social 
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classes involved in such a process are the leisure class and working class and on this 
Veblen differs; in fact in the previous sections it has been shown that institutional 
change originates in technological change, but the technological change is a matter 
prevalently managed inside the firm between undertakers – who oppose technology in 
the case of non profitability – and technicians, who are pushed by their instinct of 
workmanship to find new production systems, new products, etc. So institutional 
change is induced by conflict inside the firm although Veblen does not directly take 
the state of income distribution and its dynamic in this process into consideration. 
However it is important to notice that Veblen does not neglect the role of workers in 
institutional change. As also stressed by Walker (1977, p.230) in Veblen’s vision, 
machine discipline has a fundamental role in institutional change. In particular, 
machine discipline is the cause or revolutionary capacity of workers who – from a 
state of passivity and docility – modify their conception of institutions by a critical 
valuation of them. As Walker writes “[according to Veblen] participation of workers 
[in mechanical operations] induces them by occupational conditioning to think in the 
impersonal terms of causal sequences, and leads them to adopt scientific impersonality 
and mechanistic criteria in evaluating propositions. [Unlike technicians] workers begin 
to question the traditional metaphysical basis of justification of economics institutions. 
They become critical of specific economic and social arrangements, such as the 
distribution of income, the existence of privileged classes, the economic and legal 
domination of businessmen, thrift and even the family” (Walker, 1977, pp.230-231). 
More specifically, in chapter 9 of The Theory of Business Enterprise Veblen traces the 
lines for institutional change driven by workers; there are two main types of conduct: 
a) the conduct of workers, and b) the conduct of the labour union.  
a) The conduct of workers. As it has often been written, workers work in strict 
contact with technicians and with the mechanical process; the social relationship that 
evolves between workers and technicians and the operative relationship that involves 
workers with machines has impacts on workers’ habits of thought. In fact technicians 
and machines act following the logic of the cause-effect relation that inevitably affects 
workers’ thoughts and behaviour. Such an influence does not preclude workers’ free 
will; on the contrary, matter of fact logic is seen as producing free will in workers in 
the sense that workers are trained to a critical scrutiny of the existing institutional 
order. In addition Veblen does not agree with the general idea that the contact of 
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workers with mechanical work lowers the worker’s intelligence; he sees this idea as 
too radical a vision of the facts. As remarked by the author, the addiction to 
mechanical work lowers the intelligence in some respects but in other respects this 
addiction raises worker’s intelligence. More specifically, mechanization reduces the 
intelligence for those tasks that were the responsibility of workers before the advent of 
mechanization, but it increases intelligence in the tasks for which mechanization has 
been introduced. The consequence of the process described produces a mental training 
of worker’s habits of thought which oppose the existing institutions; consequently 
conflicts between workers and undertakers can occur in similar ways as conflicts 
between technicians and undertakers. If the result of such conflict favours workers 
then new technology is introduced into the system and if new technology is introduced 
then new institutions substitute the preceding ones. In addition and apart from the 
mental training to which workers are induced there is also a phenomenon of social 
mobility imposed by mechanization which assumes a particular relevance in a process 
of institutional change driven by workers. Veblen stresses that the labour force is in 
fact movable, interchangeable, and distributable in an impersonal manner like the parts 
of a mechanical system. In a context of strong social mobility it is not to the worker’s 
advantage to have property and more specifically, real property. In fact a profitable 
investment in real property calls for continuous upkeep and improvements, but 
workers are not able to manage such investments because of the mobility imposed by 
the industrial system and because of the negligible or nil level of personal savings; not 
only are the savings insufficient for a profitable investment but the material 
impossibility of managing the investment discourages any savings. The issue of social 
mobility and its impact on property plays an important role in Veblen in the process of 
institutional change driven by workers. The consequence of social mobility - imposed 
by mechanization - is in fact a particular moral effect: i.e. workers lose the sense of 
ownership as a natural right and as a necessary source of well-being; Consequently if 
ownership loses its ethical recognition then the existing institutional order loses its 
validity and institutional changes are possible; also in this case the institutional order 
changes in response to changes in habits of thought.                    
b) The conduct of the labour union. Apart from the current negative 
management of the labour unions of his times Veblen continued to attribute an active 
role in the process of institutional change to the labour unions. As remarked by him, it 
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is no accident that the real development of the labour union took place in 
concomitance with the evolution of mechanization. The author argues that the “spirit” 
of the labour union is to beat the canons of ownership, of business aims and free 
contacts – with a particular mention to the labour contract and to the ‘private’ 
management of workers on the part of undertakers – when they are in contrast with the 
living conditions imposed on workers. Veblen stresses that when a given order is 
intolerable for the conditions of workers then the labour union starts its fight to modify 
the institutional order and when the conflict is in favour of labour unions then a new 
institutional order can arise; this new order can be more or less compatible with the 
institution of ownership and in the extreme case of a complete removal of the right of 
ownership, it can assume the form of a socialist or anarchic society. However, such a 
profound change for a wider spread of mechanical logic to all social classes which 
cannot have concrete realization in cases where large parts of social classes are 
excluded from the influence of mechanical logic. Hence, and according to Tilman 
(2003, p.xvi; italics added), the institution of industry in Veblen “has an emancipatory 
impact on the psyche of industrial workers which turns them against social convention 
and presumably in favour of socialism”. Some of the literature does not attach great 
importance to the Veblenian hypothesis of an active role of workers in institutional 
change. O’Hara for example remarks that “unlike Marx Veblen was not convinced of 
the endogenous movement toward progress through the underlying classes challenging 
the control of economic resources by the vested interests” (O’Hara, 2000, p.68). This 
belief was probably just motivated by the institutional context in which Veblen writes 
which was not in fact ready for a change induced by workers because:    
“The underlying population is still very credulous about anything that is said or done in the name of 
Business, and there need be no apprehension of a mutinous outbreak, just yet” (Veblen 2001 [1921], 
p.70).    
 
c) Institutional changes driven by changes in the dynamic of income distribution.  It 
has been said above that in Veblenian thought conflict has a revolutionary aim in the 
sense that the existing social order and the order of ownership ‘rights’ could undergo a 
radical change driven by socialistic or anarchic movements. In view of the 
interpretation proposed here, it is suggested that institutional change is a change of 
habits of thought which aim is a ‘fair’ income distribution. In the interpretation 
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proposed here the revolutionary aim of the conflict may not develop if the State replies 
to the conflict by favouring the underlying population. In Veblen the conflict seems to 
produce radical changes in the social order since:    
“It seldom happens, if at all, that the government of a civilized nation will persist in a course of 
action detrimental or not ostensibly subservient to the interests of the more conspicuous body of 
the community's business men” (Veblen, 1904, p.287). 
 
But it will be argued that a policy in support of the popular claim favours the kept 
classes since they can maintain the existing social order. In particular, as will be 
shown, institutional change ultimately derives from the leisure class path of 
consumption. The following assumptions are in order:  
a) the leisure class is interested in competitive and ostentatious consumption. 
The source of its income is financial rent driven by the money market and by financial 
market (see §§ 2.1 and 2.2.1); 
b) firms are interested in obtaining money profits, which depends on the 
increase of prices via reduction of production (see §§ 1.4 and 2.2.2); 
c) workers react to a fall in wages and the unemployed to the state of 
unemployment via social conflict. Moreover, the underlying population is composed 
of both employed and unemployed workers. The latter are assumed to receive 
unemployment benefits via the real aids granted by “charity organizations” (see 
Veblen, 1904, ch.10)83. It will be argued that the social conflict will be generated both 
under conditions of full employment and under conditions of unemployment. In both 
the cases conflict can be brought into operation before or after the increase in rent and 
mainly on non-purely-rational bases84. In addition, note that Veblenian social conflict 
                                                   
83 Note the role of the charity organizations played a significant role during the 1800s. Historically charity 
organizations worked in the Unites States in the form of philanthropic institutions with the aim of  
supporting the poor, a large part of the community, and also the unemployed (see Barbetta and Maggio, 
2002). In the description of the traits of the leisure class Veblen himself makes reference to the 
philanthropic behaviour of members of  the leisure class. The consequence is that the leisure class – 
even if the same reasoning can be followed for the undertaking class (see Veblen, 1970 [1904], pp.69-
70) – is not extraneous to completely unselfish solidaristic behaviour. It is not easy for Veblen to justify 
the leisure class’s habit and proclivity to charity. In fact he refers to “alien motives” or as permanent 
“residue[s]” of a non predatory culture – “archaic traits” – that is to say “residues” that the canons of  
the leisure class are not able to crush (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], p.333-335). 
84 The distinction between full employment or unemployment is not incidental. In fact it has been seen in 
section 2.5 how rent can have positive or negative effects on production and employment. In particular 
it has been seen that when the system works in a condition of unemployment the increase of rent 
determines an increase in employment; so it could be argued that the increase of rent should not 
produce social discontent. In the course of our examination, it will be explained that – by the rereading 
of Veblen’s works – it is possible to assume that the unemployed – but the same applies to workers – do 
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presupposes cohesion amongst workers as well as cohesion amongst the unemployed; 
this in fact is a sufficient condition to avoid free-riding behaviours. In fact as Veblen 
remarks for social conflict to be in operation and potentially successful “two main 
lines of subsidiary preparation” are to be considered: “(a) an extensive campaign of 
inquiry and publicity […]; and (b) the working-out of a common understanding and a 
solidarity of sentiment between the technicians and the working force”  (Veblen, 2001 
[1921], p.103)85.   
The argument runs as follows. The individual members of the leisure class are 
involved in processes of competitive consumption. This means that individual A aims 
at obtaining a level of consumption higher than the level of consumption of individual 
B belonging to the same social group. It is worth noting that the leisure class as a 
whole is interested in preserving the existing social order and that this aim can be 
achieved via a level of conspicuous consumption consistent with no reaction on the 
part of workers and the unemployed, i.e. a level of wage and unemployment benefits 
which guarantee at least the level of consumption accepted by workers and 
unemployed. Otherwise, the individuals belonging to the leisure class want – on the 
microeconomic plane – to continuously increase their consumption. This mechanism 
produces the following effects. Since consumption on the part of the leisure class is 
guaranteed by financial rents, it acts in the monetary market by increasing the interest 
rate and in the financial market by purchasing large parcels of stocks and bonds; the 
financing cost for firms increases since firms have to pay more interest and dividends 
to the leisure class; so the tendency to increase consumption, that is to say waste, 
generates a tendency to increase financial costs, and therefore financial rent. Since  
financing costs are increasing, firms react by raising prices in order not to lose profits, 
or – if they cannot exploit this strategy due to a lack of demand – to reduce 
investments. Price increases determine a reduction of real wages, and the reduction of 
investments determines a drop in output; the reduction of output in turn produces 
                                                                                                                                   
not know, and cannot know, the effects of an increase of rent on employment; at the same time the 
unemployed – and workers also – act on irrational bases so they may enter into conflict anticipating and 
neutralizing the Malthusian effect (§ 2.5). Moreover it will also be explained how in Veblen the 
neutralization of the Malthusian effect does not invalidate the possibility of economic growth.  
85 In addition since the underlying population is naturally solidaristic the possible coordination between 
workers and unemployed can be admitted; so it is reasonable to think that the social conflict starts at 
the same time from workers and the unemployed.  
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negative effects since: a) it again increases prices and reduces real wages and b) it 
again reduces employment.   
An increase in waste therefore pushes the system to work with a reduction of 
real wages; such a reduction determines a negative gap between the real wage and the 
exogenous subsistence wage; the higher the waste, the higher this gap. If the 
undertakers can neutralize the increase of financing costs via the increase in prices or 
new capitalization then the rents/profits rate can be maintained unchanged86; on the 
other hand the increase in prices or disinvestments enlarge the gap between rents and 
wages. A question may now arise: what – if any – is the limit to the growth of the 
rents/wages ratio? Rereading Veblen it is possible to say that the rents/wages ratio can 
increase until workers and the unemployed can no longer tolerate such growth. In 
other words the increase of rents/wages rate has a limit of endurance for workers and 
the unemployed and Veblen calls this limit the “limit of tolerance” (Veblen 2001 
[1921], p.12). 
Veblen generally refers to the limit of tolerance to indicate a given condition of 
endurance of the state of things beyond which popular discontent emerges. As he 
writes:   
 
“Social structure changes, develops, adapts itself to an altered situation, only through a change in the 
habits of thought. [The] evolution of society is substantially a process of mental adaptation on the 
part of individuals under the stress of circumstances which will no longer tolerate habits of thought 
formed under and conforming to a different set of circumstances in the past” (Veblen, 1975 [1899a], 
p.192). 
 
More specifically, the limit of tolerance is affected by employment conditions and by 
whether the subsistence wage received is congruous with the “necessities of life” 
(Veblen 2001 [1921], p.12). As Veblen remarks:   
 
“It is more particularly in times of popular distress [..] when the current output of goods is not nearly 
sufficient to cover the consumptive needs of the community, that considerations of business strategy 
calls for a wise unemployment of equipment and man power is the most obvious cause of popular 
distress” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.71; italics added).  
 
                                                   
86 See section 2.2.2 which explains how capitalization produces profits in Veblen. 
 143
When the workers’ necessities of life are covered by the subsistence wage, i.e. when 
production is maintained at a high level that also assures employment, then no popular 
distress is generated. On the other hand, when the subsistence wage is lower than the 
necessities of life, i.e. when production is maintained at a low level that also 
determines unemployment, then “popular distress” or “popular irritation” (Veblen, 
2001 [1921], p.66) arises. Popular distress – both for workers and the unemployed – is 
therefore a consequence of high prices or disinvestments which in turn is a 
consequence of the increase of financial rents, in view of the causal links existing 
between rent increases, disinvestments (or increase in prices) and low wages and 
unemployment. Popular discontent as regards the rent/wage rate takes various forms 
and its intensity depends on the proximity of this distress to a limit of tolerance. So in 
a given institutional context a distribution of income in favour of the kept classes is 
subject to a limit of tolerance for workers and unemployed.  
Although Veblen does not directly address the question - arguing that the 
“limit of tolerance [is] a hazardous topic of speculation” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.76) -  
the issue of the determinants of the limit of tolerance should be subject to a more 
detailed inquiry. It is reasonable to think that the limit of tolerance is measured 
differently for workers and unemployed. With reference to workers their own limit of 
tolerance is measured in terms of maximum difference tolerated between the real wage 
received and the subsistence wage desired, assuming this limit as exogenous data87; at 
the same time the limit of tolerance for the unemployed is measured in terms of 
intensity of unemployment produced by reduction of output, and also this limit is 
considered here – for the sake of simplicity – as exogenous data. When the limit of 
tolerance has been reached the next question is the investigation of the consequences 
deriving from it. In other words, the question is: what happens when the material 
conditions of the underlying population reaches the limit of tolerance? Rereading 
Veblen it is possible to argue that when the limit of tolerance is reached, social conflict 
becomes highly probable. As Veblen writes:    
 
                                                   
87 It is interesting to note that this interpretation appears to be in line also with Keynes’s view of social 
conflict. In Keynes social conflict is generated when wages are reduced to “an extreme degree”. As 
Keynes writes: "it would be impracticable to resist every reduction of real wages, due to a change in 
the purchasing-power of money which affects all workers alike; and in fact reductions of real wages 
arising in this way are not as a rule resisted unless they proceed to an extreme degree” and the 
reduction in wages disturbs political confidence, by causing popular discontent" (Keynes, 1973 
[1936b], p.264).  
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“Something in the nature of riotous discontent and factional disorder is perhaps to be looked for in 
the near future in this country, and there may even be some rash gesture of revolt on the part of ill-
advised malcontents. Circumstances would seem to favor something of the kind. It is conservatively 
estimated that there is already a season of privation and uncertainty in prospect for the underlying 
population, which could be averted only at the cost of some substantial interference with the vested 
rights of the country's business men, - which should seem a highly improbable alternative, in view of 
that spirit of filial piety with which the public officials guard the prerogatives of business as usual” 
(Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.64; italics added). 
 
When the limit of tolerance is reached a problem arises: on what grounds does the 
underlying population decide to start the conflict? Theoretically there are two 
possibilities: a) the conflict is brought into operation via economic grounds, in other 
words on rational grounds, or b) the conflict is started via moral grounds - the 
“unreasoning sentiment” (Veblen, 1904, p.288) - in other words on irrational grounds. 
In Veblen the conflict has no economic basis but only a moral one and this occurs for 
two main reasons. First, the idea of the rationality of conflict presupposes that agents 
are able to calculate the present costs and, above, all, the expected benefits. In a 
context of uncertainty, as Veblen considers a capitalist economy, this calculus is 
impossible. Second, as argued above (see §§ 1.1 and 1.2), agents behave according to 
instincts, so that the possibility of a rational action is to be excluded on the 
methodological plane. As pointed out by Veblen, the outcome of social conflict - i.e. 
mainly involving changes in the formal laws and the Constitution (particularly, "the 
clause which specially safeguards the security [of absentee ownership]" - appears to be 
uncertain, since it is not known "if and when” this change will occur (Veblen, 1921, 
p.99, italics added). Even though the outcome of conflict is uncertain, its costs are 
known. In particular the certain cost of the conflict for workers is the loss of wages 
while the certain cost for the unemployed is the loss of subsistence guaranteed by 
charity organizations. Since costs are known but the benefits are uncertain, workers 
and the unemployed cannot act on economic grounds; the consequence is that their 
action is not rational. Veblen assumes that – in line with his theory of economic 
behaviour alternative to the neoclassical vision (§§ 1.1 and 1.2) – the dimension of 
conflict therefore cannot be economic but moral.   
More specifically in the moral dimension workers and the unemployed are hit 
by a sentiment by which they judge the existing institution as ‘unjust’ as regards a 
decent livelihood which in Veblen’s words becomes a “universal, and universally 
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laudable, ambition of all who have reached years of discretion” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], 
p.100). On this point he writes:  
 
“There has lately been some irritation and faultfinding with what is called “profiteering” and there 
may be more or less uneasy discontent with what is felt to be an unduly disproportionate inequality 
in the present distribution of income” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], pp.99-100; italics added).    
 
Moreover, Veblen argues that the moral dimension of the limit of tolerance is shown 
when workers perceive that they have “nothing to lose” even if their wages are not nil, 
just as the unemployed perceive that they have nothing to lose even if their aid is not 
nil. This is to say that social conflict is not a purely rational reaction, but involves an 
ethical consideration on the criteria underlying the existing income distribution. As 
Veblen writes in his “The Engineers and Price System”:  
 
“The underlying population would have anything to lose by such an overturn of the established order 
as would cancel the vested rights of privilege and property” (Veblen, 2001 [1921], p.61; italics 
added).  
 
In addition in his “The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Followers” (1906) 
Veblen writes: 
 
“There is [..] not even a direct causal connection between the material forces in the case and the 
choice of a given interested line of conduct. The attitude of the interested party does not result from 
the material forces so immediately as to place it within the relation of direct cause as effect, nor even 
with such a degree of intimacy as to admit of its being classed as a tropismatic, or even instinctive, 
response to the impact of the material force in question. The sequence of reflection, and the 
consequent choice of sides to a quarrel, run entirely alongside of the range of material facts 
concerned” (Veblen, 1906b, p.582-583; italics added). 
 
The above passage is useful in clarifying the moral dimension of the limit of tolerance. 
In fact rereading the above passage it is possible to say that material matters – such as 
the decreasing of the real wage and the increase in unemployment – quantify the limit 
of tolerance but they do not explain its origin which is moral and not economic. If the 
moral dimension of the limit of tolerance is precisely the dimension by which the 
propensity to conflict is ruled, then a problem left unclarified by Veblen is the moral 
reasons why workers and the unemployed might start a conflict; in other words the 
 146
moral logic of social conflicts is not clear in Veblen. Social philosophy has historically 
divided the reasons for social conflicts with three categories, honour, glory and 
prestige. These categories – according to Honneth (1992, p.189) – are connected to the 
objective distribution of life opportunities amongst members of the collectivity and the 
moral sentiments or the moral stress are not taken into consideration. In other words 
the above categories in fact have an economic basis since they reflect losses connected 
to the acquired ‘rights’ but they not reflect the moral sentiment and the moral stress of 
the loss suffered. In Honneth’s work the main moral sentiment or moral stress that 
pushes a social group to clash with other groups is the sentiment of stress that origins 
from non-recognition and non-appreciation. In other words given a collectivity 
composed of two groups (A and B), when the effects of the actions of group A lead A 
to remove recognition and appreciation from B, then this underestimation determines 
stress in B. Accordingly, each social group is constantly fighting to obtain social 
esteem from others; in brief – according to Honneth – the object of social conflict is 
not mainly economic, for example the distribution of resources – but mainly non 
economic and it consists of social esteem as a value in itself. Even if Honneth is not a 
scholar of Veblen his work can help us in rereading Veblen on the moral dimension of 
the limit of tolerance. Honneth in fact is a scholar of the Hegelian philosophy on social 
conflict and he develops his theory through a rereading of Hegel (see Fabrizio, 2006) 
and Veblen probably builds his theory of conflict having in mind the Hegelian theory. 
As Veblen writes:   
 
“The struggle which constitutes the method of [..] evolution is, in the Hegelian system proper, the 
struggle of the spirit for self-realization” (Veblen, 1906b, p.580).   
  
Recognition and appreciation can be seen as conventional factors – historically 
contextualized – by which each social class is identified from others. So recognition 
and appreciation is first of all a matter of habits of thought; as a  consequence, social 
esteem is primarily a question of habits of thought. At the same time Veblen 
emphasises the fact that the social esteem of his times is based on wealth owned: the 
greater the wealth, the higher the esteem. When the wealth of a social group suffers a 
reduction then the group itself is damaged in its recognition and appreciation; so the 
consequence of a reduction in wealth determined by one social class automatically 
highlights the underestimation of another one. The outrage of the class involved in a 
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process of profiteering to the  detriment of others is not so much in the removal of the 
wealth as such, but in the implicit and unexpressed intent to underestimate other 
classes, in other words in the intent to remove esteem from others. In these terms 
conflicts do not find directly originate in the struggle for existence but in the struggle 
for recognition, and therefore in the struggle for esteem. If a social class does not 
‘deserve’ to be recognized and appreciated, so if the social class A conventionally - for 
a matter of habits of thought - does not attribute esteem to another one (B) then no 
moral impediment can stop the predatory behaviour of A on B. In other words, because 
of habits of thought of the leisure class the underlying population is an unworthy class 
(see ch.1) so the underlying population or the unemployed do not deserve esteem; so 
members of the leisure class do not attribute a worthy role to the underlying 
population and if the underlying population is an unworthy class then it does not 
deserve recognition and appreciation. Note that it is reasonable to think that in Veblen 
social conflict is not driven by envy for two main reasons: a) Veblen attributes the 
sentiment of envy to the leisure class, not to workers or the unemployed, b) it is 
reasonable to think that if envy were the source of social conflict than the Veblenian 
idea of a coexistence of different habits of thought would disappear and all human 
behaviour would be motivated by predation. An immediate way of underestimating or 
intensifying the underestimation of the underlying population is to reduce its source of 
income; the consequence is that the variation in favour of the leisure class of the rents-
wages rate becomes the evidence of the implicit intent of the kept classes to 
underestimate the underlying population. The limit of tolerance is reached when the 
divergence between rent and wages is perceived by the underlying population as 
intolerable evidence of the process of underestimation perpetrated by the leisure class. 
The perception of the intolerable action of underestimating by the leisure class is a 
cultural matter; so the limit of tolerance is reached when the underlying population 
develops a group consciousness of its own sentiment of recognition and appreciation 
and on the intolerable action of its annihilation committed by the leisure class.  As 
Veblen writes: 
 
“The principles and practise of the distribution of wealth vary with [..] the [..] cultural changes [..]; 
but it is probably safe to assume that [..] the consensus of habitual opinion as to what is right and 
good in the distribution of product  […] have always been such as to give one person or class 
something of a settled preference above another (Veblen 1908b, p.113, italics added). Principles 
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(habits of thought) countenancing some forms of class or personal preference in the distribution of 
income are to be found incorporated in the moral code of all known civilizations and embodied in 
some form of institution” (Veblen, 1908, pp.112-113, italics added). 
 
The final point of investigation on the limit of tolerance and social conflict is about the 
effects of the conflict generated. More specifically several effects can occur which can 
be classified into: a) effects on the institutional plane; b) effects on the macroeconomic 
equilibrium. 
Let us see the effects on the institutional plane. When the limit of tolerance 
has been reached the existing income distribution is recognized as ‘unfair’. The 
recognition of the income distribution as ‘unfair’ requires a change in the habit of 
thought; so the underlying population starts to think in critical terms about the existing 
state of things and in particular about the existing order of income distribution. 
Passivity and docility of thought of the underlying population is replaced by a critical 
reasoning similar to the matter of fact logic based on the following logic chain: since 
the consequence of the existing distributive income is equal to the underestimation of 
the underlying population then the cause – that is to say the existing distributive order 
– needs change.  
If the underlying population perceives the income distribution as ‘unfair’, then 
it perceives the habits of thought of the leisure class as a negative value, but if it 
perceives the habits of thought of the leisure class as a negative value then it accepts 
workmanship as a value in itself. However even if the underlying population 
conceives the habits of thought of the leisure class as negative values and 
workmanship as a value this does not mean that the worker’s productivity necessarily 
increases (cf. Walker, 1977). This detail is useful in pointing out that on the 
macroeconomic plane, economic growth is not a simple consequence of the 
acquisition of a habit of thought88.  
On the macroeconomic plane in fact, the behaviour of the State plays a 
fundamental role in economic growth and the maintenance of the existing institutional 
                                                   
88 If we wanted to reread the Walker’s interpretation (see above) we should reasonably say that now 
workmanship rules the behaviour of members of the underlying population just as workmanship affects 
the behaviour of technicians, and since workmanship is the attitude to  efficiency, to production and to 
the accumulation of knowledge for production, then it is reasonable to think that conflict generated by 
an ‘unfair’ income distribution leads the system towards a path of economic growth since the under 
utilization of capital is now conceived as waste and workers act for the full utilization of the capital 
which in turn increases the level of employment. 
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order. In fact if the State reacts to the social conflict by repressing it then popular 
discontent can reasonably be expected to rise; the harsher the repression, the greater 
the likelihood of institutional change. Note that a repressive action of social conflict is 
counterproductive for the leisure class. In fact if the leisure class opposes a fairer 
income distribution, so if it continually enlarges the gap between rent and wages 
without resorting to policies of re-equilibrium of incomes then it is reasonable to think 
that the underlying population can be pushed towards conflictual actions. On the other 
hand, the taxation of rents produces a double positive effect: a) one in favour of the 
leisure class although not directly demanded by it and b) a one in favour of the 
underlying population. In other words the collectivity as a whole would obtain benefits 
if a policy of taxation of rents were used by the State. Let us see why: Starting from a 
condition of unemployment, the increase in wages – derived from reduction of rents 
via their taxation – increases total demand. Businessmen are likely to react via the 
reduction of the degree of under-utilization of capital and, hence, increasing labour 
demand. Since more capital and more labour are now employed, the aggregate output 
increases as does the rate of growth. Therefore, social conflict – if it is successful – is 
an effective means of increasing employment and the rate of growth89. At the same 
time the underlying population has no reason to oppose the existing social order since 
wages and employment increase. The leisure class can therefore continue to be the 
‘primary’ social class and the existing institutional order can be guaranteed. In 
conclusion it is possible to note that a distributive dynamic in favour of the leisure 
class tends to produce effects contrary to it if no policy of re-equilibrium of income 
exists. Note that starting from a state of unemployment, an increase in rent at any rate 
produces – thanks to the Malthusian element in Veblen – production and employment 
(see § 2.5) but, at the same time, it determines institutional change. On the other hand, 
if the income distribution is ‘fairer’, production and employment increase but 
institutions may be maintained over time. Finally, note that in a condition of full 
employment an increase in rent only produces negative effects on the institutional and 
economic plane. In fact if rent increases, prices increase and real wages decrease: so 
conflict starts; if rents are taxed then wages increase; when wages increase demand 
increases too but given the condition of full employment only prices can increase 
                                                   
89 Note that if wages increase undertakers may react by dismissing workers. If undertakers react with 
dismissals, then production falls and prices increase; the consequences are that unemployment increases 
and real wages decrease. Since rents are increasing, – due to the Malthusian element (see § 2.5) – 
demand may not suffer decreases but the conflict does not stop.  
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again and a process of inflation is generated. However, if rents are not taxed, conflict 
is not stopped and the effect is institutional change combined with inflation.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The “ironic structure in Veblen’s writings” is widely recognized (Cassano, 2005), and 
this is one of the main problems in the interpretation of his thought. In recent times 
there has been a renewed interest in Veblen’s economics, and this work falls within 
this line of research. Its main purpose is to focus on Veblen’s theory of income 
distribution, economic growth and institutional change, in the attempt to furnish an 
organic description and interpretation of his works. In particular, various related topics 
have been discussed in the previous chapters: employment, income distribution, 
economic growth and institutional change. These topics have been studied within an 
environmental context featuring conflicts originating from the struggle between 
instincts and habits of thought and intensified by the predominance of a money 
culture. We have first of all tried to bring order to the Veblenian theories of instincts 
and institutions regrouping them as typical traits of the Veblenian social classes: 
leisure class, undertakers, technicians and workers. Predation vs. workmanship and 
ownership vs. industry have been seen as sources of incompatibility and conflict 
between the aims and actions of social classes. Employment, production and 
development are thus the outcome of conflicts between incompatible instincts and 
institutions. This certainly confers originality on Veblen’s thought since he tries to find 
the origins of economic matters in non economic matters. So employment, production 
and development do not have an economic origin but an institutional one. Availability 
of resources, productivity of inputs, prices, demand, employment etc, are not the 
substance of economic choices and actions but the effects of human proclivities. 
‘Good’ proclivities – workmanship, idle curiosity and parental bent – can therefore 
support the economy and ‘bad’ proclivities can depress it. Starting from such a global 
vision of Veblen and his thought, the work has then tried to show a possible 
reconstruction and reinterpretation of Veblen’s view of the process of generating 
unemployment. It has been shown that the level of employment is the result of internal 
conflict of firm, or rather as the result of conflict between undertakers and technicians. 
undertakers – due to a predatory instinct - want to reduce production in order to keep 
prices high and obtain high monetary profits, while technicians – due to an instinct of 
workmanship – want to keep production high. In fact employment is a function of the 
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degree of utilization of capital, which is reduced if the undertakers’ profit aim 
overcomes the technicians’ production aim.  Moreover, given the context of credit 
economy and an economy ruled by  competitive consumption, the leisure class 
continuously pursues increases in financial rent by increasing interest rates and buying 
stocks and bonds. This can generate two effects: a) when financial rent increases the 
leisure class increases its demand for goods; this in turns generates an increase in 
investments, production and employment (Malthusian element of Veblen); b) at the 
same time financial rent is a financing costs for firms anyway and when full 
employment is reached, there is an additional increase in rent, reduced profits, 
increased prices, reduced real wages. The reduction of profits combined with the 
reduction of the real wage determines a reduction in investment, production and 
employment; investments in fact are affected negatively by the high costs of financing 
and by the negative expectations on sales. This kind of unemployment has been called 
unemployment from external conflict, since it derives from the conflict in the 
distribution of income between social classes. Finally the rereading proposed here has 
also suggested the idea that institutional change is driven by the dynamics of income 
distribution. The key variable is the limit of tolerance of workers and of the 
unemployed concerning their real wage level and state of unemployment. Both the 
workers and the unemployed can therefore suffer the state of a distribution of income 
by the leisure class when this reduces the real wage and employment; when the limit is 
reached, social conflict occurs. In addition it has been shown that the grounds for 
social conflict are moral and not economic in Veblen since the economic basis of the 
conflict calls for a rational calculus on expected benefits and costs of conflict which 
the Veblenian agent in fact is not able to make. Moreover social conflict, in turn, 
affects habits of thought, in the sense that workers and the unemployed internalise 
critical attitudes towards the existing social order and perceive waste as a non value 
(and, by contrast, efficiency as a value). Moreover, the social conflict not only 
determines institutional change but also economic growth. In fact social conflict 
pushes the system to distribute income more equally. In other words social conflict 
determines an increase in real wages; when real wages increase total demand increases 
and undertakers are more inclined to increase the degree of utilization of capital by 
employing more workers.  
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